The Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China remains one of the most sensitive borders in Asia, embodying both the unresolved legacies of history and the geopolitical ambitions of two rising powers. In the 1970s and 1980s, China was a poor nation, economically weaker than it is today. Yet, even then, it had an advantage in deployment and infrastructure along the Himalayan frontiers. India, though militarily competent, lagged in road networks, logistics, and high-altitude preparedness. Since the 1980s, India has significantly improved its deployment and capacity in the region, but infrastructure gaps persist. As China has grown wealthier and more assertive in recent decades, it has sought to alter the LAC unilaterally, creating flashpoints across at least eight known friction zones. These disputes oscillate between negotiations and confrontations, and India is compelled to weigh its strategic options with great care.

This essay examines the choices before India and China in this enduring rivalry, structured around key questions: war or negotiations, political readiness, China’s intent, India’s preparedness, the impact of internal politics, and alternative strategies.

War or Negotiations?

History teaches that disputes between states are settled either by force or by diplomacy. Negotiations, when genuine, involve a “give and take” that avoids bloodshed. War too involves “give and take,” but only after lives are lost, resources are wasted, and outcomes remain uncertain. The 1962 conflict, the Sumdorong Chu standoff of 1987, the Kargil parallel in 1999 (albeit against Pakistan), and the 2020 Galwan clash all reveal that in the Himalayas, geography and logistics turn even small skirmishes into high-stakes contests.

For India, war with China would impose enormous economic and political costs, straining resources at a time when development and growth are national priorities. For China, war would derail its global ambitions and alienate partners when it faces pressure from the United States and its allies. Negotiation, though imperfect, offers both sides a controlled mechanism to manage disputes without escalation.

Is India Politically Ready?

India’s political system is democratic and pluralistic, which gives it both strength and challenges. On one hand, consensus-building and accountability ensure that negotiations reflect the will of the people. On the other, internal criticism—whether in parliament, media, or civil society—can constrain governments from appearing too conciliatory. No Indian government can afford to be seen as “giving up territory,” even in a pragmatic settlement.

Yet, political readiness does exist. India has engaged China through border talks since the 1980s, signing confidence-building agreements in 1993, 1996, and subsequent years. Despite periodic flare-ups, these mechanisms demonstrate that India is not unwilling to negotiate. The challenge is sustaining political will while managing domestic expectations.

Is China Willing  Negotiate?

China’s approach to the LAC is shaped by a mix of long-term strategy and short-term tactical pressure. For decades, Beijing has combined negotiations with limited incursions, testing India’s responses and altering facts on the ground where possible. Its calculus often depends on broader geopolitical conditions: when relations with the West are tense, China may prefer stability with India; when it feels strong, it may push harder on the boundary.

At present, China’s economic slowdown and diplomatic pressures suggest it may not want open conflict. However, this does not mean it is eager for a comprehensive settlement. More likely, it prefers a controlled “managed dispute,” which keeps India distracted and limits its strategic reach, while maintaining leverage in negotiations.

Is India Ready for War?

India has steadily enhanced its military readiness since Kargil and especially since Galwan in 2020. Roads, tunnels, and airstrips are being built in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, force levels are higher, and new technologies are being inducted. Morale is strong, and the Indian Army is battle-hardened from years of high-altitude deployment.

Yet, readiness for war is not only about soldiers and weapons; it is also about industrial capacity, logistics, and long-term sustainability. China retains an advantage in infrastructure, surveillance, and sheer scale of resources. India can fight and defend effectively, but sustaining a prolonged conflict would stretch its economy. Therefore, India is “ready to fight” but prefers deterrence and limited engagement over full-scale war.

Does China Want War?

Open war with India is not in China’s interest. It would jeopardize its Belt and Road Initiative, alienate global markets, and push India closer to the United States and other like-minded partners. Moreover, the Himalayan terrain offers no guarantee of quick victory. Still, China might employ limited conflicts or sudden skirmishes to test India’s resolve, create psychological pressure, or distract from internal challenges. Thus, while China may not want war, it has no hesitation in using coercive tactics short of war.

National Unity Imperative

In democratic India, debates in Parliament, criticism in media, and questioning of government policies are inevitable. While healthy dissent is part of democracy, excessive or poorly timed internal divisions can project weakness externally. China closely monitors Indian discourse and may interpret internal discord as a lack of unity, encouraging it to press harder at the border. National unity, therefore, is not just a matter of domestic politics but also a strategic asset.

Is China Aiming to Destabilize India?

Destabilization of rivals is an age-old strategy. Chanakya himself noted the value of undermining an adversary from within. China’s toolkit includes information warfare, propaganda, cyber interference, and economic leverage. By fueling perceptions of government weakness, amplifying divisive narratives, or exploiting fault lines, China can attempt to weaken India’s cohesion. This possibility underscores the need for India to strengthen its internal resilience, counter disinformation, and maintain political stability irrespective of ruling party or government.

Other Options?

Internationalizing the dispute—inviting external powers to intervene—appears tempting but carries risks. Major powers would indeed “want their pound of flesh,” leveraging India’s vulnerability for their own strategic gain. Moreover, China would frame such moves as “ganging up,” escalating hostility. A better option for India is selective internationalization: building strong partnerships with like-minded countries (through QUAD, G20, BRICS, or bilateral ties) without formally internationalizing the LAC issue. India’s growing trade and travel links with China also offer leverage; economic interdependence, if managed wisely, can moderate tensions.

India’s Path Forward

India and China stand at a complex crossroads. China’s superior infrastructure and history of assertiveness cannot be ignored; yet India’s improvements in deployment, political resilience, and international stature are undeniable. The choices are stark: war, which risks enormous costs and uncertain outcomes, or negotiations, which offer imperfect but practical stability.

For India, the optimal path is a blend of strength and diplomacy: continue building infrastructure and military readiness, maintain political unity, safeguard economic growth, and engage in negotiations without illusions. India need not internationalize the dispute fully, but it must cultivate strategic partnerships that increase its leverage. Most importantly, India must remember that its strongest weapon against Chinese pressure is its own internal cohesion and economic strength.

In the final analysis, the LAC will remain contested for the foreseeable future. But through careful balancing of negotiation and deterrence, India can manage the dispute with 
China on its own terms, ensuring that national development is not derailed by costly conflict, while preserving sovereignty with dignity.

(The author is an Indian Army veteran and a contemporary affairs commentator. The views are personal. He can be reached at  kl.viswanathan@gmail.com )