The 2024 people’s uprising marked a rise in regional nationalism, leaving questions over the future of secularism and democracy in Bangladesh and resulting in rising tensions with India. The increased visibility of radical Islamist groups in post-Hasina Bangladesh has emboldened Islamic nationalism in the country. Even as the Nobel laureate, Muhammad Yunus, leads the nation following Sheikh Hasina’s resignation and flight, Bangladesh’s interim government has moved to lift the ban on the Jamaat-e-Islami party (JI), which has been previously charged under antiterrorism laws indicating a mainstreaming of radical Islamist groups.

Religious nationalism, fringe mainstreaming

With this turn towards religious nationalism, minorities, especially Hindus, have faced ethnic tensions and violence in post-Hasina Bangladesh, with more than 50  Hindu temples set on fire, 24 people burnt to death, Chinmoy Das, an ISKON Hindu priest, arrested, and a narrative of exclusion of tribal populations as ‘alibashi’ (separatists). Even local Buddhist temples, Christian churches and shrines of the liberal Sufi saints have been targeted, with little state action against the perpetrators. 

The heightened sense of religious conservatism also saw Islamists attack a book fair for promoting awareness on women’s menstrual hygiene. With 91 percent of the country identifying as Sunni Muslim, a sustained Islamization of the Bangladeshi society is witnessing the strengthening of religion in society and nation, with identity groups, including the Buddhist hill tribes of Chittagong (Chakmas, Hojongs, etc.), and even the non-Bengali Muslims from post-partition Assam and Bihar at risk of retributive marginalization.

While the post-2008 Hasina regime was characterized by rapid democratic backsliding – the end of a fifteen-year regime has destabilized the very fabric of society with a great deal of anxiety over the possibilities of deep-seated polarization. Moreover, with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP: a proponent of a religious Bangladeshi identity) and JI alliance being well poised to win an upcoming election, majoritarian fervor and further dampening of minority security may consolidate Bangladeshi society into a more fundamentalist version of Islamic identity. Fringe forces, like the JI, are fringe no more, and now are a staple of mainstream politics, pushing a more radical Islamic narrative of the nation. As elections get slotted for the late 2025 or early 2026, a strong appetite for democracy amongst Bangladeshis must prevail, with an urgent need for sustained civil society and government dialogue to deepen mutual trust in democracy and democratic dissent.

Backsliding relations with India

While Indo-Bangladesh relations have stood strong since the Indian Army played a crucial role in the Bangladesh War of Liberation  in1971, tensions between the two nations have heightened following the violence against Hindu minorities in Bangladesh.

Indian doctors going so far as to refuse medical attention to Bangladeshi patients and protest marches in Kolkata before the Bangladesh consulate show clear signs of counter mobilization of Indians against Bangladesh and growing discontent against Dhaka among ordinary Indians. While the presence of Bangladeshi Hindu refugees from the 1971 War of Liberation had continued to foster a close and cooperative relationship between Indian and Bangladesh, the same refugees, now generational residents in border towns, have increasingly been tagged as “infiltrators” in the Bharatiya Janata Party’s nationalist rhetoric and civilizational reinterpretation of India, as against the ethno-linguistic affinities that Indian Bengalis also share with their cross-border Bangladeshi counterparts.

Outright hostility following incidents of violence against Hindu minorities in Bangladesh and irredentist rhetoric by Bangladeshi politicians seeking to merge erstwhile colonial Bengal (a territory spanning Bangladesh, as well as West Bengal, Bihar and Odisha in India) have dampened relations between New Delhi and Dhaka. Indian domestic politics has already created a strong rhetoric against Bangladeshis with the pervasive fear that Bangladeshi migrants encroach on physical and political spaces, jobs, land, and welfare resources. The tensions between India and Bangladesh have only strengthened anti-Bangladeshi rhetoric and narratives amongst the Indian public. The suspension of visas for Bangladeshis citing the breakdown of law and order in that country has only exacerbated the situation. .

At the same time, Bangladeshi elites, instead of acknowledging and addressing the genuine concern over the safety and security of minorities, have sought to deny these as mere Indian disinformation and media propaganda to discredit the authenticity of the student-led protests and the newly formed interim government which has been critical towards India. Mass hysteria, mutual suspicion and aggression that often threatens retributive action is a cause for concern in both countries, especially as both migrants and minorities remain a vulnerable category.

Spillover effects in regional dynamics

There have been growing demands by the Bangladeshi government to extradite Hasina, who having fled the country and given refuge by India is becoming another point of confrontation. Chinese involvement with the Chittagong port has already been a source of discomfort to India threatening maritime security in the Bay of Bengal. The rise of BNP as the most important party in the interim coalition, a party that is seen as more sympathetic towards China and Pakistan by New Delhi, and the diplomatic efforts by Beijing to woo Dhaka, opens the possibilities for increased Chinese influence in South Asia, making India more circumspect in its dealings with the interim government.

2024 has been a year of political transition in South Asia, having faced a series of crises since 2021, with old problems often resurrecting in new forms. Be it the resurgence of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan following the hasty withdrawal of American troops; or the economic crisis that consequently led to mass uprising that led to the removal of the Rajapaksha dynasty in Sri Lanka; the incarceration of former prime minister Imran Khan in Pakistan and replacement by a military-sponsored Sharif regime; or a string of unstable governments in Nepal, have only heightened political stability and national security concerns across South Asia. 

Bangladesh is a case study on how national movements not only have domestic impact but also international repercussions on human and regional security, where shifts in national attitude has had a spillover in diplomatic tensions and shifting regional dynamics. Bangladesh lies at the geostrategic juncture between South Asia and South-East Asia, vital to security in the Bay of Bengal. Even though the restoration of political stability in Bangladesh is a regional necessity, its uneasy relationship with India is detrimental to South Asian cooperation and integration.

(The author is a postgraduate student pursuing M.A. in Political Science at St. Xavier’s College (Autonomous), Kolkata & M.P.A. from Indira Gandhi National Open University, New Delhi. Views expressed are personal. He can be reached at allendavidsimon2003@gmail.com or linkedin.com/in/allen-david-simon )