Indian diplomats are engaged in a battle of wits in the ongoing diplomatic wrangle with Washington. External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar sharply criticized the Trump administration’s decision to impose a 25% tariff on India on April 2, followed by the July 6 announcement of an additional 25% penalty on the import of Russian oil. Jaishankar’s defense of India’s reliance on discounted Russian oil as being in the country’s national interest reaffirms New Delhi’s unyielding stand on sovereignty and strategic autonomy. Refining and reselling the oil to Europe, China, and Japan has been criticized by some Western commentators as profiteering from someone else’s misery. At the same time, EU member states have been buying refined Russian oil from India and the United Arab Emirates, in addition to directly purchasing Russian coal, LNG, natural gas, and petroleum.

Trump’s targeting of India raises the question of why Turkey has not been penalized for buying Russian oil and armaments. Why did the Trump administration refrain from imposing punitive tariffs on Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Arab Emirates for committing the same act?

Selective Targeting of India 

Trump has been selective in imposing tariffs, using a mix of parameters—trade deficits, foreign policy alignment, preferential treatment based on personal or political considerations, and domestic economic benefits—rather than applying a uniform set of principles generally adhered to in foreign policy and international trade.

The absence of a consistent framework highlights how presidential prerogatives drive these policy outcomes. Globally, the effects—whether anticipated or unforeseen—remain uncertain and indeterminable. Such decisions may therefore be perceived as a gamble, dictated by the preferences of a single individual. If consequences turn adverse, blame would fall squarely on Trump.

India’s case, therefore, warrants scrutiny. The after-effects of the tariffs suggest India has been singled out for political convenience and deeper geopolitical and commercial interests.

India has effectively been made a scapegoat for the EU and U.S. failure to contain the Ukraine crisis. EU and NATO leaders, facing the economic strain of sustaining the war without a firm U.S. commitment, began wavering. Secondary sanctions offered NATO allies a way out, and the Trump administration integrated tariffs into a sanctions-like regime aimed at curtailing the Kremlin’s revenue stream.

It is striking that India came under the axe, despite many EU and NATO allies continuing to rely on Russian fossil fuels. Between February 24, 2022 (the start of the Ukraine war) and August 21, 2025, Russia earned over €933 billion (slightly above US$1 trillion) from fossil fuel exports to European and Asian buyers. In three years, the EU imported €213 billion (22% of the total), China €268 billion (28.3%), India €148.7 billion (15.9%), and Turkey €111 billion (11.9%).

Table 1: Import of Russian Fuel by European & Asian Buyers (Feb 24, 2022 – Aug 21, 2025)

Source: Russia Fossil Tracker, last updated Aug 26, 2025

On average, individual EU or NATO states purchased only 2–3% of Russian fossil fuel supplies. Germany accounted for nearly 3%, while Hungary, Brazil, Italy, the Netherlands, South Korea, and Japan each imported about 2%. Without these vast proceeds sustaining Moscow, it is conceivable that Putin might have been compelled to negotiate much earlier—saving lives, reducing economic disruption, and averting prolonged human suffering.

Trump’s Tariff and Indo-US Relations

The steep tariff has triggered deep resentment among Indian leaders, diplomats, retired officials, and academics, despite the otherwise warm relations between the two nations. India has long been a close friend, ally, and strategic partner of the United States, maintaining a generally pro-Western stance except when national interests and strategic imperatives dictated otherwise.

India has avoided turning BRICS into an anti-American platform, focusing instead on reforming multilateral trade and financial institutions like the World Bank, IMF, and WTO. This constructive approach reflects New Delhi’s broader ambition: to shape a fairer international order, preserve strategic autonomy, and avoid entanglement in great-power rivalries.

India’s purchase of 15.9% of Russian fossil fuel, worth €148.7 billion is transactional when compared to the projected US$500 billion in two-way trade expected from the Indo-U.S. COMPACT initiative launched in February 2025. COMPACT (Catalyzing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce & Technology for the 21st Century) seeks to boost trade, defense, and technology ties by 2030.

Yet, beneath the economic partnership, historical fault lines persist. The Trump team appears to rely on Cold War-era assumptions, recalling the US-Pakistan alignment against the Indo-Soviet axis of the 1970s. India’s philosophical and civilizational orientation, combined with its BRICS engagement and push for alternatives to the dollar, continues to distinguish its global posture.

Geopolitical analysts argue India did not deserve the punitive treatment it received. Some believe Washington could rebuild trust by waiving the 25% penalty on Russian oil imports, in exchange for Delhi easing non-tariff barriers and opening markets to US businesses. Such compromise could stabilize relations and reaffirm the strategic interdependence between the two democracies.

Raison d’être Behind Washington’s Stance

Much of Washington’s tough posture stems from India’s reluctance to deepen its role in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). During his October 2024 visit to Tokyo, Jaishankar rejected Japanese Foreign Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s proposal for an “Asian NATO,” reaffirming India’s non-aligned stance. This slowed efforts to create a NATO-style architecture in the Indian Ocean, frustrating Washington.

The Trump administration viewed India’s hesitation as undermining the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS). From Washington’s perspective, access to the Indian Ocean and close naval collaboration with India are indispensable for IPS objectives—regional democratization, security, and development.

America’s Strategic Calculus 

U.S. policy relies on in-depth assessments by the State Department, Pentagon, and intelligence community. Analysts believe Washington already anticipates India’s global rise. With the world’s largest population and fastest-growing diversified economy, India aspires to lead the Global South. Modi and Jaishankar emphasize strategic autonomy while projecting leadership rooted in civilizational values—pluralism, dharmic ethics, and democratic resilience.

This divergence allows Delhi to resist coercive diplomacy. Yielding to Trump’s demands would damage both India’s global ambitions and Modi’s domestic standing. On the contrary, refusing to yield may enhance Modi’s image as a strong leader protecting national interests. Denying U.S. businesses deeper access to India’s vast agricultural market could even strengthen Modi’s political dividends at home.

(The writer is an international consultant with academic and professional experience in Bangladesh, South Asia, and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. Views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at rsheikh2016@gmail.com)