The Aiyar-Tharoor exchange has at least offered something rare in contemporary Indian politics: disagreement expressed in elegant prose rather than television shouting, screaming and even fistfights. In an age dominated by hashtags, studio debates and instant outrage, two politicians exchanging carefully argued letters feels almost like a throwback to a more civilised era. If Indian politics produced more such literary duels, readers/viewers might even begin to look forward to disagreements.
Bangladesh stands at a decisive moment. The July Charter challenges the entrenched dominance that has defined its post-1991 political order. Whether it is implemented, diluted, or quietly sidelined will determine not only the balance of power among parties, but also the credibility of reformist politics in the country’s democratic future. If the BNP continues to delay or dilute implementation, and if tacit understandings emerge between the country’s two dominant parties, the reformist aspirations of the July movement may gradually lose momentum.
Social scientists argue that witch-hunting is a complex social phenomenon rooted not merely in superstition but in structural inequalities. Scholars studying rural India, including Surinder Jodhka, note that accusations of witchcraft often intersect with caste conflict, gender discrimination, and disputes over property or land. Elderly women, widows, and socially marginalized individuals frequently become easy targets because they lack protection within local power structures.
At the iftar gathering, attended by civil society members, ministers, bureaucrats and other distinguished guests, High Commissioner Verma emphasised the shared aspirations of Bangladesh and India. He stated that both nations stand at the threshold of a promising future as two vibrant and forward-looking societies. The event served as a platform to strengthen people-to-people connections and diplomatic goodwill between the two neighbours. By bringing together influential members of Bangladeshi society, the gathering reflected a clear intention to foster deeper engagement
Sri Lanka has a wide range of monetizable opportunities based on its strategic location and also existing domestic business landscape. The ongoing T20 Cricket World Cup is one example. No other country in South Asia, other than Sri Lanka, will find it possible to host a match between India and Pakistan. It is time Sri Lanka works towards leveraging its geographical location to weather global trade reset, while effectively leveraging its cultural foundation to boost its global soft power.
More than 60 percent of Pakistan’s 241.5 million population (2023) is below the age 30, with a median age of about 20. It is one of the youngest nations in the world living in a country that has remained adrift since its creation. Cricket was once a source of national confidence for young Pakistanis, but in recent years even that has vanished. The T20 defeat is just another instance of the crisis of confidence gripping the country that is also debilitating its cricket team.
AI is neither inevitable trauma nor guaranteed transformation. It is an amplifier. The Delhi summit must therefore convey Bharat’s civilisational wisdom — the natural intelligence systems that sustained life long before algorithms. The future of nature will depend not on how intelligent our machines become, but on whether humanity remains wise enough to align them with the only system that has sustained life for billions of years. Artificial Intelligence may dominate global conversation. But Natural Intelligence remains the foundation of survival.
Declining Trump’s invitation would not signal hostility toward the United States. It would signal coherence in India’s own diplomacy. It would affirm that New Delhi will not lend its name to a project that concentrates authority in a single capital at a time when global cooperation demands broader legitimacy and shared accountability.
A deliberate drift toward Beijing or Islamabad as counterweights to India would alarm New Delhi and risk regional polarization. Bangladesh’s strength lies in balanced diplomacy—engaging China economically, maintaining relations with Pakistan, but grounding its immediate neighborhood policy in stability with India.
All of this would be consequential even under a fully elected government with a clear popular mandate. It becomes more troubling when done by an interim administration. Trade and security alignments of this magnitude shape a nation’s geopolitical posture for decades. They influence relations with China, Russia, India, the European Union, and ASEAN. They affect bargaining positions in multilateral forums. They alter perceptions among investors and strategic planners. After the national election on February 12, the elected government will inherit this architecture. They will face a choice: comply and accept narrowed autonomy, or attempt renegotiation and risk economic retaliation.
