China’s rise is no longer measured only by the size of its economy, army, or exports. It is also measured by roads, ports, bridges, power plants, scholarships, digital platforms, media networks, and diplomatic language. This is the new face of soft power. In the past, soft power often meant culture, cinema, education, language, and public image. Today, China has expanded that meaning. It has turned infrastructure into influence and development finance into diplomacy. This is visible across the world, but it is especially visible in South Asia.

Globally, China has become one of the most active builders of the developing world. The Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013, now includes about 150 countries. In 2025, Chinese BRI engagement reached a record level, with $128.4 billion in construction contracts and $85.2 billion in investments. Since 2013, total BRI engagement has reached about $1.399 trillion. This is not ordinary foreign assistance. It is a long-term strategy to build connectivity, secure markets, deepen political relationships, and shape how countries think about China’s role in the world.

China's Changing Global Image 

This strategy has also improved China’s global image in some areas. Brand Finance’s Global Soft Power Index 2025 placed China second, ahead of the United Kingdom. China ranked highly for “business and trade,” “future growth potential,” and “products and brands the world loves.” Pew Research also found in 2025 that views of China had become more positive in 15 of the 25 countries surveyed. These findings do not mean China is universally admired. They show something more important: China is becoming harder to ignore. Many countries may have concerns about Chinese power, but they also see China as a source of investment, trade, technology, and quick delivery.

Visible Projects in South Asia

South Asia is one of the clearest testing grounds for this model. The region has nearly two billion people, huge infrastructure gaps, young populations, fragile economies, strategic sea lanes, border tensions, and deep development needs. China understands this. Its soft power in South Asia is not built only through Confucius Institutes or cultural festivals. It is built through visible projects. A bridge can carry vehicles, but it can also carry a political message. A port can handle cargo, but it can also create strategic dependence. A scholarship can educate a student, but it can also shape a future official, journalist, engineer, or diplomat.

Pakistan is China’s strongest partner in South Asia. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, or CPEC, is often described as the flagship of the Belt and Road Initiative. Reuters reported in 2025 that CPEC involves about $65 billion in Chinese investment, with thousands of Chinese nationals working on related projects. China and Pakistan have also agreed to upgrade railway networks, develop Gwadar port further, and expand cooperation in mining and offshore oil and gas. This is infrastructure diplomacy at its deepest level. 

For Pakistan, China offers roads, power, ports, and diplomatic support. For China, Pakistan offers strategic access, a reliable partner near India, and a gateway to the Arabian Sea. Yet this influence has costs. Attacks on Chinese workers have become a serious issue, and Beijing has repeatedly pressed Islamabad to improve security. Soft power becomes weaker when projects require heavy security and public suspicion grows.

Bangladesh is another important case. China has become a major development and trade partner for Dhaka. It has supported large infrastructure projects and supplied machinery, industrial goods, defense equipment, and construction services. In FY24, China remained Bangladesh’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade amounting to Tk 2.246 trillion, according to Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics data reported by The Financial Express. Reuters reported in February 2026 that China’s influence in Bangladesh was likely to deepen after the election, especially after the political changes following 2024. 

Bangladesh’s attraction to China is practical. China can finance and build fast. It can offer technology, market access, and diplomatic flexibility. But Bangladesh also faces a challenge. If the relationship remains too import-heavy and loan-driven, economic dependence may grow faster than public trust.

Attraction and Danger

Sri Lanka shows both the attraction and the danger of China’s infrastructure diplomacy. Hambantota port has become the most cited example. After struggling with debt and weak commercial performance, Sri Lanka leased a controlling stake in the port to China Merchants Port Holdings for 99 years in 2017. The story is often simplified as a “debt trap,” although Sri Lanka’s crisis also came from domestic mismanagement, tax cuts, foreign reserve shortages, and the collapse of tourism. Still, Hambantota damaged China’s image in parts of the region. It showed that infrastructure can create influence, but it can also create fear. When a project becomes linked with sovereignty concerns, soft power turns into strategic suspicion.

