With the return of the Taliban to power in Kabul on 15 August 2021, the situation in Afghanistan has become grimmer. Despite the reported reservations among substantial sections of US lawmakers and those in the Pentagon and intelligence agencies about the American forces’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, President Joe Biden went ahead with the decision, leaving the Afghans helpless.

The Afghanistan war is far from over and terror activities have increased in recent months, with the killing and harassment of journalists and school children in various provinces making headlines. This has only made the situation even more precarious.
 
In the given scenario, it would be very much in context to take a look at how the drawdown of the US forces has allowed Al-Qaeda an opportunity to revive itself in Afghanistan.

Since Al Qaeda is an organization that is driven by the notion of jihad (waging a righteous war on behalf of Islam) a brief discussion on what constitutes jihad is essential. Jihad is viewed as a collective duty by the Muslim Ulema (those specializing in Islamic theology) as opposed to a personal obligation. The jihadis (those waging the 'holy war') of all colors and creeds feel that jihad is one of the vital pillars of Islam but is now absent from the religion.

Jihad was viewed as a ‘permanent revolution’ against internal and external enemies who fundamentally attempted to infringe upon the authority of the faith.  In this context, scholars like Fawaz A. Gerges make a distinction between religious nationalists and transnational jihadis. While religious nationalists oppose the tactics adopted by the latter, they are keener to tackle the ‘near enemy’ (Adou al Qareeb) as opposed to the ‘far enemy’ (Adou al-Baeed). This is a major distinction that needs to be noted when the rise of Al-Qaeda or any other traditional transnational jihadi organization is discussed.

Rise of Al-Qaeda

In such a context, Al Qaeda as an organization was viewed as a vanguard of Muslims by Osama bin Laden.  It originated in 1989 when the Soviet forces began to retreat from Afghanistan and the Arab Afghans re-assembled under the leadership of bin Laden. The Arab-Afghans operated out of Sudan and then Afghanistan.

It was not an organization that was philanthropic in nature. It did not see itself as an organization that was working merely for the benefit of its “fellow Muslims”. It may have preached a universal ideology but in reality, this organization professed, propagated and practiced a realpolitik-based ideology.

The 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania brought Al Qaeda into focus and the 9/11 attacks accelerated its growth as a pivot of global terror. The shift in status from local to global was attributed to the bin Laden- al Zawahiri connection, which made the formal birth of Al Qaeda possible. Al Qaeda was viewed as a group that saw itself as a possible strategic voice for the umma (community), one that would be of interest and provide its support.

The 9/11 episode changed the course for Al Qaeda as the attack had bigger repercussions that even Al Qaeda as an entity had not expected.  The 9/11 attacks transformed Al Qaeda from a social movement into an international terrorist organization. Interestingly, most jihadis earlier did not even believe that Al Qaeda was capable of launching such a massive attack with a handful of Arabs, fooling American intelligence agencies, especially the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 

In fact, scholar Fawaz Gerges suggests that Arabs were in a state of disbelief that a few among them were able to escape the penetrative lens of the US security establishment with commensurate ease.  

Decline of Al-Qaeda

Interestingly, Al- Qaeda is an organization that is beset with inherent weaknesses as well. The ‘branching out approach’ of Al Qaeda did not benefit the organization. Al Qaeda may have branched out due to inherent contradictions within the group’s leadership, apart from existing conflicts in its ranks, given its different strategic objectives and organizational interests. These problems destabilized the group and made the organization lose focus.  

Al Qaeda wants to regain legitimacy in the eyes of its followers. In the words of Barak Mendelsohn, this tendency has led Al Qaeda to rethink and re-evaluate itself as a transnational jihadist organization as it competes for market share in both the West and the Middle East.  

Similarly, Al Qaeda’s offshoots have shown mixed results. While organizations like Al-Shabab have managed to “wield substantial territorial control” and even expanded their access to the Somali diaspora, other offshoots have not done that well. The Al Shabab has managed to emerge as a force to reckon with though it is a large heterogeneous group.  

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has not developed permanent administrative structures.  It essentially operates within local settings.

Al Qaeda has not been able to attract religious nationalists into its larger fold. While its version of jihad has scores of followers, there are others who do not follow this extremist model of jihadism. In fact, initially, Al Qaeda’s social base and its support were restricted to Saudi Arabia, Yemen and to some extent Pakistan.    

Opportunity for revival

Today, Al Qaeda has limited public support because of an ‘existing state of statelessness’ in areas where they manage to capture power. Al Qaeda is leading a scattered existence along the Afghan-Pakistan border and its leadership is undergoing a constant shift.

The phenomenon of ‘leaderless jihad’ can be associated with Al Qaeda at the moment, and the splinter groups affiliated to Al Qaeda are leading the 'Al Qaeda threat' and carrying out attacks and consolidating the existing threat perception.  

In such a scenario, the return of the Taliban amidst the US withdrawal from Afghanistan may provide Al Qaeda an opportunity to reassert its influence in Afghanistan. Although it continues to weaken as an entity, it will remain a relevant actor on the Afghan stage. In fact, the nature of the war is likely to change in Afghanistan.

Though Al-Qaida may not use Afghanistan to launch a direct attack on the United States, it can do so from other frontiers.

Although it is a terror group in decline, it will continue to hold on to its core values of leading a battle against the “so-called” far enemy, which in this case happens to be the US. This animosity towards the US will sustain the organization. It will function through its localized sub-organs and franchisees with the phenomenon of ‘leaderless jihad’ firmly strengthening its roots within the jihadi infrastructure. Thus, despite the withdrawal of troops, the arrival of peace will be a distant dream for Afghanistan.

While hosting Al-Qaeda may not be beneficial to the Taliban if it wants to gain international legitimacy, it does know that Al Qaeda is a tool in its hand that it can play with. Since the Taliban is not monolithic in character, and various competing factions and clans comprise this grouping, it is possible that one of its various factions could attempt to gain control in Afghanistan by using Al-Qaeda.

(The writer is a New Delhi-based political analyst. The views expressed are personal. She can be contacted at anuttama92@gmail.com) 

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