Bangladesh has missed a significant diplomatic opportunity by staying away from the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi on September 12–13. At a moment when emerging economies are demanding a greater role in global affairs and the international system is becoming increasingly multipolar, Dhaka chose not to participate in a forum that brought together some of the world’s most consequential political and economic powers.

The decision is particularly notable because Bangladesh currently chairs the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), the regional grouping comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand.

India had extended an invitation to Prime Minister Tarique Rahman to participate in the BRICS Outreach session in his capacity as the current chair of BIMSTEC. Separately, India had also invited Rahman for a bilateral visit. Indian officials publicly clarified that the two invitations were distinct.

Dhaka ultimately decided that Rahman would not attend the BRICS gathering. On September 10, State Minister for Foreign Affairs Humaiun Kobir said there was “no scope” for Bangladesh to send a government representative because the invitation was extended to Rahman as BIMSTEC chair rather than specifically as Bangladesh’s prime minister.

That interpretation may have satisfied a narrow question of diplomatic protocol. But diplomacy is ultimately about much more than protocol. It is about identifying opportunities, protecting national interests, and converting access into tangible political and economic benefits.

By that broader measure, Bangladesh’s absence deserves serious scrutiny.

Why the BRICS Summit Mattered

BRICS has evolved substantially from the original BRIC grouping of Brazil, Russia, India and China. South Africa joined in 2010, while the subsequent expansion brought Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Indonesia into the grouping.

The 2026 New Delhi summit therefore brought together countries with enormous demographic, economic, energy and geopolitical weight. The summit included leaders such as Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, alongside Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and other heads of government. The grouping adopted a New Delhi Declaration addressing international economic and geopolitical issues, including the conflict and instability affecting the Middle East.

BRICS is not a conventional military or political alliance. Its members have substantial differences over foreign policy, economics and security. India and China, for example, have their own strategic disagreements, while Russia, Iran and the UAE have different relationships with the United States and other Western powers.

But those differences are precisely why diplomatic engagement matters.

Countries do not participate in international forums only when they agree with every other participant. They participate because such forums provide access—to governments, markets, investors, development institutions, technology, information and political influence.

For Bangladesh, those opportunities are particularly important.

China and Russia remain significant development and strategic partners. India is Bangladesh’s immediate neighbor and one of its most consequential economic, political and security interlocutors. Indonesia, Brazil, the Gulf countries and African economies offer additional possibilities for trade, investment, energy cooperation and market diversification.

A presence at the BRICS Outreach session could therefore have served multiple Bangladeshi interests simultaneously. Bangladesh is already connected to the BRICS economic ecosystem.

Did Dhaka Benefit From Absence?

Perhaps the most striking aspect of Dhaka’s absence is that Bangladesh is not an outsider to the wider BRICS economic architecture. Bangladesh became a member of the New Development Bank (NDB) in September 2021. The NDB was established by the BRICS founding members as a multilateral development bank intended to finance infrastructure and sustainable-development projects in emerging and developing economies.

The bank has since expanded its membership beyond the original BRICS countries. As of June 30, 2026, it had approved 141 projects with cumulative approvals of approximately $44 billion and disbursements of about $25 billion.

These are precisely the kinds of institutions and financing channels that matter to Bangladesh.

The country requires investment in transport, ports, energy, industrial infrastructure, climate adaptation, water management, urban development, digital infrastructure and logistics. It also needs to diversify export destinations, attract foreign capital and strengthen its resilience against economic shocks.

A summit bringing together governments and economic actors connected to these objectives offered Dhaka an obvious platform for engagement.

The question, therefore, is not whether Bangladesh could have secured a particular agreement simply by attending. There is no guarantee that participation in a summit automatically produces investment or diplomatic breakthroughs. The question is whether Bangladesh benefited by being absent.

BIMSTEC gave Dhaka an additional diplomatic platform. The BIMSTEC dimension makes the decision even more significant. Bangladesh’s chairmanship provides Dhaka with an opportunity to present itself not merely as an individual South Asian state but as a representative of a wider Bay of Bengal regional framework.

Participation by the BIMSTEC chair could have been used to promote regional connectivity, trade, energy cooperation, maritime links, climate resilience and cooperation on the Rohingya crisis. Instead, the distinction between attending as Bangladesh’s prime minister and attending as BIMSTEC chair became central to the public debate.

Were National Interests Served?

State Minister Humaiun Kobir repeatedly emphasized that Rahman had been invited as BIMSTEC chair rather than as Bangladesh’s prime minister.

