When nations prepare for conflict, they frequently pretend to be preparing for peace. India's ongoing Trishul military exercise, a large-scale tri-service simulation spanning from Gujarat's deserts to the seas off Sir Creek and into the Arabian Sea, is being portrayed as a routine operation. Routine, like most things in the security world, may be seen from different perspectives.

Observers observe that Trishul, which involves land, air, and naval forces across a thousand-kilometer front, is the most ambitious joint exercise since Operation Sindoor. On the surface, it represents military modernization and readiness. But beneath that surface is a silent message about intent and hierarchy, a reminder of who controls the pace in the region's security environment.

Strategic theorists frequently claim that when a state's defense preparations are heightened by spectacle, they gain an element of performative deterrence. Thomas Schelling referred to this as the "theatre of resolve," which involves exploiting visible capabilities to alter enemies' expectations. India's exercise fits that pattern perfectly. Its time, scope, and position project not only preparation but also pre-eminence, a posture that signals to neighboring states where the center of gravity is.

Regional Messaging Confusing

The language around Trishul provides more nuance. Indian commanders have spoken of a "new normal" in which any cross-border provocation may result in a full military reaction. That is a doctrinal shift with geographical implications. Once carefully handled, the escalation threshold appears to be more fluid. South Asia's security, which was already vulnerable to misunderstanding, is now working in a context that blurs deterrence and domination.

History offers useful caution. across 2016 and 2019, India's carefully calibrated military responses to perceived threats were popular at home but unnerving across the region. Each instance, however brief, incrementally changed the psychological bounds of what constituted acceptable military posturing. Scholars like C. Christine Fair has remarked that India's strategic culture is heavily impacted by "a desire to convey credibility through demonstration." Trishul exercises, for example, may serve less as training routines than as demonstrations of credibility, symbolic gestures aimed to remind rather than reassure.

There is also a maritime dimension worth mentioning. The Arabian Sea, once a trade channel, is now becoming a competitive arena. India's increased naval exercises, combined with its Indo-Pacific ambitions and Western partnerships, indicate a shift from coastal defense to regional management. For smaller coastal states, such patterns can readily translate into worry, not from an impending threat, but from an inferred sense of power. Barry Buzan once said, "In regional security complexes, proximity magnifies perception." When a major power operates near contested or shared spaces, the neighbors are obligated to interpret purpose through action.

This is where India's challenge is. It strives to be recognized as a responsible stakeholder in global security, yet its regional messaging frequently appears unilateral. The greater the prominence of its military footprint, the less room for diplomatic reassurance. Over time, frequent exhibitions of force, no matter how appropriate, risk instilling in smaller governments what scholars refer to as security fatigue: a perception that discourse is unnecessary since deterrence has already determined the conversation.

Are Muscular Displays Warranted?

It would be misleading to assume that India's aims are entirely coercive. The integration of its military forces, technological advancements, and operational readiness are all indicators of a growing power's natural progression. However, how we demonstrate evolution is important. Strategic confidence is best judged by how a state handles perceptions, rather than how it demonstrates capacity.

Trishul may eventually reveal to be a double-edged sign. It strengthens India's image as a capable, collaborative power, but it also highlights a growing disparity between its self-perception and regional reception. The exercise informs neighbours of India's capabilities, but not of its limitations. And in an area as rich in history and mistrust as South Asia, that divide might mean the difference between deterrence and supremacy.

If New Delhi wants to lead, the way forward is through softer guarantees rather than demonstrative displays. Even caution can be a sign of strength in the deterrent theatre.

(The author is a political analyst and columnist with a deep interest in South Asian geopolitics, international diplomacy and policy reform. He graduated from King's College London with a focus in global governance and is passionate about narrowing the disparity among academia and policy making.  Views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at aaravsharmaa245@gmail.com)