China is no longer just a neighbor to South Asia; it is actively redrawing the region's economic and security map. For decades, South Asian geopolitics was a story of India's regional influence and its rivalry with Pakistan. Today, many geopolitical analysts argue, the main story is China. Through strategic investments, powerful security deals, and assertive diplomacy, Beijing is shaping a new regional order. 

This new reality presents both massive opportunities and serious risks for countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India. China's foreign policy has become more assertive. It is creating a new system where it sits at the center, and South Asian nations must now navigate this new, complex landscape.

China's Tool Of Influence

China's primary tool of influence is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). But the BRI is not a single plan; it looks very different in Pakistan than it does in Bangladesh. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the flagship project, with China pledging over $62 billion to connect its western Xinjiang region to Pakistan's Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea. This project has built critical infrastructure, such as the New Gwadar International Airport inaugurated in October 2024 and the 884 MW Suki Kinari Hydropower Project. These projects provide energy and jobs. 

However, CPEC faces challenges. Progress has slowed, and, according to regional observers, China is now worried about Pakistan's recent friendly talks with the United States, fearing US monitoring of the strategic Gwadar port. Despite this, China and Pakistan remain "iron-clad" allies, recently signing a new Action Plan for 2025-2029 to build a "closer China-Pakistan community."

Bangladesh shows a different side of China's BRI. Dhaka is not locked into one corridor, instead using Chinese investment for specific, high-priority projects. This, many diplomatic analysts note, allows Bangladesh to balance its relationships with both China and India. China is Bangladesh's largest trading partner, with exports valued at $22.88 billion in 2024 and total investment reaching nearly $42 billion by early 2025. The 50th anniversary of diplomatic ties in March 2025, marked by Chief Adviser Dr. Muhammad Yunus's visit to Beijing, resulted in nine new agreements. Two are game-changers: a commercial agreement for China to modernize and expand Mongla Port with a $400 million loan, and Bangladesh's official invitation for Chinese companies to participate in the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP). This Teesta project is extremely sensitive, giving China a role in a river system disputed by India and Bangladesh. For Dhaka, it is vital development; for New Delhi, it is what Indian strategic thinkers call a major strategic concern.

China, India Contestation

China's influence is not just economic; it is also a top arms supplier. China is the biggest arms supplier to Bangladesh, accounting for 72% of all arms imported by Dhaka between 2019 and 2023. When Bangladesh purchased two Ming-class submarines from China, it made New Delhi nervous, seeing it as part of what U.S. and Indian security analysts have termed China's "String of Pearls" strategy. For Pakistan, China is a full defense partner, providing advanced technology from JF-17 fighter jets to new Hangor-class submarines. This deep military bond ensures Pakistan remains a strong counter-weight to India, creating what defense experts describe as a security dilemma for New Delhi, which now faces a "two-front" challenge.

India is not watching passively. It objects to the BRI, as CPEC passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, territory India claims. In response, India is pursuing its own "multi-pronged" strategy. It has strengthened alliances through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) with the US, Japan, and Australia to ensure a "free and open Indo-Pacific." It is also countering the BRI with its own projects, investing in Iran's Chabahar Port as a competitor to Gwadar and working with Japan on the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor. Following the 2020 Galwan Valley border clash, India has also moved tens of thousands of troops to its border with China and is modernizing its military with new Rafale jets and the INS Vikrant aircraft carrier. However, as numerous economic analysts have highlighted, India struggles to compete with China's deep pockets, as Chinese-funded projects are often completed faster.

China's rise has, in the consensus view of most international relations scholars, fundamentally changed South Asia. The old, India-centric region is gone. Pakistan has tied its future to Beijing, seeing China as its ultimate guarantor. Bangladesh has played a smart game, using Chinese money for national development while maintaining its "friendship-to-all" foreign policy. The Teesta project shows Dhaka's new confidence in following its own national interest. For India, the challenge is immense, as it must now compete for influence in its own backyard. 

The question is no longer if China will be a major player in South Asia, but how South Asian nations will manage this new giant. They must find a way to use China's wealth and power for their own development without falling into what many critics call a "debt trap" or losing their sovereignty. This is the new Great Game, and its outcome will define South Asia for the 21st century.

(The author is a research scholar in the Department of International Relations, Jahangirnagar University, Dhaka, Bangladesh. His research interests include South Asian politics, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism, Migration, Peace & Conflict Studies, Environmental Politics and China’s Foreign Policy. Views expressed are personal. He can be reached at md.saiful.stu2018@juniv.edu/  LinkedIn )