Trump’s demand for Pakistan to recognize Israel threatens to trigger serious domestic backlash inside the country. Public sentiment in Pakistan overwhelmingly supports the Palestinian cause, while religious and political groups strongly oppose normalization with Israel without the creation of an independent Palestinian state.
Chinese social media reactions to Rubio’s visit also reflected a degree of skepticism and criticism towards India. Several commentators focused on developmental and infrastructural contrasts between India and China. Discussions surrounding traffic congestion, pollution, aging infrastructure, and even the extreme summer temperatures in northern India were used by some online voices to project what they described as a “dismal” picture of India.
The Putin–Xi meeting, therefore, should not be interpreted as the birth of a fixed anti-American alliance. Rather, it reflects a flexible alignment whose cooperation is strongest where grievances overlap, but weakest where ambitions collide. Putin and Xi are united more by pressure than by trust. They are aligned in opposing American dominance, but not necessarily in supporting each other’s long-term rise.
Though with a Muslim population much larger than most of the OIC member countries, India has not been given its membership due to Pakistan’s objection and, unlike Russia, has not applied for observer status either. However, organisers of the KazanForum invited local Indian Consul General Jeysundkhar, who is based in Kazan, for the special session "Greater Eurasian Partnership: Development Strategy"
However, the visit clarified one important reality: despite periodic friction over trade, tariffs, Russia, immigration, or strategic autonomy, neither India nor the United States presently has the luxury of disengagement. The relationship may no longer carry the earlier romanticism of “natural allies,” but it continues to be driven by geopolitical realities - energy security, China’s rise, maritime stability, technology supply chains, and the changing balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.
For many in India and Sri Lanka, however, the memory of the assassination remains raw. Rajiv Gandhi’s killing was not merely the death of a much-loved former prime minister; it marked the violent spillover of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict into India itself.
Non-nuclear weapon states arrived at the conference with legitimate frustration. Nuclear arsenals are being modernized at enormous cost. The New START Treaty expired in February 2026 without a successor framework — the first time since the early 1970s that no binding limits govern the strategic arsenals of the United States and Russia. China is expanding its arsenal faster than any other nuclear power.
The Afghanistan Freedom Front was formed in March 2022 under the leadership of Gen. Yasin Zia, the former Chief of General Staff of the Afghan National Army. The force comprises mainly the former members of the Afghan National Security Forces, trained soldiers and experienced officers, former defenders of Afghanistan against the Taliban under a democratically-elected government who are now stateless, exiles, and warriors once again.
The real question for South Asia is not whether to engage with China. That question is already settled. Every country in the region engages with China in some way. The real question is how to engage wisely. South Asian governments need transparency in project contracts, stronger debt management, competitive bidding, parliamentary oversight, environmental safeguards, and public debate before signing major deals.
This is not new and it’s certainly not accidental that women are participating in every sphere of the Baloch movement, from the streets of Quetta, the capital of Balochistan, to the suicide operations of the Majeed Brigade. It’s the most precise sociological indicator of how far this conflict has travelled in southwestern Pakistan. Mama Qadeer Baloch conducted 2,000-kilometre march from Quetta to Islamabad in 2013-14, under the banner of Voice for Baloch Missing Persons. It was largely sustained by women.
Barring several imponderable items, the pomp and show and the nine-course meal banquet, Trump essentially returned empty-handed after his visit to China, with the latter asserting over Taiwan, ushering in G2, but with no major trade or investment concessions from Beijing. It is advantage China in this round, and the new-found confidence in Beijing could constrain New Delhi's moves.
Now, Bangladesh has said that future bilateral relations with India will heavily depend on successful renegotiation and renewal of the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, which expires in December 2026. Bangladesh’s Water Resources Minister Shahiduddin Chowdhury Anee and the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) General Secretary Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir are pressing for immediate talks on new agreements that should not have fixed tenures.
Amid this regional uncertainty, a new dynamic is emerging. China and Pakistan are taking steps to form a new regional alliance that plans to include Bangladesh as a potential member. This reality may lead to various disagreements about the need for SAARC’s revival. However, establishing active regional cooperation in South Asia would help create geopolitical pressure and push crises like the Rohingya problem towards a coordinated solution.
None of this suggests that Pakistan’s rise is occurring at the expense of India’s decline. Despite its challenges, India remains far more capable than Pakistan in areas such as advanced technology, financial capacity, and strategic alliances. Nevertheless, the evolving global environment suggests that diplomatic flexibility is becoming increasingly important. In other words, the issue is less about visibility or size and more about the ability to operate effectively amid differences and maintain communication during difficult times.
China buys more than 80 percent of Iran’s shipped oil. In 2025, China purchased an average of 1.38 million barrels per day of Iranian oil, accounting for around 13.4 percent of China’s seaborne oil imports.China has therefore become the largest economic absorber of Iranian oil and Tehran’s principal economic lifeline. Without Chinese demand, Iran’s sanctions-hit economy would face far greater pressure.
Neither Bangladesh nor India — including West Bengal — is likely to fully concede its position. The future instead lies in pragmatic compromise, where domestic political constraints are balanced against the imperatives of regional cooperation. Ultimately, the trajectory of India–Bangladesh relations will depend less on identity politics and more on whether both sides can align economic necessity with political will.
The broader reality is that even if a political understanding emerges, restoring confidence in the Strait may take far longer than restoring a ceasefire. Shipping markets operate as much on perception of risk as on military realities. Tanker operators, insurers, charterers, and energy traders require predictability — and that predictability is currently absent.
New Delhi now occupies an awkward middle space: not fully trusted by the West, yet no longer fully aligned with the broader Global South consensus either. That ambiguity becomes riskier if Washington and Beijing move into even a temporary phase of strategic stabilisation.
The major bilateral issue is border security and management. While India claims that millions of Bangladeshis enter India illegally, reside and work here, Bangladesh dismisses that contention outright, saying that as their per capita income was higher than India’s, there was no reason for economic migration from Bangladesh to India.
