In South Asia, identity has gradually become one of the most contested assets. Eligibility for things like opening an account, crossing a border, or legally using a different name is now determined by Aadhaar, a passport, or bank KYC. This proves that these documents are worth more than just being called paperwork.

The region's land area, unrestricted borders, and a pivot to digital-first identity systems have genuinely become central issues in India. Researchers are continually debating whether forensic science and biometric security should work together to enable early fraud detection (Tiwari et al., 2022).

India is moving rapidly towards digital identity systems. From Aadhaar-linked bank accounts to DigiLocker and mobile e-KYC, one compromised credential can now open doors that used to require several separate documents.  A forged Aadhaar number no longer just gets someone a SIM card; it can get them a bank account and, in some recorded cases, a passport (Rana, 2023).

Cross-Border Identity Fraud

India shares a roughly 4,000-kilometre border with Bangladesh, and large areas pass through villages that share roads and markets with settlements across the border, making round-the-clock patrolling nearly impossible (Observer Research Foundation, 2025).

Estimates of how many people have crossed the border illegally and settled in India vary widely, and researchers acknowledge that there is no single reliable figure (Observer Research Foundation, 2025). What is better recorded is the pattern following the entry: local street vendors arrange Indian-looking paperwork, after which the person disappears from the official records (Observer Research Foundation, 2025).

Recent arrests in Kerala involved Bangladeshi nationals carrying forged and unauthenticated Aadhaar cards, voter IDs, and PAN cards bearing West Bengal addresses, pointing to an organized forgery chain (Three Illegal Bangladeshi Migrants Arrested in Kerala, 2026). 

Similar networks have also surfaced outside Kerala. Investigations into passport and visa fraud networks in Delhi, Mumbai, and border towns in West Bengal have found touts supplying entire identity packages, beginning with a fabricated Aadhaar and building towards a PAN card and, eventually, a passport application ("Passport Fraud Racket Busted", 2023).

Human trafficking cases add another layer, as some of the same document networks serving illegal migrants have also been found supplying identity cover for trafficked persons (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2023).

The Role of Biometric Profiling

Aadhaar plays a major role in India's identity system, with well over a billion residents registered through fingerprint, iris, and demographic data (Tiwari et al., 2022).

Biometrics are harder to fake than a printed card, but not unbreakable. Fingerprint sensors have historically been vulnerable to shape-based spoofing, which is why UIDAI only recently rolled out Fake Finger Detection across registered devices, alongside newer iris-based devices (Unique Identification Authority of India, 2026).

Iris recognition is more difficult to deceive because it provides around twice as many differentiation points as a fingerprint. Scientists have issued warnings about spoofing attempts using printed images or textured contact lenses during low-liveness tests (Khade & Ahirrao, n.d.).

Cases have also surfaced of cloned fingerprints lifted from old enrolment records being used to authorize withdrawals from rural bank accounts. This is part of the reason liveness detection—checking for indicators such as pulse or eye movement rather than relying on a static fingerprint—is increasingly becoming a necessary security layer rather than an optional one (Unique Identification Authority of India, 2026).

The National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) has also been using the Automated Facial Recognition System since 2019 to match suspects with passport and criminal photographs.

Role of Forensic Document Examination

The best biometric systems rely on written records. Indian passports contain several security features—including an Ashoka Pillar impression, micro-lettering, a machine-readable zone (MRZ) code, and specialized security inks—that forensic experts use to distinguish authentic documents from falsified ones (Gupta & Ravi, 2017).

Deception usually involves lamination alteration, identity manipulation, or forged credentials, as a compelling forgery typically begins with a stolen or authentic blank substrate (Gupta & Ravi, 2017). A similar vulnerability exists with Aadhaar and PAN cards, where fraudsters exploit weaknesses in physical verification and bypass the digital and biometric safeguards intended to prevent identity misuse.

