Pakistan’s political landscape has once again tilted sharply in favor of the military. The recently enacted 27th Constitutional Amendment—passed hurriedly through both houses of parliament in November 2025—has fundamentally reshaped the country’s civil–military power structure and concentrated unprecedented authority in the hands of a single military leader, Field Marshal Asim Munir. 

For decades, Pakistan has been described as a “hybrid” state where elected governments operate under the shadow of the army. But this constitutional change has formalized what was once implicit—and risks steering the country toward outright military authoritarianism, with serious implications for Pakistan’s internal stability and regional peace.

Securing Munir's position 

The amendment creates the powerful new post of Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), which Munir now holds simultaneously with his position as Chief of Army Staff. With this dual command, he now exercises direct authority over the army, air force, and navy—a unified command system Pakistan has never had. It also abolishes the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, which at least symbolically allowed the civilian leadership to play a role in strategic and nuclear decisions. That vestige of shared authority has now disappeared.

The changes are specifically tailored to secure Munir’s position. His tenure resets to five years starting from his appointment as CDF, meaning he will remain in office until 2030 and have significant influence over the next general election in 2029. More strikingly, his removal now requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority—a threshold higher than what is needed to remove the prime minister. The amendment also grants him lifelong immunity from prosecution, a privilege he uniquely enjoys as Pakistan’s only five-star military officer. In effect, parliament has locked itself out of any realistic oversight of the most powerful military leader since Field Marshal Ayub Khan.

Concentration Of Power

These structural changes are not merely administrative; they represent the biggest shift in Pakistan’s power dynamics in decades. Analysts warn that nuclear authority—which at least formally rested with the civilian leadership—has now tilted decisively toward the military. Munir now oversees the National Strategic Command and can make crucial decisions without involving the prime minister or the political cabinet. For a nuclear-armed state prone to crisis escalation with India and Afghanistan, this concentration of control in a single military office raises troubling risks.

Equally consequential is the blow dealt to Pakistan’s judiciary. The amendment establishes a Federal Constitutional Court with powers to override the Supreme Court and limits the influence of judges on judicial appointments. Two senior judges resigned in protest, describing the changes as an assault on judicial independence. By curtailing legal oversight, the amendment grants the military leadership not only political and strategic supremacy but also insulation from any meaningful challenge through legal institutions.

The political bargains behind the amendment reflect Pakistan’s familiar pattern of elite collusion. Reports suggest that Asif Ali Zardari’s Pakistan Peoples Party supported the amendment in exchange for his own lifetime immunity as president. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif—leading an uneasy coalition—appears to have relied on military backing to sustain his government. With civilian parties weakened and deeply divided, the military has seized the opportunity to embed its dominance into the constitutional framework.

A Militarized State

These domestic developments come at a time of rising insurgency and instability. Pakistan is grappling with intensifying Baloch separatism in Balochistan and increased militancy by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan factions in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Rather than calming tensions, the amendment threatens to aggravate perceptions of military overreach, repression, and resource extraction—particularly in marginalized regions. There are even rumors of a future 28th amendment to alter Pakistan’s federal structure in ways that may further reduce provincial autonomy and trigger stronger resistance.

The regional implications are equally disturbing. Munir has positioned himself as the decisive defender of Pakistan’s strategic interests. His confrontational rhetoric toward India—especially after the May conflict—has enhanced his domestic standing. He has also adopted a harsher tone with the Afghan Taliban, accusing Kabul of harboring militants and threatening disproportionate force. A newly empowered and less restrained military command structure raises the likelihood of rapid escalation—or miscalculation—in South Asia. 

Moreover, Pakistan’s geostrategic diplomacy under Munir has changed course. He is credited internally with breaking Pakistan’s isolation by reviving defense ties with Saudi Arabia and strengthening engagement with the United States. Washington’s willingness to work with Munir may be influenced by Pakistan’s proposal to contribute to a Muslim peacekeeping force in Gaza—making global actors reluctant to criticize Pakistan’s internal political upheaval. With the world distracted by multiple major crises—from Ukraine to the wider Middle East—Munir’s power consolidation has generated only mild international concern.

Yet history shows that military domination has never brought Pakistan stability. Previous eras of uniformed rule—Ayub Khan in the 1960s, Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s, Musharraf in the 2000s—began with promises of order and efficiency. They ended in political upheavals, economic setbacks, and diplomatic isolation. Pakistan’s military, instead of acting as a guardian, became more deeply entangled in politics and business, eroding the legitimacy of democratic institutions.

Munir’s rise escalates this familiar cycle. With authority unchallenged by parliament, insulated from judicial checks, and celebrated as a national savior, powerful military leaders often believe they alone can define national interest. But centralizing power in a single office magnifies the consequences of misjudgment. A Pakistan governed through coercion and strategic adventurism risks descending into a deeper crisis—precisely when it faces economic struggle, societal polarization, and militant threats.

This amendment may strengthen Munir’s grip over Pakistan for now, but it weakens the foundations of a stable and accountable state. It transforms the hybrid system into an openly militarized one, further sidelining the political class and disempowering ordinary citizens. Civilian governments will be left governing in name only, subordinate to a military hierarchy that now enjoys constitutional supremacy.

A Political Coup

Pakistan has taken a dangerous step toward authoritarian rule at a moment when democracy worldwide faces backsliding. For the region, this shift could mean a more unpredictable and aggressive Pakistan—one where military decisions increasingly drive external policy while domestic grievances simmer unattended. For Pakistanis, it means a shrinking democratic space and the continued deferral of aspirations for genuine civilian governance.

The 27th Amendment, celebrated by its proponents as a security reform, is in reality a political coup executed through constitutional means. It marks not only Munir’s personal triumph but the institutional victory of the military over all other state authorities. As history warns, empowering any unelected institution above the republic’s elected will invites instability—not strength. Pakistan may soon discover that consolidating military power does not secure the nation’s future, but instead places it at greater risk, both within and beyond its borders.

(The author is an Associate Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi. Views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at anand_rai@hotmail.com )