Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s three-day visit to Sri Lanka that ended Sept 10 is strategically more significant than the relatively modest value of the three Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) signed in Colombo might suggest.

Since the visit of K C Pant 38 years ago in the troubled aftermath of Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement and quit notice given to Indian peacekeepers stationed in the North and East in 1987-90, this is the first visit by an Indian defence minister and it comes at a time when India is increasingly defining security in the Indian Ocean as inseparable from its own national security.

The visit therefore should not be viewed simply as another bilateral defence engagement. It represents an attempt by New Delhi to institutionalise India's security relationship with Sri Lanka, while simultaneously reassuring Colombo that India's expanding security interests need not threaten Sri Lankan sovereignty.

The April 2025 India-Sri Lanka Defence Cooperation MoU already created a broader framework for defence cooperation. Singh's visit adds practical mechanisms to that framework. The September 2026 agreements therefore appear to be less about creating a new defence relationship and more about operationalising and institutionalising an existing one.

Capacity Enhancement and Risk Assessment

During the visit, the two sides exchanged three defence-related agreements. Under the MoU, India will upgrade six L-70 air-defence guns already supplied to the Sri Lanka Air Force, with the work financed through an Indian government grant. This is the most strategically sensitive of the three agreements. On the surface, it is a relatively small military modernisation project. But it raises an important question - whether a new threat has emerged for which this additional air-defence capability is required.

The need for other two MoUs will be beneficial to Sri Lanka because of the need for training for Sri Lanka Army officers, starting from the school cadet level to senior officers attending National Defence College.

Sri Lanka does not face an obvious conventional air attack from a neighbouring state. Therefore, the justification cannot simply be an immediate enemy threat. The guns could instead be relevant to protection of strategic infrastructure, airports, ports, energy installations and other critical facilities against drones or other asymmetric threats.

That distinction is important. Sri Lanka should ensure that defensive equipment acquired through bilateral cooperation remains under Sri Lankan operational command and Sri Lankan strategic decision-making. The agreement is therefore best understood as capacity enhancement rather than preparation for conventional war.

Maintenance Support for Air-Defence Guns

However, the sudden conceived need for enhancing air-defence systems is intriguing. Among military analysts, there are concerns over the decision to offer maintenance support for Sri Lanka’s existing Indian-supplied L70 air-defence guns.

Sri Lanka received 24 L70 40mm systems from India  over the decision between 2000 and 2006. India has reportedly already maintained 18 and would provide free maintenance for the remaining six. However, earlier reports had described the MoU more broadly as covering the supply of Indian air-defence guns.

Defence analyst Col Nalin Herath, former head of military strategic affairs wing, questioned whether maintaining an inherited capability is strategically justified, while resisting unnecessary expansion of air-defence procurement.

Sri Lanka is preparing to deepen defence cooperation with India at a moment when Colombo should be pragmatically assessing the kind of military capability it actually needs.

Foreign Affairs Minister Vijitha Herath indicated that MoU covering the supply of Indian air-defence guns concerns maintenance support for six remaining L70 40mm air-defence weapons supplied by India between 2000 and 2006. India had already undertaken maintenance of 18 of the 24 systems.

There is an important strategic difference between maintaining existing equipment at no cost and acquiring a new generation of air-defence weapons.

Sri Lanka's defence planning should start not with what a friendly country can supply, but to analyse the threat, if any, that the weapon intended to defeat.

Air-defence systems are designed to protect territory, military installations, ports, airfields, command centres and other critical infrastructure against hostile aircraft, helicopters, missiles or, increasingly, drones.

Sri Lanka undoubtedly needs some capacity to protect its airspace and critical national infrastructure. But the scale and sophistication of that capability must correspond to the country's actual strategic environment.

Sri Lanka does not presently face an identified conventional military adversary possessing a demonstrated intention and capability to launch sustained air attacks against the island.

Maintenance or Procurement?

Defence analysts say small states frequently make the mistake of allowing defence cooperation to become equipment-driven. A friendly major power offers equipment, training or concessional financing. The receiving country accepts because the political relationship is valuable. Over time, however, the armed forces acquire platforms that may have little relationship to their most pressing security challenges.

At the India-Sri Lanka Defence Industry Seminar in Colombo in March, Sri Lanka's Defence Secretary highlighted opportunities arising from India's rapidly expanding defence manufacturing sector, including technology transfer, training and joint ventures. That is an opportunity, but it should not become a procurement obligation.

There is a perfectly rational argument for keeping existing L70 systems operational. India's offer to maintain the remaining six weapons free of charge could save Sri Lanka money and preserve an existing capability. If the systems are already in Sri Lankan inventories, maintaining them at minimal cost can be rational.

But maintenance should not automatically become the first stage of a larger procurement programme. The government should publish or at least have parliament's relevant oversight mechanisms examine the operational assessment behind any expansion.

Maritime domain awareness, coastal surveillance, search and rescue, cyber-security, protection of critical infrastructure, intelligence-sharing, disaster response and counter-drone capabilities may offer considerably greater practical security value than expanding traditional gun-based air defence.

Shared Security Interests and Cooperation

India and Sri Lanka have legitimate shared security interests. India's stated approach is centred on regional security and its "Neighbourhood First" policy, while Colombo has repeatedly emphasised the importance of close bilateral defence cooperation.

India has also provided Sri Lanka with substantial defence assistance, including a military store and medical consignment valued at more than US$5 million in June 2026. Such cooperation is valuable. But the relationship should not become defined primarily by defence hardware.

The proposed cooperation between the two countries' National Defence Colleges and cadet organisations may ultimately prove strategically more valuable than an additional weapons system.

Sri Lanka's long-standing foreign-policy tradition has sought to avoid becoming a military platform for competing major powers. That principle becomes even more important as geopolitical competition intensifies across the Indian Ocean.

National Air Defence Threat Assessment 

Herath said Sri Lanka should conduct an independent National Air Defence Threat Assessment to examine which countries or non-state actors could realistically conduct an aerial attack against Sri Lanka; which national assets genuinely require protection; and what kind of radar, electronic surveillance, counter-drone systems or cyber capabilities provide greater protection to the island nation. 

It would be also prudent to assess the kind of military acquisition, ammunition, maintenance and training would cost over 10–20 years and if such acquisitions would create perceptions that Sri Lanka is becoming part of another country's military architecture. His suggestion is that a parliamentary oversight committee should oversee that major defence commitments are subjected to transparent scrutiny rather than treated exclusively as executive decisions.

New Delhi's security concerns deserve respect because India is Sri Lanka's closest major neighbour. At the same time, Sri Lanka's sovereignty, neutrality and non-alignment and freedom to maintain good relations with all major powers must remain equally non-negotiable.

(The author, a former Sri Lankan diplomat, is a political and strategic affairs commentator. The views expressed are personal. He can be reached at sugeeswara@gmail.com.)