Forged Aadhaar and PAN cards recovered in fraud cases are often technically well-made, with correct fonts and correctly placed QR codes, which is why examiners increasingly lean on digital forensic verification, checking the QR code data against UIDAI's own servers rather than trusting the printed card by itself (Digital Forensic Verification of Identity Documents, 2024). 

A card that passes a visual inspection can still fail a back-end verification within seconds.

New Channels for Fraud

Once a false identity exists, it tends to move toward the financial system. The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, empowers the Enforcement Authority to trace and freeze proceeds of financial crimes. However, enforcement data reportedly shows only about 15 convictions out of nearly 6,000 cases taken up since 2015, a gap that researchers treat as a real structural weakness (Combating Money Laundering in India, n.d.).

Digital KYC was introduced to close these gaps, and studies on Aadhaar-based e-KYC report a sharp reduction in onboarding fraud compared with older paper-based verification (e-KYC Opportunities in Fraud Prevention and Risk, 2025).

However, the rapid growth of UPI has also created new channels for fraud. Fake banking applications, phishing pages impersonating KYC updates, and QR-code scams are common enough that researchers are increasingly applying machine learning to detect them ("Digital Banking Fraud in India", 2025).

Much of this  fraud money is moved through what investigators call mule accounts—bank accounts opened using someone else's forged KYC documents, or using the genuine documents of a person who has handed them over for a small payment. A fraud network can then use these accounts to receive and rapidly transfer stolen funds, often routing them through multiple accounts before the money leaves the banking system as cash or cryptocurrency.

Some of this activity overlaps with national security concerns rather than ordinary financial theft. Several Prevention of Money Laundering Act cases linked to cross-border terror financing have identified forged identity documents as the entry point through which operatives opened accounts without triggering routine KYC alerts (Enforcement Directorate, 2023).

Integrating Forensic Science and Biometric Systems

None of these systems performs well in isolation. A passport that successfully survives human inspection may prove false under the forensic ink test, while an authentic biometric match could well be applied to a fraudulent Aadhaar ID.

What the researchers are now trying to establish is a composite method for detecting ID forgery through multiple layers of verification.  Document forgery can be identified through document forensics, biometric manipulation through liveness testing, and AI-generated or manipulated identities through anomaly-detection systems (Tiwari et al., 2022).

This is also where inter-agency collaboration matters.  A biometric flag generated by UIDAI is useful only if it reaches the passport office or local police quickly enough to take action. Addressing this gap is central to the recommendations below.

Need for Greater Public Awareness

Research in this area points to several practical measures. First, biometric devices should be registered and required to meet liveness detection and anti-spoofing standards wherever Aadhaar is used, including in older installations, since existing devices can also be exploited.

Second, the need for a joint, immediate verification mechanism involving the BSF, state police, UIDAI, and passport departments, rather than a post hoc investigation.

Third, upgrading forensic facilities with sufficient resources to verify the security features of identity documents.

Fourth, enforcing PMLA to ensure that a greater proportion of cases result in convictions.

At the same time, a large share of KYC fraud still starts with someone handling an Aadhaar photocopy or an OTP to a stranger who sounds convincing enough. Strengthening institutional systems, therefore, needs to be accompanied by greater public awareness of basic identity-security practices.

Building an Integrated Security Net

Identity and financial crimes that occur across India's borders never begin with anything overtly fraudulent. They generally begin with a small breach in routine authentication processes. Biometrics, forensic document examination, and audit trails can each address one side of the breach,  none can serve as a security net on its own. They must be used in conjunction with one another.

With an increasing share of Indian identity technology that is now being carried out online, addressing these vulnerabilities has become a necessity. Most of the tools needed already exist in India, scattered across UIDAI, the passport authorities, forensic labs, and the bank compliance teams. What remains missing is the connecting tissue between them.

(The author is a B.Sc. Forensic Science student at NSIT-IFSCS affiliated with the National Forensic Sciences University (NFSU), Gandhinagar, Gujarat. He focuses on interdisciplinary research exploring the intersection of forensic science, technology, and public policy. The views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at parth.researchofficial@gmail.com)