The 75th anniversary of India–China relations offers a rare diplomatic opening. In a world of strategic rivalry, climate change and air pollution represent a shared threat where national interests converge. Environmental cooperation provides a low-politics entry point for rebuilding trust—through joint work on crop-residue management, high-density air-monitoring networks, and clean-energy transitions. Moreover, the Himalayan region—the planet’s “Third Pole”—is acutely vulnerable to black carbon and atmospheric pollutants from both sides of the border. Cooperation on air quality is therefore an act of Himalayan stewardship, protecting the water security of over a billion people.
At the same time, MBS has skilfully leveraged China as a strategic counterweight, signalling that any American hesitation could push Riyadh towards deeper military and technological cooperation with Beijing—an outcome the United States would prefer to avoid. China has already become Saudi Arabia’s largest trading partner, while the United States remains its primary arms supplier and security guarantor.
If Taiwan were to fall, Japan’s security architecture would be fundamentally compromised. The First Island Chain would fracture, opening a northern pathway for Beijing toward Okinawa and Kyushu. Takaichi recognised this reality and voiced what many regional strategists have long acknowledged: Japan has little choice but to act, even at the cost of Beijing’s displeasure.
Reincarnation in Tibetan Buddhism is a profound spiritual process determined by the enlightened intentions of the deceased master and recognized through visions, prophecies, dreams, and unmistakable signs - not through the drawing of lots. The historical record is unequivocal: Tibet consistently regarded the Golden Urn as an external political imposition and avoided it whenever authentic spiritual evidence was present.
While low-level clashes may continue, the possibility of a large-scale conflict, as projected by recent U.S. intelligence reports, remains far-fetched. Both countries are acutely aware that they stand to lose far more than they can gain. Despite uneasy relations, several factors actively discourage conflict
The two incidents in India and Pakistan over the course of a week have shown that the coverage of terrorism by the Chinese media ecosystem largely reinforces the state’s foreign policy narratives and preferences for alignment in South Asia. Pakistan emerges as a clear preference for the public, which is reinforced by commentators and opinion makers on non-state news media platforms.
CPEC 2.0 is expected to serve as a major leverage tool for China to access Afghanistan’s untapped natural resources and enhance connectivity to Pakistan and Central Asia. However, for Afghanistan, the initiative may be more of a challenge than an opportunity. Countries such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives have already faced severe economic consequences from poorly structured Chinese-funded projects.
China's rise has, in the consensus view of most international relations scholars, fundamentally changed South Asia. The old, India-centric region is gone. Pakistan has tied its future to Beijing, seeing China as its ultimate guarantor. Bangladesh has played a smart game, using Chinese money for national development while maintaining its "friendship-to-all" foreign policy. The Teesta project shows Dhaka's new confidence in following its own national interest. For India, the challenge is immense, as it must now compete for influence in its own backyard.
India's increased naval exercises, combined with its Indo-Pacific ambitions and Western partnerships, indicate a shift from coastal defense to regional management. For smaller coastal states, such patterns can readily translate into worry, not from an impending threat, but from an inferred sense of power. When a major power operates near contested or shared spaces, the neighbors are obligated to interpret purpose through action.
Xi Jinping's focus remains on projecting steady-handed leadership, reinforcing that China does not seek to replace the US but demands recognition of its legitimate sphere of influence. The Chinese approach is less about the symbolism of meetings and more about playing a long game, similar to the ancient strategy of Go (Weiqi): patient, adaptive, and quietly expansionist.
China has become Bangladesh’s top development partner, providing the capital and engineering expertise. It provided funding and construction for the $4.63 billion Padma Bridge Rail Link. This project connects the underdeveloped south to the capital. China also built the $2.48 billion Payra Thermal Power Plant, a critical piece of energy infrastructure. It constructed the Bangabandhu Tunnel under the Karnaphuli River in Chittagong, the first of its kind in South Asia.
The Indo-Pacific has indeed been relatively more stable compared to many other geopolitically contested regions. The QUAD plays a role in deterrence and in norm setting, but its impact is partial. India, through its constellation of policies—Act East, SAGAR, IPOI, MAHASAGAR, etc.—contributes significantly to that peace
The convergence of instability in Myanmar, fragility in Bangladesh, and external meddling by China and Pakistan threatens to form a volatile arc along India’s eastern flank. The challenge for New Delhi is not to pick sides in Myanmar’s internal war but to manage outcomes—to stay present, relevant, and nimble while others overreach. Because when the last ballot is counted, Myanmar will likely look the same: weary, divided, and ruled by men who mistake fear for order. The generals will call it normalcy; the world will call it tragedy.
As China continues to invest beyond what its economy can absorb, unproductive spending—much of it debt-financed—has expanded far faster than GDP. A decade ago, total debt was about twice the size of the economy; now it is roughly triple. The debt-to-GDP ratio has reached around 300 percent, alarmingly high for a developing economy.
While China’s model may not be directly replicable in a democratic setup like India, the emphasis it places on institutional adaptability, long-term strategic planning, and coordinated governance holds enduring relevance. India’s path will be different—but learning from China’s successes and failures can help shape a more inclusive, resilient, and forward-looking developmental trajectory.
Open war with India is not in China’s interest. It would jeopardize its Belt and Road Initiative, alienate global markets, and push India closer to the United States and other like-minded partners. Moreover, the Himalayan terrain offers no guarantee of quick victory. Still, China might employ limited conflicts or sudden skirmishes to test India’s resolve, create psychological pressure, or distract from internal challenges.
China’s Myanmar policy highlights a core strategic contradiction. While Beijing positions itself as a champion of peace, development, and regional connectivity, yet its explicit support for the military regime entrenches coercive rule to safeguard its strategic and economic interests.
Strategically, the display went beyond the immediate region. The unveiling of long-range nuclear platforms and hypersonic missiles positioned China as a peer competitor to the United States in global deterrence. No longer confined to regional defense, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) signaled its readiness to project power across continents.
The debate in Delhi will inevitably ask whether engagement through the SCO dilutes India’s other partnerships or rewards China without resolving the frontier. That binary misses the point. The right question is: can we turn multilateral statements into Indian payrolls while holding our security lines? The answer is yes, if we focus on execution.