The Constitution of India enshrines fraternity as a foundational value alongside liberty, equality, and justice. Yet fraternity cannot survive on parchment alone; it requires everyday acts of courage. Deepak Kumar’s gesture — simple, instinctive, humane — stands in contrast to the flood of rhetoric that seeks to divide citizens along religious lines. It reminds us that the long history of Hindu-Muslim interaction in food, literature, architecture, festivals, and everyday life cannot be erased by slogans.
If Jamaat comes to power it will likely begin with populist moves such as anti-corruption drives, predicts Ahmedur Chowdhury, a Bangladeshi writer and editor who has been living in Norway since surviving a 2015 attack. He says he fears mobilisation of religious groups to push for declaring Bangladesh an Islamic republic and enforce Sharia law. The result would be shrinking freedoms for women, curbs on cultural life, and serious threats to freedom of expression, religious minorities, and secular political and cultural spaces.
The threat from ISIS-K is real and growing. A resurgence in Pakistan would have serious implications for the broader region, including India. The danger is compounded if Pakistan once again attempts to clandestinely redirect ISIS-K towards Kashmir. What may appear as an isolated terror incident is, in fact, part of a wider pattern that demands sustained vigilance. Pakistan’s internal security instability risks creating openings for cross-border terror movements, potentially hardening new militant modules aimed at India and beyond.
The optimistic view is that the “Twin Election” will force a compromise. The referendum provides a mandate for reform that even a BNP government cannot ignore. The “July Charter”, if ratified, creates checks on executive power that did not exist before. The students, even if they end up on the opposition benches, will form a moral pressure group that cannot be easily crushed. The cynical view is that Bangladesh is merely swapping a monopoly for a duopoly, or worse, a monopoly of a different colour.
All signs point to a BNP victory. In a competitive contest without the Awami League, the BNP’s organisational depth and electoral reach make it the frontrunner. Yet victory alone may not translate into authority. The absence of the Awami League, the continued influence of Sheikh Hasina from exile, the rise of Islamist alternatives, and the central role of unelected institutions mean that any new government will inherit a fractured polity. The 2026 election may revive the BNP’s fortunes, but it will not by itself heal Bangladesh’s democratic wounds.
Ultimately, Bangladesh’s absence from the 10th edition of the T20 World Cup was the result of the BCCI’s ego and the ICC’s double standards where power politics and selective decision-making outweighed fairness and sporting integrity. Although many view the Pakistan Cricket Board’s support for Bangladesh positively, in reality it is also a strategic move to counter India for its own strategic benefit. If the match is boycotted, Bangladesh will suffer even greater financial and administrative losses.
Unlike earlier jihadist cells dominated by Pakistani nationals, this unit deliberately recruits women from Indonesia, the Philippines, Uzbekistan, and other foreign countries. Reason behind recruiting non-Pakistani nationals serves a dual purpose: it complicates attribution and shields Pakistan’s security apparatus from direct accountability. Such operational sophistication reflects ISI’s continued role not merely as a passive enabler but as an active architect of jihadist adaptation.
South Asia has the potential to be a global digital leader. It has a young population and a booming tech industry. However, this potential will only be realized if the region is secure. We must treat cybersecurity as a pillar of national security, just like border defense. This requires better technology, smarter laws, and stronger regional ties. The digital threats of 2026 are fast and complex. To meet them, South Asia must be faster and more united. The time to build a collective digital shield is now, before the next major crisis occurs.
Yet the strategic costs are real. Reduced engagement in Bangladesh risks ceding influence at a moment when Dhaka is actively diversifying its partnerships. Hesitation over Chabahar weakens India’s leverage in Iran and Central Asia and underscores its vulnerability to US pressure even as it seeks a more multipolar foreign policy. The 2026–27 Budget does not signal a dramatic shift in Indian foreign policy. There is no abandonment of neighbours-first rhetoric or of connectivity-led diplomacy. What it reveals instead is a narrowing circle of feasible economic action.
