The likely retirement of the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle-Mk II (GSLV-Mk II) offers an interesting lesson for India's plans to bring private industry into the launch vehicle business. 

Unlike the PSLV and LVM3, GSLV-Mk II has not been offered to private players for technology transfer or productionisation. A retired top ISRO official said the GSLV-Mk II is expected to be retired after completing its approved missions.  

The reason is not that the rocket has suddenly become incapable of flying. Rather, its cost and complexity make it increasingly difficult to justify keeping it in service when the more capable LVM3 can take over missions in its class. 

That raises a larger question: Is India's rocket privatisation strategy simply about handing over mature government-developed vehicles to industry, or can private companies be brought into the development of the next generation of rockets from the very beginning? 

The latter could prove far more consequential. 

Six Liquid Engines, Six Sources of Complexity 

GSLV-Mk II is a three-stage vehicle, 51.73 metres tall and weighing about 420 tonnes at liftoff. It can place roughly 2,250 kg into geosynchronous transfer orbit and around 6,000 kg into low Earth orbit. 

Its architecture, however, is relatively complicated. 

The rocket has six liquid-propellant engine units — four liquid-engine strap-ons, one Vikas engine powering the second stage and one cryogenic engine powering the upper stage. Its first stage is solid-fuelled. 

Every liquid propulsion system requires its own supporting infrastructure — propellant handling, tanks, feed systems, valves, controls, instrumentation, testing and checkout. More engines and more propulsion systems mean more manufacturing, integration and testing. 

That complexity has a cost. 

GSLV-Mk II nevertheless deserves credit for what it achieved. It was the vehicle through which India first established operational capability with indigenous cryogenic propulsion. It also provided the technological bridge to the much more powerful LVM3. 

Its retirement, therefore, should not be interpreted as a failure. Mature technologies are eventually replaced when a newer architecture becomes more capable or economical. 

But there is another lesson. 

Not every rocket that reaches maturity necessarily has to be privatised. 

Production Is Not Development 

India's current approach of transferring mature launch vehicle technologies to private industry is an important step. It can create manufacturing capacity, improve production efficiency and allow ISRO to concentrate on more advanced missions. 

But there is a distinction between productionising a rocket designed by ISRO and developing a rocket with industry as a partner. 

When a mature vehicle is handed over to industry, most of the important architectural decisions have already been made. 

The private company can improve manufacturing processes, establish supply chains, create tooling and standardise production. But it is fundamentally manufacturing an existing design. 

That is perfectly reasonable for proven vehicles. 

PSLV, SSLV and LVM3 can provide Indian industry with valuable experience in producing launch vehicles at scale. 

But if the objective is to create a globally competitive Indian launch industry, the ambition has to go one step further. 

NGLV is the Opportunity 

That opportunity is the Next Generation Launch Vehicle, or NGLV, informally called Soorya. 

NGLV is not simply another version of an existing Indian rocket. It is being conceived as a new-generation vehicle with higher payload capability, modularity and reusability. 

The full configuration is planned to have a liftoff mass of around 1,000 tonnes and a payload capability of about 30 tonnes to low Earth orbit. Its first two stages are planned around clustered LOX-methane engines, while the third stage will use a cryogenic engine. ISRO has already conducted a hot test at thrust-chamber level of a high-thrust LOX-methane engine for the programme. 

The government has approved about Rs.8,240 crore for NGLV development, including development flights and associated facilities. The rocket is expected to serve future requirements ranging from large satellite constellations and communications spacecraft to human spaceflight, the Bharatiya Antriksh Station and lunar and interplanetary missions. 

This is precisely where private industry should enter — not after the rocket is ready, but while it is being designed. 

Design Rocket With Factory in Mind 

Bringing an industry partner in at the design stage would allow manufacturing considerations to influence the rocket's architecture. 

Design-for-manufacture, design-for-assembly, tooling, welding, testing, quality control, supply chains and production economics could all be considered while the vehicle is still evolving. 

That could prevent a familiar problem: designing an excellent rocket first and then discovering that producing it economically and repeatedly is a different challenge altogether. 

NGLV is large enough to make this issue unavoidable. 

Two configurations are being considered — a core-alone version and a full configuration with two strap-on boosters. The vehicle is expected to be about 105 metres tall and 6.5 metres in diameter, though the final dimensions and configuration are subject to change. 

At that scale, manufacturing cannot simply be treated as an extension of today's rocket assembly operations. 

Factory May Have to Follow Rocket 

Large components of NGLV will have to be manufactured close to Sriharikota because transporting very large rocket structures over long distances by road will present its own logistical challenges. 

That means manufacturing facilities, specialised equipment, large-scale welding capability, testing infrastructure and logistics systems need to be planned well ahead of operational launches. 

This provides a strong argument for selecting an industry partner while NGLV is still under development. 

The private partner could invest in manufacturing facilities and build the required capabilities from the outset. In return, the government would have to provide sufficient long-term procurement visibility to make such investment commercially viable. 

This is fundamentally different from simply giving a company a technology-transfer agreement and asking it to produce a rocket. 

Let Industry Share the Risk 

Such a model will not be easy. 

Rocket designs evolve. Components are modified. Technologies mature at different speeds. A company investing heavily in dedicated manufacturing facilities will naturally want assurances that those facilities will not become stranded assets because of a subsequent design change. 

There will also be questions over intellectual property, technology ownership, commercial rights and the degree of freedom available to the private partner. 

But these are precisely the issues that should be settled at the beginning of the programme. 

A structured public-private partnership can provide long-term procurement commitments while allowing ISRO to retain strategic and technological leadership. Multiple suppliers can be developed for critical systems where feasible, reducing dependence on one company. 

The private partner, meanwhile, should be expected to invest its own capital, develop manufacturing expertise and assume a reasonable share of commercial risk. 

From Contractor to Partner 

India's space programme is already moving from government-only manufacturing towards greater private participation. 

The next transition should be more ambitious. 

PSLV, SSLV and LVM3 can take Indian industry from contractor to manufacturer. NGLV can take it from manufacturer to partner. 

That is a much more important transformation than simply transferring old rocket technology. 

The GSLV-Mk II experience also demonstrates that not every existing vehicle will have a commercial future. Some rockets will naturally disappear when a newer and more economical architecture arrives. 

The purpose of privatisation, therefore, should not be to find a private buyer for every government-developed rocket. It should be to create an industry capable of designing, manufacturing, operating and eventually improving India's future launch vehicles. 

GSLV-Mk II can make its exit after doing its job. NGLV should enter the stage with industry already inside the tent. The ultimate objective should not be to privatise India's past. It should be to build India's launch industry for the future. 

(The author is a Chennai-based veteran journalist who has been tracking the Indian space sector for decades. The views expressed are personal. He can be reached at venkatacharijagannathan@gmail.com)