Officially, India maintained that no territory was lost. Strategically, however, many analysts described the situation as a shift in the status quo—an altered operational environment in which access, patrolling patterns and tactical depth were recalibrated.
India’s rise coincides with China’s structural slowdown, reshaping Asia’s strategic landscape. For Malaysia, the choice is not between India and others—but between preparing early for India’s ascent or adjusting late. Prime Minister Modi’s visit represents a strategic inflection point. Deepening ties in defence, technology, semiconductors, energy, food security, education, and culture is not merely prudent—it is foundational to Malaysia’s long-term prosperity, security, and strategic autonomy.
But in NSS 2025 the specific reference to the “Quad” appears less central as compared to its 2022 prominence. The document emphasized the allies assuming primary responsibility for their own region even as it identified the Indo-Pacific as a key economic and geopolitical battleground. It reiterates that alliances and strengthening partnerships “will be the bedrock of security and prosperity long into the future”
It’s heartening to see that China has resumed the pilgrimage of Indian pilgrims to the sacred Mount Kailash and Lake Manasarovar in Southwest China’s Xizang Autonomous Region this year after a five-year break, and India has restarted the issuance of tourist visas to Chinese citizens suspended since 2020. Recently, several direct flights between the two countries have been restored. This development is expected to strengthen exchanges in people-to-people fields, as well as in trade, culture, and other areas.
The broader strategic ramifications of the India–UK FTA are profound. It strengthens bilateral cooperation in areas such as defence, technology, renewable energy, and education, reinforcing both countries’ strategic footprints in the Indo-Pacific region.
China’s presence in South Asia has expanded considerably since the launch of the BRI in 2013. Beyond trade and infrastructure, it has emerged as a provider of military hardware and a key influencer in education, media, and policy discourse. China's outreach in smaller South Asian countries is multifaceted, ranging from party-to-party diplomacy to soft power tools like Buddhist cultural ties and influence operations.
In a media interview, Khandu strongly refuted Beijing’s territorial claims and emphasized Arunachal’s historical relationship with Tibet, a nation forcibly occupied by China in the 1950s. He pointed out that Arunachal Pradesh shares roughly 1,200 km of border with Tibet, around 100 km with Bhutan, and 550 km with Myanmar. His remarks were a pointed rebuttal to China’s repeated claims over Arunachal Pradesh, including renaming it as “Zangnan” or “South Tibet.”
The Tibetan diaspora must now take the lead in mobilizing global opinion. The Dalai Lama has issued a clarion call — not only to uphold Tibet’s spiritual and cultural values, but to defend the right of a people to decide their own destiny.
There are multiple reasons why the MEA doesn’t dare to say “no one except Dalai Lama can decide his successor”, some of which could include External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar fears getting snubbed during his coming visit to Beijing
China’s strategy for building a regional order in Central Asia converges with its playbook in sub-regions across the Global South, like Latin America, Africa and South Asia. The substance and optics of its Latin America Summit and Xi Jinping’s tour of Southeast Asia in the last few months reflect this strategy.
Contrary to the longstanding popular expectation that the Dalai Lama could announce an interim successor until a reincarnation is determined after his death, he has chosen the option that sets the stage for a long-term conflict between Beijing and the institution of the Dalai Lama. It is clear now that the next Dalai Lama will be from outside China and Tibet.
While SCO saw ministers invoke "mutual trust" and “overall development” in public, Chinese actions reveal a twin-track approach toward India—maintaining diplomatic channels and economic engagement in public, while simultaneously tightening its grip on sectors where India remains dependent.
China's geographic proximity and growing power remain the core reasons ASEAN clings to its long-standing hedging and neutrality strategy. Fear of retaliation—whether economic or military—has deterred ASEAN from adopting a firm position against Beijing, which could compromise the region’s economic survival.
The Chinese making inroads into Pakistan for a while now may also be a significant factor behind President Donald Trump not taking an unambiguously supportive position towards India. Trump’s comments have been calibrated to achieve equivalence between India and Pakistan and quite strikingly handed Islamabad some bragging rights by offering to intervene in resolving the Kashmir issue.
Over the past 40 years, the U.S. has transitioned from an industrial to a consumption-driven economy. Manufacturing, which contributed about 25% to GDP in 1970, now accounts for just 10%. The outsourcing of production to China, Mexico, Vietnam, and others has led to the loss of nearly 5 million factory jobs between 2000 and 2020 alone.
A landmark event in 2023 was the MoU with Japan’s Rapidus Corporation to establish semiconductor manufacturing in India. Backed by Japanese giants like Sony, Toyota, Kioxia, NEC, NTT, and MUFG Bank, this move could be a game-changer for India’s electronics ecosystem, which currently lacks indigenous chip production.
The Pahalgam tragedy, coupled with Pakistan’s public admission of its role in fostering terrorism, presents such a moment. China must rise to the occasion—not by choosing sides, but by choosing peace. It must move from silence to strategy, and from passive balancing to active peace-building.
In this context—marked by fresh US scrutiny of tariff offenders—India has a unique opportunity to step in as a more reliable and less controversial partner for the US in supply chain manufacturing. A complementary—not adversarial—partnership with China could also benefit India in tapping the US market, especially since India has incurred a relatively lower tariff increase of 27 percent
While the opportunity is vast, the risks are real. Without transparency, environmental safeguards, and strong domestic ownership, the Dhaka-Beijing river cooperation could backfire. A 50-year master plan must be rooted in Bangladesh’s ecological realities, ensuring local participation, sustainable practices, and equitable governance. Otherwise, well-intended cooperation could become a boomerang, undermining long-term water security.
