Ever since the Directors-General of Military Operations of India and Pakistan issued a joint statement, reiterating the two countries’ commitment to the 2003 ceasefire, there has been a growing sense of optimism within the strategic and diplomatic community worldwide. Many experts have called the agreement path-breaking and highly significant. 

Undoubtedly, as of now, it is a breakthrough, especially after relations between New Delhi and Islamabad reached a new low following the Pulwama attack in 2019 (followed by the Balakot strikes) and the abrogation of Article 370, which granted Jammu and Kashmir a special status under the constitution, by the Indian government.

But the February 25 agreement needs to be seen in the context of what was agreed upon in 2003. It is interesting to note that no Pakistan official wants to take credit for the agreement, which many believe is path-breaking. Optimists rejoicing over the deal fail to mention that when the two nations were parleying behind the scenes, they were sparring with each other at the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) in Geneva on February 24 – only a few hours before the “ceasefire agreement” was announced.

The history of international relations tells us that realism often triumphs over-optimism. In our selective reading of history, we forget that on two occasions, in January, 2013 and May, 2018, the Indian and Pakistani armies issued a similar statement. But everything went into a tailspin soon.

Fragile history

No development between the two nuclear neighbors can be seen in isolation. In the geopolitical scene, the strategic triangle of India-China-Pakistan needs to be clubbed with the latest development to decode the larger picture. For a brooding skeptic, the thaw on the Line of Control (LoC) will mean nothing much, given the fragile history of the subcontinent. Therefore, it is important to understand what the ceasefire means, under what geostrategic circumstances it came about and the way ahead.

Surely, the ceasefire will lower the tensions along the LoC and the International Border, which have been on the boil for some time. In 2020 alone, the LoC witnessed 5,133 ceasefire violations in which dozens of people were killed. The February 25 reiteration will help India initiate a dialogue with Pakistan sometime in future, if both sides adhere to the terms of the ceasefire. Everyone agrees that peace is the only way forward as unsettled frontiers help no one. But, then, there are contrary versions of ‘national interest,’ which has the last laugh and prevails over peace.

A tactical move

After assuming office as prime minister in 2014, Narendra Modi and his BJP government took a clear line vis-a-vis Pakistan -- talks and terror cannot go together. The abrogation of Article 370 marked India’s paradigm shift on the Kashmir question. It meant that Kashmir was practically off the negotiating table. This stance held till April 2020, before the Galwan Valley skirmishes and China’s aggression on the Line of Actual Control (LoAC). 

Significantly, India did not have to engage in a two-front conflict as Pakistan did not make any aggressive military maneuver along with China. After pushing back the powerful Chinese army on the Sino-Indian front and restoring the status quo ante, it seems the decision-makers in South Block revisited the India-Pakistan-China strategic triangle.

Thus it can be reasonably assumed that the lowering of tensions on the LoC with Pakistan is a tactical move by India. It will help New Delhi keep a close watch on the Chinese actions on the LoAC. For Pakistan, too, it is a win-win situation as it has been going through multiple domestic and international crises. The Pakistan economy is in the proverbial intensive care unit with rising debts. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) sanctions, of which India was the prime mover, make it difficult for the country to get loans from global lenders. 

The Biden administration, Pakistan’s major funder Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have time and again called upon Islamabad to negotiate with New Delhi. Thus, an active engagement with its neighbor is also in Pakistan’s interest.

The way forward

In the last 75 years, on multiple occasions, the two countries have come close to ending the long-standing disputes. The Vajpayee-Musharraf four-point formula in 2001, which included the withdrawal of troops from Kashmir; the free movement of Kashmiris across the LoC; self-governance without independence; and India and Pakistan continuing to administer the two parts of the state alongside the Kashmiris, was a major initiative that ended in a stalemate. The series of terror activities in India, actively sponsored by Pakistan, have played the spoiler, ever since.

As for the February 25 joint military statement, the devil is in the details. It says “the two DGMOs agreed to address each other’s core issues and concerns which have the propensity to disturb peace and lead to violence.”

Kashmir issue

Since Partition, Kashmir has remained the most contentious issue for Pakistan. Is India ready to address it? What would be the domestic political repercussions of changing the position on Kashmir for the Modi government? From the days of the Jana Sangh, Kashmir has been at the core of the BJP’s nationalist plank. The revocation of Article 370 on August 5, 2019, was seen as a fait accompli by the Modi government as Pakistan was not able to generate world opinion in its favor due to India’s much larger economic and global standing. 

It is, therefore, highly unlikely that India will show any willingness to discuss Kashmir, the “so-called core issue” for Pakistan.

As the two countries move towards a thaw on the LoC, it is in their interest to put the contentious issues on the back burner and resume the people-to-people contacts as they did in 2003-04; resolve the Kulbhushan Jadhav issue; activate the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC); and engage in trade and commerce. 

At the same time, it is important to understand that in international relations, such peace gestures are used to distract the enemy - the Kargil betrayal by the Pakistani army and its state policy of terror are facts.

The Indian armed forces should use the opportunity to beef up security, fix the gaps on the LoC and prepare for any eventuality. The ceasefire reinforcement should, at best, be seen as the start of an engagement. Drawing optimistic conclusions may be misplaced as history tells us that long-lasting peace is difficult to achieve.

(The writer is a post- graduate diploma candidate at Asian College of Journalism, Chennai. Views are personal. He can be contacted at mayank09031610@gmail.com)