On July 30 a suicide attack was launched at a Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) gathering in the village of Khar in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Bajaur district of Pakistan. The attack consumed the lives of several attendees. This was the second assassination attempt on the regional leader of JUF, Maulana Ziaullah, in which he eventually lost his life.

On July 31, ISIS (Central) claimed responsibility for the Khar attack through its Amaq News Agency channel. The Pakistani Taliban (TTP) stoutly condemned the attack and denied any involvement n an effort to stave off any possible retaliatory move by the Pakistani government.

Pakistan’s bomb disposal teams confirmed that about 100 kg of explosives were utilized in the Khar bombing. Pakistan’s outgoing Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif issued a statement in response to the attack stating “The terrorists are enemies of Pakistan, we will eliminate them from the face of existence”.

The JUI-F is a Deobandi Sunni political party, which is a part of the ruling coalition in Pakistan, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). Being a Deobandi Sunni affiliate party, JUI-F derives immense support from its connections to Pakistan’s network of Deobandi madrassas and religious institutions.

Pakistan's growing vulnerabilities

Like other religious parties, JUI-F too has undeniably tried to take advantage of the economic crisis in Pakistan and the arrest of the former Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan. However, according to the terror outfit Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), JUI-F and all those affiliated with the Taliban are apostates for their belief in the democratic system which they say contradicts the Sharia law.

As a result, the attack on the JUI-F political rally held on July 30 in Khar shouldn’t come entirely as a surprise.

Due to PML-N’s affiliation with JUI-F and its ties with Afghan Taliban, it was expected that these entities would be the likely targets of ISIS.

According to Muhammad Israr Madani, head of the International Research Council for Religious Affairs (IRCRA), “In Balochistan, most of the JUI-F Balochistan leaders, as well as those of its splinters — the JUI-Nazriati — are allied with the Kandahari region and their leaders on their own, without necessarily representing the party’s central policy over the Taliban”. He says that in Bajaur JUI-F leaders had cemented strong ties with the Afghan Taliban in Kunar and Nangarhar provinces of Afghanistan, which has made them susceptible to being targeted by the ISKP.

JUI-F commands a strong presence across the Pashtun belt and the areas dotting the Afghanistan border with Pakistan. That itself makes them an easy target for efficient ISIS attacks. The ISKP has several safe havens inside Afghanistan from where their operations are directed against Pakistani targets. 

ISKP in recent years has also targeted some of the most prominent Pakistani leaders including Mufti Sultan Muhammad, Maulana Abdul Salam, Qari Ilyas, Maulana Shafiullah, and Mufti Bashir.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province has seen several attacks in recent months, though most were claimed by the TTP. Bajaur specifically has been a “hotbed” of such attacks and was controlled by the Taliban in the past.

It is difficult to determine the exact number of ISKP cadre in Bajaur, but it has been confirmed that a group of local insurgents associated with the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, led by Abu Bakkar Bajauri, switched loyalties to the ISKP. Hence, the frequency of ISKP-led attacks in the area.

Imran Khan' abortive plan

Another important factor worth mentioning is that of Haji Usman Turabi. Turabi comes from Gabbary village in Bajaur’s Mamond area. He was a jihadi commander in Afghanistan. His family had immense connections with the leadership of the Afghan Taliban movement as his grandfather Akbar Khan was a well-known fighter in the war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

Soon after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, Turabi was appointed governor of Kunar province in August 2021. He was later replaced following a scandal caused by a photo shared with Pakistan’s hardline cleric Mufti Nadeem at his office.

Mufti Nadeem is known for his strong opposition to the Salafi community. Thus the photo of Turabi and Mufti at the governor’s house angered Kunar’s local residents and the Salafi community.

During Turabi’s term as the governor, the Taliban administration initiated several operations to wipe out ISKP militants from Kunar province. In retaliation, the ISKP began targeting Taliban sympathisers in Bajaur. This followed the killings of many religious scholars associated with the JUI-F as well as Turabi’s relatives in the region.

Another reason for the ISKP's attacks in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa region was because of the large population of Taliban fighters who returned from Afghanistan.

The former Pakistan PM Imran Khan claimed the Afghan Taliban had ordered their Pakistani fighters to return to Pakistan upon assuming power in Kabul. Having been left with limited choices, Khan had reportedly said that with regard to returning Taliban fighters, the government would “either line up those 40,000 people—including fighters and their families—and shoot them”, or find a way to rehabilitate them.

Despite the political consensus to “rehabilitate” the terrorists, the returning Taliban fighters were never rehabilitated.  Imran Khan had foreseen the need to nip the TTP issue in the bud and had suggested such a programme. He had claimed his government had wanted to resettle TTP fighters in Pakistan’s FATA region, but the efforts were unsuccessful as the provinces had failed to make provision for the necessary resources to counter the elements rejecting the merger of the tribal areas with Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.

There was an increase in the number of freelance TTP fighters in the region, possibly resulting in a series of persistent attacks on military and police posts.

