When then Ceylon PM Sir John Kotelawala questioned China's doctrine way back in the fifties
The melodramatic act performed by Ceylon’s (now Sri Lanka) third prime minister Sir John Lionel Kotelawala had simply upset the apple cart of the Bandung conference and India’s first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s motive of introducing Chou En-Lai to the decolonized states, write Punsara Amarasinghe & Eshan Jayawardane
To historians of Southeast Asia, the Bandung conference of 1955 presents itself as one of the most striking international initiatives undertaken by newly-independent Indonesia. For historians of Indonesia, it marks the emphasis on foreign as against domestic policy that was associated with Sukarno's growing dominance. To biographers of Sukarno, it appears to be both a strategic device in domestic politics and a far-sighted perception of a shift in international relations.
Internationally, it was both to demonstrate the influence of India and to show its limits. Even more it was to mark some kind of success for the People's Republic of China and for its premier Chou En-Lai in developing the foreign policy line associated with the five principles of co-existence.
However, the melodramatic act performed by Ceylon’s (now Sri Lanka) third prime minister Sir John Lionel Kotelawala had simply upset the apple cart of the Bandung conference and India’s first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s motive of introducing Chou En-Lai to the decolonized states. There have been a number of narratives written from various perspectives describing the role of Sir John Kotelwala’s role in Bandung. Many of them have depicted him as a colonial infant who acted under British interests to sabotage the motives of Bandung conference which grounded on building Afro-Asian socio-economic cooperation to resist any kind of neo-colonialism by any nation.
The idea of Bandung conference was technically conceived in the conference held in Colombo under the leadership of Sir John in 1954. The Colombo conference itself was a bright idea that arose from Sir John. Yet, the Colombo conference was rather a platform for the leaders of newly independent states to discuss their common problems and the idea of calling a larger summit for Afro Asian countries was propounded by Indonesian leader Sukarno. He himself proposed the clam city called “Bandung “in Indonesia as the host city of the conference and India’s prime minister Nehru played the cardinal role as the protagonist who anticipated bringing his notion of nonaligned principle into the forum of Bandung.
On the other hand, the timing of Bandung was less revealing. Indeed, the conference took place during a period of growing international tension and complexity. The Cold War was in the process of establishing itself as an abiding phenomenon, reaching deep into newly liberated states and non-self-governing territories alike. In the backdrop of such complex political unrest that had started to soar its wings globally, the discontent among the leaders who participated in Bandung was a salient factor and the opening of Bandung diverged its participants into strong ideological convictions.
It was rather obvious that Nehru was dwelling in his idealism driven by his profound sense of resentment towards colonialism as inherently evil and his mission in Bandung stood for achieving two main goals. The first was to undermine American Cold War interests in Asia as it was represented by the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which he perceived as a real threat to the neutrality of decolonized countries in Asia. Secondly, he wanted to utilize the Bandung forum to engage the People’s Republic of China as a fellow Asian country regardless of its Communist ideology.
However, Nehru’s motive of softening the path for China to stand among neutral countries was not favourably viewed by some of the leaders who participated in the conference. Sir John and Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippines were main vocal opponents in China’s standing as a neutral country because of its Communist doctrine. From the two of them, the voice raised by Sir John was widely trumpeted by Western media as a vehement criticism of Communism and this was later used by Sir John’s political opponents to describe him as a hardcore follower of the West.
But, the reality stemming from Bandung records indicate that Sir John ‘s speech echoed more neutrality than the Philippines’ Romulo, who took pro-US stances at the conference. Notwithstanding his fame as an anti-Communist fascinated by Western values, Sir John raised the importance of “Asian Values “in his speech at Bandung. Highlighting his Buddhist faith Sir John stressed that the Third World’s “strength” lay in its “weakness.” It was precisely because they were “all poor and underdeveloped” that Third World states could “offer formally (their) services as mediators”.
Sir John’s major blow at Bandung was his proposal to describe Chinese “Communism” as another form of imperialism equal to Western colonialism. Bringing the examples of Soviet satellite states from Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Sir John pointed out the similarity between Western imperialism and Soviet expansionism, arguing that the latter should be declared as another form of imperialism.
As a matter of fact, this was an unexpected moment for Nehru who was yeaning to introduce his friend Zhou En-Lai to the Afro-Asian leaders at Bandung. Nehru with his usual paternal sense of statesmanship approached Sir John at the end of the second-day session and asked Sir John “Why did you do it? Why did you not show me your speech before you gave it?” This remarked sounded like paternal advice of a senior statesman of an Asian power to a less scholarly, stubborn prime minister of a lesser-known island. But to the biggest surprise of Nehru, the answer from Sir John was shocking and coarse as he answered: “Why should I? Do you show me yours before you give them?”
The world witnessed by Bandung leaders and the objectives they determined to achieve in 1955 have been altered today with rapid changing dynamics since the fall of the Soviet Union. Also, the camaraderie Nehru showed for China was marred by the India-China war, which was fought eight years after the Bandung conference, showing up realpolitik against Nehruvian idealism. Even today there is considerable distancing between China and India over geopolitical issues in South Asia.
In evaluating the role of Sir John, one should always remember that it was his pragmatism and inherent personality factor which boosted his role in a conference dominated by a political giant like Nehru. More importantly, Sir John’s audacity to question a leading political ideology and defend his position as premier of a sovereign state before a powerful neighbour like India was an early warning to not take small neighbours for granted.
(Punsara Amarasinghe is a visiting fellow at Center for Global Legal Studies at University of Wisconsin Madison. He can be reached at punsaraprint10@gmail.com. Eshan Jayawardane is an independent researcher in Napiers, New Zealand. The views expressed are personal)
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