G Parthasarathy

When the foreign ministers of 10 member-countries of ASEAN commenced their meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on July 9, no one expected to see the differences among the member-states on how to deal with China’s blatantly aggressive behaviour on its territorial claims in the South China Sea, leading to the first-ever breakdown in such a conference in the past 45 years. There was the usual consensus on such issues as economic integration, political and security cooperation, tensions over the North Korean nuclear programme and the ASEAN Declaration of Southeast Asia as a nuclear weapons-free zone. Moreover, when Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen spoke at the conference, he urged the need for ASEAN unity in dealing with the most pressing security issue, evoking serious concern in the region — the growing stridency and assertiveness of China on its territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Reports from Phnom Penh indicate that after Prime Minister Hun Sen’s speech, the Chinese approached Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Nam Hong and made it clear that China objected to the inclusion of any reference to differences on the South China Sea in the conference’s joint declaration. As recipients of massive Chinese economic assistance, the Cambodians have generally toed the Chinese line on regional issues and in the past even listened to Chinese advice that efforts should be made to block Indian participation in the East Asia Summit. When the tensions in the South China Sea were under discussion, Cambodia’s Foreign Minister Hor Nam Hong refused to include any reference to the issue in the joint communique of the conference. With Chinese maritime vessels positioned astride the Scarborough Shoal located barely 100 kilometres from its soil and 1800 kilometres away from mainland China, and China threatening to send its vessels with naval escorts to areas it claimed, the Philippines vehemently objected to the stand of the hosts, Cambodia. Other countries like Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei, facing similar Chinese claims, were taken aback. When the Cambodians refused to budge, the Philippines Foreign Minister packed his bags and headed home.

It took some skilful diplomacy by Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa to salvage the situation. He worked with his colleagues to get Cambodia to agree to a six-point declaration which called for “full respect for the universally recognised principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)”. Within hours of issue of this Declaration of Principles by ASEAN, China reasserted its sovereignty over the entire South China Sea and all the islands in the region. China, of course, has a unique and self-serving interpretation of the UNCLOS. It holds that the UNCLOS is “not an international treaty that settles disputes between sovereign states, nor can it be used as a reference for settling such disputes”. States having differences on maritime boundaries across the world, however, abide by the principles enunciated in the UNCLOS, for determining maritime boundaries, where there are differences.

China’s aggressive diplomacy in Phnom Penh has been accompanied by assertive military posturing in recent weeks, all across its maritime boundaries, in both the South China and East China Seas. On June 28, China began combat patrols in waters around the disputed groups of islands in the South China Sea. The move was described by its Defence Ministry as undertaken to protect “national sovereignty” in its territorial waters. It was said to manifest its “determination” to “defend our territorial waters” and to “protect our maritime rights”. Around the same time, the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) announced that nine new offshore blocks in the South China Sea, all in disputed waters with Vietnam, were open for oil exploration. This, after having warned India not to explore in the blocks allocated to it by Vietnam in an area it had been involved in exploration activity since 1988. The disputed blocks cover an area of 160,000 square kilometres, with some blocks located barely 80 miles from Vietnam’s coast and well within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Interestingly, in recent days, Vietnamese academics have drawn attention to Chinese maps and documents between the 18th and early 20th centuries that clearly demonstrate that China’s historical claims to sovereignty have never extended beyond its Hainan Island and did not even include the Paracel and Spratly Islands, leave alone the entire South China Sea.

China’s assertiveness is growing not only in the South China Sea, where it has set up a new Prefecture in Sansha in its Southern Hainan Island. Sansha has been designated as the centre for enforcing Chinese claims across the South China Sea and empowered to administer some 200 offshore islets. Similar growing assertiveness has characterised Chinese behaviour in the East China Sea also on issues like its territorial claims on the Senkaku Islands. China appears confident that with its growing military strength and economic influence, it can create splits in ASEAN and prevent the emergence of a unified ASEAN approach to deal with its territorial ambitions. China is today ASEAN’s largest trading partner with the two-way trade touching $300 billion in 2011 (against an expected $ 80 billion in bilateral trade between India and ASEAN in 2012).

In recent years, China has overtaken Japan as the largest contributor of economic assistance to ASEAN. Chinese FDI has also grown substantially in Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Myanmar and Cambodia. The Chinese are evidently calculating that with Myanmar, which like Cambodia is heavily dependent on Chinese assistance and investment, soon set to assume the chairmanship of ASEAN, they can ensure that ASEAN cannot mount a serious diplomatic challenge to their territorial ambitions in the near future.

Chinese domination of the sea-lanes of the Indian and Pacific Ocean would be a matter of concern to India as around 50 per cent of its foreign trade moves across the South China Sea. Moreover, with base facilities available in Seychelles and Gwadar, China is poised to expand its influence in the Indian Ocean. If China achieves its territorial ambitions in the South and East China Seas through coercive diplomacy, it could well be tempted to adopting a similar route on its growing territorial claims on India. It is, therefore, imperative for India to work with other partners in the East Asia Summit like the US, Russia and Japan to facilitate the emergence of a cohesive ASEAN strategy to counter Chinese territorial ambitions. Under no circumstances should India back off from its commitments made to Vietnam on offshore oil and gas exploration. Moreover, a much greater focus is required on accelerating the growth of defence, economic and investment ties with ASEAN countries, with particular focus on Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines.

The Tribune, 3 August 2012