Over the years, there has been a strong consensus that Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have provided sanctuary to several regional and foreign jihadist fighters belonging to the Taliban, al-Qaida’s central Leadership, and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU).

Safe havens provide the insurgents and terrorists the time to plan attacks, generate critical support for infrastructure by raising funds, imbibe radical ideologies and provide technical assistance to associated groups and cells. Known in Pakistan as ilaqa-e-ghair (lawless Lands), the Pashtun tribal areas that are around the Peshawar Valley have without a doubt been a sanctuary for various militant groups.

Waziristan is a stronghold of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Baitullah Mehsud was always suspected of providing safe haven for core elements of al-Qa`ida and the IJU.

Free for all at the border

The other important factor which increases Pakistan’s worries in KP is the ongoing insurgency in the area. It is an ongoing armed conflict involving Pakistan, and various Islamist jihadist outfits such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Jundallah, Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI), TNSM, al-Qaeda, and their Central Asian allies such as the ISIL–Khorasan (ISIL), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, East Turkistan Movement, Emirate of Caucasus, and elements of organized crime.

Also, ever since the Taliban’s exit from the war theatre, ISKP has consistently tried to exert its monopoly on jihad in the South Asian region. Treating each other as rivals, ISKP and Taliban have exchanged attacks on their individual leaders, commanders, or assets. Recently, the Taliban claimed the assassination of an ISKP recruiter/ commander Aijaz Ahmad Ahangar alias Abu Usman Al-Kashmiri. Ahangar was a Srinagar-born ISHP leader based in AFG.

ISIS (central) has in the past, also claimed responsibility for the assassination of a party official in Inayat Killi. It is only recently that the central ISIS branch has openly issued claims in the name of “Khorasan Province” (ISKP). The group also claims attacks in Pakistan in the name of its “Pakistan Province” or “ Wilayat-e-Pakistan” branch.

It must be also mentioned that in 2019, ISKP had declared the provinces of “Wilayat-e-Hind” ( Province of Hind/India) on May 12, and “Wilayat-e-Pakistan” (Province of Pakistan) on May 14. Since ISIS does not recognize the sovereign borders as decided by nation states, it functions according to its own comprehension of various areas as a part of its own self-designated Caliphate area.

In 2019, the ISKP continued to face pressure from several sides including the Ashraf Ghani-led administration, US forces, and also from the Taliban’s crackdowns. As a result, the outfit was forced to give up its territorial control in northern and eastern Afghanistan.

In India, ISIS managed a response in the form of ISJK in Islamist-insurgency-ridden Kashmir (prior to the abrogation of Article 370). ISK received some level of organized support in the form of ISJK at that time.

Pakistan helpless against IS offensives

In Pakistan, ISKP conducted large-scale terrorist attacks resulting in mass casualties. The jihadist landscape of Pakistan offers a great advantage to IS as it limits the risks of factional issues which may hinder making it a part of a larger wilayat, consisting of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asian States. Hence the necessary modus operandi conducted by ISIS in regard to the fore mentioned areas presents itself as the rationale for its fight for dominance in those areas.

Despite the higher frequency of TTP attacks in the Pakistan region, it must be noted that the threat the Islamic State poses cannot be possibly undermined. It has been responsible for one of the deadliest bombings in Pakistani history, which killed 149 people in Balochistan in 2018. The recent series of IS-claimed attacks too bear witness to their growing security threat in the Indian subcontinent.

The ISKP’s current objective is to prevent the Taliban from accomplishing its objective as a government in Kabul and prevent it from fulfilling its promises to the Afghan people. In order to achieve this, ISIS/ISKP will continue to target not just Taliban fighters but also nations that may have alliances with the Taliban government, such as China, Russia, and Pakistan.

Hence, apart from attacks on the Taliban, there is an increase in the frequency of attacks in the areas bordering Afghanistan in Pakistan.

Pakistan failed to negotiate peace or broker any settlement with the TTP last year. Its military forces have been incapable of sustaining or launching operations near the Afghan border and have consistently lacked any kind of formal offensive due to its economic crisis and political polarization.

The recent attacks have also fuelled tensions between Pakistani officials and the Taliban administration in Afghanistan. The Pakistani government has accused the Taliban of providing safe havens to some terror outfits. Taliban officials have denied those charges. With the virtual breakdown in the Pakistan- Afghan Taliban relations, much remains to be seen in the way Islamabad responds to these cross-border assaults. 

It is highly unlikely that the caretaker Pakistani dispensation will be able to show decisive results on this front any time soon, including mulling any counter-terrorism measures beyond its borders with Afghanistan. The Pakistan Army will be very reluctant to do this, given its deep involvement with state-sponsored terrorism against India. Given the steady deterioration of bilateral relations between Islamabad and Kabul, Pakistan may be forced to re-calibrate many of its strategic moves. 

(The writer is an Indian research analyst specializing in the AF/Pak region and counter-terrorism. Views are personal. She can be reached at aparnarawal@gmail.com)