As the monsoon season approaches Bengal, tensions are rising across northern Bangladesh and its floodplains due to mounting risks of water-induced disasters. Bangladesh, the world’s seventh most climate-vulnerable country, shares 54 transboundary rivers with India. Yet, to date, only one formal water-sharing agreement—the Ganga Water Treaty—was signed in 1996, after nearly three decades of negotiations. That treaty, valid for just 30 years, is set to expire this year. Meanwhile, the long-pending Teesta River agreement remains unresolved. The recent deterioration in diplomatic and political ties between Dhaka and New Delhi could further worsen if major water-related disasters unfold this season.

So, is Dhaka considering renewing the Ganga agreement with Delhi? What happens in 2026 if no new deal is reached? What about the remaining 53 transboundary rivers? Compounding the issue is China's strategic $2.1 billion loan and master plan proposal for the Teesta River, which has stirred geopolitical tensions across the Himalayan region.

Legacy of Failed Water Cooperation

Bangladesh and India share a complicated legacy of water cooperation. The Joint Rivers Commission (JRC), established in 1972, was intended to peacefully resolve transboundary water issues. However, it has failed to bring consensus on key rivers such as the Teesta, Feni, Manu, Muhuri, Khowai, Gomati, Jaldhaka, and Torsa. Despite Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) signed in 2019 and 2022 to withdraw water from the Feni (1.82 cusecs) and Kushiyara (up to 153 cusecs) rivers during the monsoon, implementation has been largely ineffective.

Bangladesh suffers nearly $1 billion in economic losses annually from flash floods, river overflows, and monsoon flooding. The 2024 floods in the Feni River area revealed critical weaknesses in the country’s disaster response, affecting 1.8 million people, killing 25, and leaving thousands marooned.

Teesta: A Strategic and Humanitarian Flashpoint

The Teesta River, a Himalayan tributary of the Brahmaputra, originates in Sikkim and flows through West Bengal before entering Bangladesh via Kurigram. Though only 121 km of the Teesta’s course lies within Bangladesh, the nation holds a vastly higher stake in its waters. Out of approximately 30 million people reliant on the river for their livelihood, 71% are Bangladeshi, compared to 2% in the Indian states of Sikkim and 27% in West Bengal.

Teesta’s average annual runoff is 60 billion cubic meters during the flow season, and just 500 million cubic meters in the lean season. The JRC has attempted to resolve the dispute multiple times—in 1972, 1983, and 1990—but without success. India’s construction of the Gajoldoba Barrage upstream in 1996, larger than Bangladesh’s Teesta Barrage, has fueled further mistrust. Although a draft agreement was reached in 2010, promising 40% of the river’s flow to each country and reserving 20% for environmental needs, it was blocked by West Bengal, despite approval from India’s central government.

Amid reported Indian reluctance, Dhaka has turned to Beijing for a 50-year master plan on river management. This has raised alarms in Delhi, especially as the proposed infrastructure is near the strategically sensitive Siliguri Corridor, a 22-kilometer-wide stretch connecting India to its northeastern states. Dhaka's pivot towards Beijing may ultimately disrupt the regional balance of power.

Ganga Water Treaty: Expiration and Consequences

While the shift towards Chinese investment may seem pragmatic for Bangladesh, the country—rich in rivers and floodplains—requires more cost-effective and sustainable solutions. This raises urgent questions: Is Dhaka formulating a balanced approach with its neighbor? Will there be renewed diplomatic engagement to address not only the Teesta but all transboundary rivers? Will the Ganges Treaty be renewed?

India, meanwhile, has long been accused of "weaponizing water" by constructing 36 dams and barrages on shared rivers, sparking a form of hydropolitics that leaves water hostage to bilateral tensions. Yet politicizing water will not solve cross-border challenges—whether of drought or deluge.

The Ganga (Padma) is Bangladesh’s most vital river, flowing through 21 districts. India’s controversial Farakka Barrage, built in 1975 despite strong protests and diplomatic pushback from Bangladesh, continues to affect seasonal flow patterns. During monsoon, it exacerbates flooding; during the lean season, agricultural lands suffer from drought. Canals under the Ganges-Kobadak (GK) irrigation project have lost navigability or dried up. The Ganga Water Treaty remains the only binding legal framework under which Bangladesh can hold India accountable.

The Big Question for Bangladesh

Once that treaty expires, Bangladesh will lose its legal leverage, as no international arbitration is possible without a formal agreement between the parties. While the treaty mandates a minimum of 35,000 cusecs of water for Bangladesh during the dry season (January to May), India has failed to meet this obligation on several occasions. Research suggests that nearly 1.5 million hectares of Bangladeshi land have been damaged due to drought and poor water management.

The big question remains: Will Bangladesh be able to renegotiate the Ganga water agreement and foster broader cooperation on transboundary rivers with India? Or will relations continue to sour, deepening the humanitarian and ecological crisis?

(The author is a researcher and master’s student in international relations at Jahangirnagar University, Bangladesh. Views are personal. He can be contacted at rajinsadik110@gmail.com)