The Constitution of India mandates the formation of a parliamentary form of government for operation within the country. While doing so, it categorically rejected the doctrine of absolute parliamentary sovereignty, which is a feature of the Westminster model. 

In the context of Indian constitutional jurisprudence, this distinction is fundamental, as this feature highlights the intention of the makers of the Constitution to lay emphasis on the supremacy of the Constitution and limited government. The idea is not simply doctrinal in nature, but has been clearly and expressively enumerated by the text of the Constitution, the Constituent Assembly Debates, and a similar vision of the Supreme Court of India in its numerous judgements, thereby culminating in the basic structure doctrine.

Parliament has no Absolute Sovereignty

As embodied by the Constitution of India, the mode of the parliamentary form of government in India is basically a procedural and institutional arrangement. Articles 74 and 75 focuses on the principle of collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers to Parliament, which comprises both the houses. To ensure the functioning of a responsible government, the nation witnesses independent functioning of executive and legislative hands and the accountability of the performing government is put on check by mechanisms such as no-confidence motions and financial control etc. 

Constitutional supremacy lies in the fact that the legislative, the executive and the judiciary has to function without violating the provisions of the Constitution.

In contrast, parliamentary sovereignty can be understood by taking into consideration what has been stated by British Jurist A.V. Dicey. Dicey defines Parliamentary sovereignty as the legal right of the British Parliament, under the Constitution, to make or unmake any law and do so without the possibility of its decisions being overridden or set aside by another body or person is a substantive legal doctrine. 

As such, parliamentary sovereignty can be taken as a substantive legal doctrine. In the broader context, the Parliament can make or unmake any law, and even the judiciary cannot invalidate its enactments, as such, there lies no distinction between ordinary and constitutional law.

However, in the Indian context, the Indian constitutional law rejects this absolute supremacy. In the Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India (1991) 4 SCC 699, the Supreme Court further highlighted the supremacy of the Constitution over parliamentary sovereignty, where judicial review is a logical consequence of constitutional supremacy.

Constitutional Provisions: Textual Supremacy and Popular Sovereignty

The Preamble to the Constitution establishes India as a “Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic.” The very first words of the Preamble, “We, the People of India,” itself establishes the nation to be a popular sovereignty.  Article 245 opens with the subordinating clause: “Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws...” This textual mandate of the Article, correlating it with Article 13 (laws inconsistent with fundamental rights are void), Article 246 (subject matters related to law making) and Part III, places clear restraint or limitation on parliamentary authority. Further, Article 368 enumerates the power of amendment where amendment of certain provisions require ratification by states. All together, these provisions underscore shared sovereignty.

Constituent Assembly Debates: Original Intent Against Absolute Power

In fact, the Constitutional Assembly Debates played a crucial role in drafting of the Constitution. The Constituent Assembly Debates on Constitutional Supremacy reveal a conscious rejection of Diceyan sovereignty by the stakeholders. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, on 4th  November 1948, defended the amending procedure of the Constitution, stating that while the Constituent Assembly framed the Constitution, the future Parliamentarians who shall be elected on adult suffrage, shall function keeping in mind that the Constitution is supreme. He further emphasised on the flexibility of the Constitution for the greater benefit of the nation at large. 

Again, on 8 November 1948, Pandit Nehru advocated for a Constitution that is “solid and permanent” yet flexible, warning against rigidity that could hamper national growth. Debates on Article 368 highlighted concerns over majoritarian overreach, with members like H.V. Kamath stressed on the  safeguards. The debates of the Constituent Assembly highlighted the intention of the framers for a parliamentary form of government that is accountable and maintains constitutional supremacy.

Judicial Doctrine: Basic Structure as the Core

Correlating  with the fundamentals of the Constitution, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has authoritatively translated the intent of the framers of the Indian Constitution into binding law. In the landmark case law of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225, the Supreme Court held that Parliament’s amending power under Article 368, though wide, cannot alter the “basic structure” or essential features of the Constitution. Justice H.R. Khanna stated, “The power of amendment... cannot be so exercised as to destroy the basic structure of the Constitution.” Therefore, the basic structure of the Indian Constitution includes features like supremacy of the Constitution, republican democracy, secularism, federalism, separation of powers, judicial review, and the  fundamental rights.

Further, in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625, the concept of basic structure was further widened as the apex court held that limited amending power of the Parliament itself is a basic feature. These landmark decisions establish the fact that the Parliament itself is a creature of the Constitution, and not its master. Its powers are bound by limitation as such it is never sovereign in the absolute sense.

Comparative and Normative Significance

India’s model of parliamentary operation is different from the UK in the sense that while in the UK, parliamentary sovereignty allows even constitutional changes through ordinary legislation, India’s model operates within the framework of constitutional democracies, featuring written charters and judicial review. This design protects pluralism, federalism, and rights in a diverse society, preventing the unfair use of power by the majority.

Ultimate Safeguard of Indian Polity

India’s constitutional design operates on the line of a fully functional parliamentary democracy anchored in constitutional supremacy rather than parliamentary sovereignty. As Dr. Ambedkar envisioned, the Constitution shall remain workable, flexible, and resilient. As such, in an era of evolving challenges, the supremacy of the Constitution continues to serve as the ultimate safeguard of Indian polity.

(Bishaldeep Kakati is an Advocate, Gauhati High Court and Dr Bipasha Saikia is a Assistant Professor, JB Law College, Guwahati, Assam. The views expressed are personal. They can be contacted at deep.kakati99@gmail.com)