The current unrest in Bangladesh poses a pressing geopolitical question: is the country drifting out of India’s strategic orbit? A significant rift emerged in August 2024 when Sheikh Hasina—long the political cornerstone of India–Bangladesh relations—was removed from power. This followed an uprising in which student protests over employment quotas escalated into widespread violence against her government, ultimately forcing her to flee and seek shelter in India.

Since Hasina’s departure, Bangladesh’s politics have been shaped by a volatile mix of nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism, and growing anti-India sentiment. Violence flared again after the killing of radical activist Sharif Osman Hadi, a prominent figure in the 2024 movement to oust Hasina.

Hadi, the founder of Inqilab Mancha (Platform for the Revolution)—a radical student group at Dhaka University—was known for his sharp anti-India views and advocacy for a “Greater Bangladesh.” Many believe his death triggered massive anti-India protests and renewed calls to “free” India’s northeastern states from New Delhi’s control. Following his killing, a Facebook post declared: “In the struggle against Indian hegemony, Allah has accepted the great revolutionary Osman Hadi as a martyr.”

Hasina has accused the Yunus administration of undermining Bangladesh’s founding principles and pursuing a reckless foreign policy that threatens regional stability. She argues that its actions distort the country’s history and endanger its secular and constitutional foundations. After the Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus–led administration assumed power, it moved swiftly to curb Hasina’s political influence. While requesting her extradition from India, the interim government amended the International Crimes Tribunals Act of 1973 by administrative order in November 2025 to broaden its scope and allow for her prosecution. Hasina was later sentenced to death in a trial held in absentia—a development critics say reflects the politicisation of the judiciary.

Resurgence Of Political Islam

In 2013, several leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami were convicted, and a number of top figures who had served as Razakar or Al-Badr commanders in 1971 were executed; the party was subsequently banned. After Hasina’s ouster, however, the Supreme Court overturned the cancellation of Jamaat-e-Islami’s registration, allowing it to operate again as a political party. Under pressure from Jamaat-e-Islami and other fundamentalist groups, the Yunus interim government then banned Hasina’s party, the Awami League. This suggests that fundamentalist forces are systematically using Yunus to erase the pro-India influence of the Mujib family ahead of elections.

Bangladesh’s move away from secular, non-partisan politics—even if it appears to be a domestic shift—will have clear geopolitical consequences. It strengthens a Pakistani–Chinese alignment hostile to India and embeds a new anti-India element in Bangladeshi statecraft.

Under Yunus’s administration, evidence points to Bangladesh becoming a growing hotbed of anti-India sentiment. Yunus is not a seasoned statesman; he was appointed largely to placate a fundamentalist-led student uprising, and in doing so appears to be strengthening the very forces that brought him to power.

Yunus has promoted the idea of a “Greater Bangladesh,” which purportedly includes parts of Assam, Tripura, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Odisha, and Bihar in India, as well as Myanmar’s Arakan region. This has led some observers to portray him as an agent of global Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological influence in Bangladesh.

China, Pakistan And Strategic Realignment

Against this backdrop, Yunus’s actions increasingly reflect the anti-India agenda of pro-Pakistan fundamentalists. This is illustrated by a book he recently presented to a visiting Canadian delegation - its cover featured a map of Bangladesh appearing to encompass large parts of India’s northeast—a symbolic gesture aimed at globalising the anti-India narrative. Earlier, he had presented the same book to a visiting Pakistani army general.

Yunus’s first official visit to China after taking office marked a clear departure from Bangladesh’s earlier India-centric approach. In Beijing, he urged China to expand its influence in South Asia, noting that India’s seven northeastern states were “landlocked” and “have no access to the ocean,” adding that Bangladesh was “the only guardian of the ocean for this entire region.” The visit reflected a strategic shift following the rise of anti-India, pro-Pakistan forces after Hasina’s removal.

In a notable development, Beijing invited for the first time a senior Jamaat-e-Islami leader—Syed Abdullah Muhammad Taher, a key contender in the upcoming elections. “It was an excellent trip; they treated us as government dignitaries,” Taher remarked. Taher is the former head of Islami Chhatra Shibir, widely viewed as Jamaat’s extremist student wing. Beijing’s outreach suggests it recognises Jamaat’s potential to gain power or exert decisive influence after the elections. For China, this appears to be a classic “pincer movement” against Indian influence during Bangladesh’s political transition.

Attempt To Open Anti-India Front?

The recurrence of violence has prompted scrutiny of the government’s response. Some analysts attribute the perceived inaction to the significant political leverage wielded by fundamentalist religious groups. This view is echoed in regional discourse; a Dhaka-based journalist recently suggested that Pakistan—having waited decades for such an opportunity—could exploit Bangladesh’s forthcoming electoral process to institutionalise radical Islamic networks that threaten India’s security, thereby continuing a long-standing strategic rivalry.

Fifty-five years ago, in the general election of December 1970, the Awami League won 160 of the 162 seats in East Pakistan, setting the political foundation for the creation of Bangladesh. In the upcoming election, scheduled for February 2026, if Pakistan-backed Jamaat-e-Islami and its proxies prevail, Bangladesh could become a terror case—opening a new front and posing a serious security challenge for India.

(The author is Executive Director, Centre for Strategic Studies–Trincomalee (CSST), Sri Lanka and a geopolitical analyst. Views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at jjathi@gmail.com / director@trincocss.org / www.trincocss.org.)