Bangladesh stands at a historic crossroads. The referendum of 12 February 2026 is more than a constitutional amendment—it is a test of democratic conscience, with lessons for South Asia’s struggle to balance majority rule and pluralism. At stake is not only a legal provision, but the moral identity of the state, the legacy of the Liberation War, and the meaning of equal citizenship.

The proposal to remove secularism from the Constitution’s fundamental principles forces a deeper question: what are the limits of democratic choice? If democracy is reduced to the will of the numerical majority alone, it risks hollowing out its ethical foundation. Comparative experience underscores this danger. In the UK’s Brexit referendum, the preferences of Scotland and Northern Ireland were overridden by an England‑centric majority. In Canada’s Quebec referendums, cultural and linguistic divides revealed how majority decisions can deepen fractures rather than resolve them. These cases demonstrate a core democratic insight: majority rule is necessary, but not sufficient. Democracy derives legitimacy not only from numbers, but from its moral capacity to protect equal dignity, security, and rights—especially for minorities. When democratic procedures undermine those protections, they may remain procedurally valid but lose moral legitimacy.

Political theory has long warned of the “tyranny of the majority,” a recurring reality in South Asia. India’s democratic debates, like those in Hungary and Turkey, show how majoritarian politics can erode constitutional safeguards and weaken pluralism. Bangladesh’s referendum poses the same test: will democracy rest on moral restraint or unchecked numbers? The answer lies in how the referendum is structured, for process design determines whether democracy’s promise can be upheld.

Questions About Proposed Referendum 

The proposed structure of Bangladesh’s referendum raises serious concerns. Multiple constitutional changes are bundled into a single question, forcing voters to accept or reject them wholesale. This denies citizens the ability to express differentiated preferences—supporting one reform while opposing another—and constrains genuine democratic choice. In democratic theory, this violates the principle that voters must be able to make a free and informed choice on each distinct issue. 

More troubling still is the omission of the term “secularism” from the referendum question itself. A number of parties opposed its removal during the consensus‑building process, while others supported putting it to a vote. Yet the principle that has generated the deepest moral and political debate is excluded from explicit public consideration. This omission undermines transparency and violates the principle of informed consent. The July Charter’s replacement of secularism with “freedom of religion” compounds the problem. While the two concepts are not inherently opposed, they are not interchangeable. Freedom of religion protects individual belief and worship, but it is sustainable only when the State remains neutral among religions. Religious freedom protects belief; secularism protects civic equality. Without secularism as a constitutional anchor, religious freedom risks becoming uneven—protecting the majority while leaving minorities exposed.

Consider this distinction in practice: a State may guarantee “freedom of religion,” yet if it privileges the majority faith in public institutions—mandating religious education or favoring one religion in State ceremonies—minorities are left with nominal freedom but diminished equality. In such cases, freedom exists in form but not in substance, because neutrality is absent. Global experience confirms this fragility. As John Locke noted, religious freedom is hollow if the State privileges one faith, leaving minorities unprotected. Charles Taylor likewise shows that secularism is not anti‑religious but a framework of fairness, ensuring equal freedom for all. Without neutrality, freedom risks becoming the majority’s prerogative alone.

The Charter’s drafting process also revealed a lack of inclusiveness. Of Bangladesh’s 52 registered political parties, only 25 signed it. With two representatives from each, a total of 50 representatives signed the Charter. Among them, not a single woman and only one minority representative participated. This composition reveals not merely an oversight, but a structural exclusion. The most serious flaw lies in the government’s failure to meaningfully engage minority communities on the question of secularism. No formal consultations were held to hear their concerns, and their perspectives are conspicuously absent from the July Charter. In the absence of institutional mechanisms to register and reflect minority views independently, the referendum process cannot be regarded as inclusive. International standards for referendums, including principles articulated by bodies such as the Venice Commission, emphasize that democratic legitimacy rests on transparency, inclusiveness, and fairness. Most critically, when changes to a constitution’s foundational principles are proposed, democratic validity depends on securing the informed consent of all citizens—particularly those whose rights and security are most directly affected.

The 1971 Liberation War rejected religion‑based statehood and gave birth to a Constitution grounded in equality and pluralism. Secularism was its ethical cornerstone. Pakistan’s denial of linguistic, cultural, and political rights to East Bengal produced a constitutional vision rooted in equality. Accordingly, the 1972 Constitution enshrined democracy, nationalism, socialism, and secularism as foundational principles. Secularism was never conceived as hostility to religion; it was the mechanism through which citizenship was detached from faith. Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and Christians had fought together in the Liberation War; secularism was the constitutional expression of that shared moral commitment.

Why Secularism Matters

Political philosophy clarifies why secularism matters. Mill warned that unchecked majority rule degenerates into oppression. Amartya Sen emphasized that justice requires pluralism. Hannah Arendt understood politics as the maintenance of secure coexistence which demands neutrality. John Rawls argued that a just society is judged by how it treats its weakest members. Together, these perspectives converge on a single principle: democracy is not merely procedural; it is moral. Secularism is the constitutional articulation of that moral commitment.

Bangladesh, though Muslim‑majority, has historically significant Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, and Indigenous minorities. Removing secularism would create a profound democratic dilemma as it is the safeguard against majoritarian dominance and structural exclusion. The South Asian experience shows the risks of privileging religion in constitutions. Sri Lanka’s special status for Buddhism, coupled with nationalism, marginalized minorities and fueled decades of conflict, damaging tourism, investment, and fiscal stability. Pakistan’s religious state identity narrowed citizenship, entrenched discrimination, and weakened accountability, producing recurring instability and economic uncertainty. Globally, religious exclusion heightens political risk, erodes investor confidence, and harms reputation. 

Yet the region also offers positive lessons. Nepal’s post‑conflict reforms introduced proportional representation, requiring parties to include minorities in their lists. This turned symbolic inclusion into genuine participation, strengthening democracy’s inclusiveness.

Bangladesh’s referendum is not only a domestic turning point but a case study in how constitutional design shapes democratic legitimacy. If clarity, inclusiveness, and protection of minorities are absent, procedural votes risk producing exclusion rather than consensus. The choice before Bangladesh will echo across South Asia, reminding the region that democracy’s strength lies not in numbers alone, but in its moral capacity to safeguard equal citizenship.

(The author is Professor and Chair of the Department of Economics, International University of Business Agriculture and Technology (IUBAT), Dhaka. His research focuses on regional trade, sustainable development, and South Asian economic cooperation. Views expressed are personal. He can be reached at golam.grasul@gmail.com)