From Dhaka’s perspective, that distinction may have carried political and diplomatic significance. Yet from a strategic perspective, the BIMSTEC invitation could also have been viewed as an asset. It gave Bangladesh a reason to be at the table.

A government seeking to enhance the international profile of BIMSTEC could have used the occasion to raise the organization’s visibility before major powers and emerging economies. High-level meetings could have been used to discuss infrastructure, trade corridors, energy security, climate financing and regional connectivity.

Diplomacy is not merely about the wording of invitations. There is a broader lesson here. Diplomatic engagement cannot be reduced to determining whether an invitation has been issued in precisely the preferred capacity. The more important question is what national interests can be advanced through participation.

International diplomacy frequently produces opportunities that do not appear in official programs. Leaders meet on the margins of summits. Ministers establish personal relationships. Officials open communication channels. Business representatives identify potential partners. Informal discussions sometimes create possibilities for future negotiations.

These benefits are difficult to quantify, but they are an important part of international statecraft.

Bangladesh could have used the New Delhi gathering to maintain high-level communication with India while simultaneously engaging China, Russia and other BRICS members and partners. It could have discussed trade and investment, development finance, energy, technology, climate financing and supply-chain diversification.

It could also have demonstrated that Bangladesh seeks engagement with multiple centers of power without automatically aligning itself with any one of them.

That distinction matters.

Attending a BRICS-related event would not have required Bangladesh to become anti-Western, pro-Chinese or pro-Russian. Engagement is not the same as alignment.

Indeed, a country pursuing an independent foreign policy should normally seek more channels of communication, not fewer.

The Sheikh Hasina Issue

The decision also unfolded against the continuing dispute over former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who remains in India.

Dhaka has repeatedly sought her extradition, while India has indicated that the matter is subject to legal and bilateral processes. The issue has become one of the most difficult points in Bangladesh-India relations.

Dhaka has also signaled that Rahman’s first visit to India should take place in a bilateral rather than multilateral context. Kobir said that the government was working toward a bilateral visit when circumstances were conducive.

There is a legitimate diplomatic argument for separating sensitive bilateral negotiations from multilateral engagements.

However, the two tracks need not necessarily exclude one another.

A BRICS Outreach session could have provided an opportunity for Bangladesh to engage India at a multilateral gathering while preserving the option of separate bilateral negotiations over contentious issues.

Indeed, international diplomacy often requires governments to manage disagreements while maintaining communication.

The Larger Strategic Question

The most important issue raised by Bangladesh’s absence is therefore not whether Dhaka technically had the right protocol interpretation. It is whether Bangladesh’s foreign policy is sufficiently focused on expanding its strategic options.

The international system is changing rapidly. Economic influence is increasingly dispersed across Asia and the wider Global South. New financial institutions and diplomatic groupings are emerging alongside traditional Western-led institutions.

Bangladesh cannot afford to approach this changing environment by voluntarily reducing opportunities for engagement.

Its foreign policy should instead be guided by a straightforward question: Does a particular engagement advance Bangladesh’s national interests?

The BRICS Outreach session offered Bangladesh access to major powers, emerging economies, development institutions and regional partners in one location. Participation would not necessarily have solved any major bilateral dispute or produced immediate economic gains. But it would have created opportunities for diplomacy that are difficult to replicate from a distance.

The irony is that BRICS did not close its doors to Bangladesh. Bangladesh chose not to walk through them.

For a country with Bangladesh’s strategic location, economic ambitions and regional responsibilities, diplomatic opportunities should be approached with pragmatism and long-term calculation. The lesson from New Delhi should therefore be broader than the controversy surrounding one invitation.

Bangladesh needs a foreign policy that seeks more platforms, cultivates more relationships and preserves more strategic options.

In an increasingly competitive and multipolar international environment, standing outside important rooms can become costly—not because every meeting produces an immediate breakthrough, but because influence is often accumulated through sustained presence.

Diplomatic opportunities rarely remain available forever. They arise from circumstances, personalities and shifting geopolitical alignments—and disappear just as quickly. Bangladesh should make sure that, when the next opportunity arrives, it is prepared to be in the room.

(The writer is an award-winning journalist, columnist, editor and publisher of the Bangladesh-based publication Blitz and a commentator on Islamist extremism, terrorism and South Asian geopolitics.  The views expressed are personal. He can be reached at noman14@gmail.com and on X: @Salah_Shoaib.)