Nepal presents a more complicated picture. China has expanded language programs, student exchanges, party-level contacts, and infrastructure ambitions. South Asia has 14 Confucius Institutes across six countries, including two in Nepal. A 2024 Indian Council of World Affairs report said Nepal’s two Confucius Institutes had trained more than 50,000 Chinese-language professionals. But China’s image has also faced pressure. The Pokhara International Airport, built with a China Exim Bank loan, has struggled to attract international flights since opening in 2023. In 2026, Nepal charged 55 people and a Chinese company in a major corruption case linked to alleged cost inflation of more than $74 million in the airport project. This case is important because soft power depends on trust. If projects are seen as expensive, opaque, or politically influenced, public approval weakens.

The Maldives is one of the smallest countries in South Asia, but it sits in one of the most strategic locations in the Indian Ocean. China’s influence there has grown through infrastructure, tourism, trade, and high-level diplomacy. President Mohamed Muizzu’s 2024 visit to China reflected a clear attempt to deepen ties with Beijing. China and the Maldives upgraded relations and discussed infrastructure and trade cooperation. Yet the Maldives is also a warning case. Reuters reported in 2025 that its public and publicly-guaranteed debt had reached $9.4 billion, or more than 134 percent of GDP, by the last quarter of 2024. India and China remain its biggest creditors, and both compete for influence there. For a small island state, Chinese soft power can bring airports, bridges, and tourists. But it can also create debt anxiety and domestic political division.

Strategic Competitor, Trade Dependent

India is different from the rest of South Asia because it is not a BRI participant and sees China as a strategic competitor. Yet China still has influence in India through trade, technology, manufacturing inputs, and supply chains. India’s trade deficit with China reached a record $99.2 billion in FY2024-25, with imports from China at $113.5 billion and exports to China at only $14.3 billion. This is not soft power in the traditional sense. It is structural economic power. India may distrust China politically, especially after the 2020 Galwan clash, but Indian industries still depend on Chinese components in electronics, solar cells, pharmaceuticals, and electric batteries. This shows that influence does not always require affection. Sometimes dependence is enough.

Bhutan remains the least exposed to China’s soft power. It has no formal diplomatic relations with Beijing and has traditionally relied on India for security, trade, and hydropower cooperation. But China is still present through border negotiations and strategic pressure. Reuters reported in 2025 that India expanded energy ties with Bhutan and extended a $455 million line of credit, partly as Beijing stepped up engagement over the long-running Bhutan-China border dispute and diplomatic relations. Bhutan’s case shows that Chinese influence can work even without large public projects. Geography itself becomes pressure.

Business sans Moral Lectures

Afghanistan is a special case. Since the Taliban returned to power in 2021, China has taken a cautious but active approach. It has not followed the Western path of isolation. Instead, it has kept diplomatic channels open and explored mining, trade, agriculture, and Belt and Road cooperation. In 2025, Reuters reported that China was interested in exploring and mining Afghanistan’s minerals and wanted Kabul to formally join the BRI. Afghanistan’s lithium, copper, and iron deposits are especially attractive for China’s supply chain security. For the Taliban, China offers recognition without moral lectures. For China, Afghanistan offers minerals and strategic depth. But the risks are high because security, governance, and human rights concerns remain unresolved.

Challenge for South Asia 

China’s soft power in South Asia is therefore powerful but uneven. It works best where governments need fast infrastructure, financing, and diplomatic support. It works less well where debt, corruption, security or sovereignty concerns dominate public debate. China’s greatest advantage is delivery. Its greatest weakness is trust. Many South Asian states want Chinese roads, bridges, ports, power plants, and markets. But they also worry about overdependence, opaque contracts, political influence, and strategic consequences.

The real question for South Asia is not whether to engage with China. That question is already settled. Every country in the region engages with China in some way. The real question is how to engage wisely. South Asian governments need transparency in project contracts, stronger debt management, competitive bidding, parliamentary oversight, environmental safeguards, and public debate before signing major deals. They should welcome investment but avoid dependency. They should accept connectivity but protect sovereignty. They should learn Chinese but also defend academic freedom. They should trade with China but also diversify exports and partners.

China has moved from infrastructure to influence. South Asia must now move from dependency to strategy. The region should not see China only as a threat or only as a friend. It should see China as a powerful actor whose offers must be judged carefully, project by project, and interest by interest. In the end, soft power succeeds when people trust the intention behind the investment. China has built many things in South Asia. The harder task is building confidence.

(The author is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Governance Studies (CGS) in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Views expressed are personal. He can be reached at md.saiful.stu2018@juniv.edu/  LinkedIn )