India must also recognise that Pakistan's internal security crisis has wider regional implications. Escalating Pakistan–Afghanistan tensions could create additional uncertainty along the western frontier, while attacks on Chinese projects could affect regional connectivity and investment.
India has demonstrated that it can develop and manufacture modern artillery systems. What needs reassessment is how quickly we acquire, integrate and field them, and how effectively we ensure that new technologies communicate and operate together.
If India says the security of its Northeast, border management, trade and connectivity matter, Bangladesh can equally say that water sharing, deaths at the border, market access, energy security, river management and sovereign equality matter to it.
The Indian military views no disengagement in Arunachal Pradesh as part of a wider strategic recalibration, prompting India to match Chinese force rebalancing by shifting strike corps and resources equally across both northern and eastern fronts.
BRICS is acquiring greater visibility, while countries of the Global South continue to seek a greater voice in the international system. The desire for a more multipolar world is becoming increasingly evident. Over the next decade, this could produce a geopolitical configuration rather different from the one we have known since the end of the Cold War.
Kuhn says if the first half of this century is being defined by USA-China relations, the second half may well be defined by India-China relations and, in the New World Order, "India-China relations will likely become the most pivotal.....for the entire world".
The strategic equation has irrevocably shifted. Pakistan’s long-standing attempt to separate itself from its proxies has failed, replaced by the reality of a state struggling with the infrastructure it created. As these groups operate with increasing autonomy, the world community is left with a clear conclusion
Supported by the Transboundary Rivers of South Asia Programme (TROSA), this led to formation of grassroots networks, including the India-Nepal Joint Action Forum (INJAF) through which civil society organisations and local communities could raise common riverine concerns with officials in their respective countries. Many women in the community participate in these programs, leading to development of women’s empowerment centres (Mahila Mandals).
The Pakistan-China Boundary Joint Commission needs to be viewed in backdrop of the fast-changing geopolitics of South Asia and its military implications. The Shaksgam Valley sits immediately north of the Siachen Glacier and just west of Aksai Chin under China's control. By controlling Shaksgam, China can jointly monitor Indian military movements from the north while Pakistan does so from the south.
The question, therefore, is not whether Bangladesh could have secured a particular agreement simply by attending. There is no guarantee that participation in a summit automatically produces investment or diplomatic breakthroughs. The question is whether Bangladesh benefited by being absent.
For China to achieve its hegemonic ambitions in Asia, weakening democracies is essential. India, therefore, stands as an iron wall against illiberal encroachments, positioning itself as both a regional hegemon and a defender of democratic order.
The Mecca Pact, barely a month old, has already been discredited. Its authenticity is in question, its efficacy doubtful. The very notion of an “Islamic Nato” has been exposed as a mirage. Collective defence requires not just declarations but capabilities, coordination and political will. None of these are evident in the pact’s functioning.
A more sensible and balanced engagement with India might help Bangladesh maintain its national interests while boosting its competitiveness in the region as it moves into the post-LDC transition period. A bilateral visit should happen soon to address Bangladesh's food, fertiliser and fuel shortages.
The real change, then, is not merely that Chinese media sounded friendlier towards India. It is that they assigned India a different place in the story. New Delhi appeared as a complex but consequential partner, whose strategic autonomy and cooperation matter to China's imagining of a changing world order.
Pakistan, for its part, will have to recognise that the old assumption of an immutable treaty operating independently of the broader India-Pakistan relationship has become untenable. Islamabad cannot expect the water relationship to remain insulated indefinitely from terrorism
Hopes for Sino-Indian relations centre on a cautious diplomatic thaw, institutionalised border stability and renewed high-level engagement. Indian negotiators and defence planners are well aware that “trust must be verified”. While the activation of these eight points provides valuable channels to prevent an accidental kinetic clash on the ground, the real test of China’s sincerity will not be the joint statements signed in Beijing, but whether it ceases infrastructure build-ups and respects the historical patrolling rights of Indian troops along the LAC.
By removing the ‘Indo’ prefix from Indo-Pacific the US implicitly acknowledges that it no longer unilaterally defines the eastern strategic landscape. Regional organisations like BRICS continue to redefine the lexicon of ‘rules-based order’ to insulate themselves from western domination.
The bilateral discussion between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the 18th BRICS Summit indicates surge in mutual ties, particularly by way of trade. However, little can be expected by way of full settlement of the boundary dispute.
The timing of the EU announcement coincided with the BRICS+ Summit in New Delhi, creating speculation about whether the EU was seeking to reinforce its strategic engagement with India amid the growing influence of the BRICS grouping.
