Open war with India is not in China’s interest. It would jeopardize its Belt and Road Initiative, alienate global markets, and push India closer to the United States and other like-minded partners. Moreover, the Himalayan terrain offers no guarantee of quick victory. Still, China might employ limited conflicts or sudden skirmishes to test India’s resolve, create psychological pressure, or distract from internal challenges.
China’s Myanmar policy highlights a core strategic contradiction. While Beijing positions itself as a champion of peace, development, and regional connectivity, yet its explicit support for the military regime entrenches coercive rule to safeguard its strategic and economic interests.
Strategically, the display went beyond the immediate region. The unveiling of long-range nuclear platforms and hypersonic missiles positioned China as a peer competitor to the United States in global deterrence. No longer confined to regional defense, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) signaled its readiness to project power across continents.
The debate in Delhi will inevitably ask whether engagement through the SCO dilutes India’s other partnerships or rewards China without resolving the frontier. That binary misses the point. The right question is: can we turn multilateral statements into Indian payrolls while holding our security lines? The answer is yes, if we focus on execution.
The summit is taking place under the shadow of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It is also taking place at a time when relations between China and the Quad member countries have become fraught, with Beijing increasingly challenging democratic values and resorting to coercive trade practices.
A review of Quad initiatives is one of the key agendas for the four world leaders, an Indian government statement quoted the prime minister as saying before his departure. The grouping includes the world’s oldest and largest democracies — Japan, India, Australia and US — and represents a combined GDP of $34 trillion, or 40 per cent of the global total.
Bachelet, during her China visit between 23-28 May, will “meet with a number of high-level officials at the national and local levels, civil society organizations, business representatives, academics, and deliver a lecture to students at Guangzhou University,” the statement released by her office said on Friday
But what came as surprise amid this report was the Chinese state media's defence of India after criticism from Group of Seven (G7) nations, ANI news agency said. Global Times, a Chinese government outlet said, "Blaming India won't solve the food problem."
Chinese firms also raised objections to Pakistan’s new draft renewable energy policy, which, interestingly, calls for international competitive bidding—something the Chinese have been advocating in the Sri Lankan power sector, mainly to counter Indian influence
In his book "India-China Boundary Issues", late Indian diplomat R S Kalha observed that, "China will continue its policy of keeping India strategically confined to South Asia with the active assistance of Pakistan, and strategically imbalanced by continuing incursions across the LAC.In such an event, there is little change that there will be any meaningful forward movement in the settlement of the boundary dispute between India and China."
“Earlier, we used to say Chinese have strategic patience. They are ready to wait. Now, the present India has come up a long way and we also have strategic patience and we are also ready to wait,” he said
Currently, the total trade between India and China is exchanged through US dollar per se. As the Chinese yuan is not a global currency, it is more stable than the US dollar, writes S. Majumder for South Asia Monitor
Significantly, Colombo is also seeking bridge financing through bilateral means from India and China as the negotiations with the IMF will take at least three-four months. So far, New Delhi has provided assistance worth $2.4 billion dollars in form of lines of credits and loan repayment deferment.
“Conventional security for CPEC projects is essential, but state institutions cannot ignore the strategic and political context. Cursing external elements alone cannot solve the problem,” Muhammad Ameer Rana, a security expert, wrote in Dawn. He suggested engaging with the Baloch people to address their concerns, the most prominent among them are the cases of missing people.
Xiaomi India is a trader and distributor of mobile phones in India under the brand name MI. It procures the completely manufactured mobile sets and other products from the manufacturers in India. "It has not availed any service from the three foreign-based entities to whom such amounts have been transferred," the ED said.
But there was no clarity on what China meant by allowing the return of "some" Indian students, when over 23,000 Indian students, mostly studying medicine in Chinese colleges, are stuck in India after they returned home as the coronavirus broke out in China in December 2019
India's first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru "made a blunder" when he recognised China's claim over Tibet but he did what he thought was best for his country, said Penpa Tsering, the president of the Tibetan government in exile, in Washington
“Any collaboration with any NGO/Foundation is subject to Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA). Hence, all Universities/Institutions having collaboration with Confucius Institutes/Hanban/CLEC or planning to collaborate to set up Confucius Institutes (CIs) or any other joint venture in any other name will be required to seek prior clearance under FCRA,” reads the communication
In preserving its strategy of breaking the containment policy, Moscow, Tehran, Islamabad, Taipei and Pyongyang remain at the forefront. All five will be used as a bargaining tool with Washington and the containing squad in exerting greater influence and say on the pull-push tussle in the Indo-Pacific domain, writes Collins Chong Yew Keat for South Asia Monitor
