Politics in South Asia has always been hostage to geography. Mountains, rivers, corridors, and coastlines dictate strategy more stubbornly than campaign slogans ever could. For the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), fresh from its commanding victory in the February 2026 elections, the question is not whether it likes India. The question is whether it can afford not to engage India seriously.

Geography answers that question before ideology even gets a word in. Bangladesh shares a 4,097-km border with . It is ringed on three sides by Indian territory, and its economy is interlaced with Indian markets, transit routes, and energy grids. Whatever political tensions may flare, the map remains stubbornly unchanged. A wise government begins from that reality.

Interdependence Is Not Submission

Trade between the two countries has crossed $13 billion in recent years, with India exporting energy, cotton, machinery, and food products, while Bangladesh sends garments, jute goods, and pharmaceuticals across the border. India is Bangladesh’s largest trading partner in South Asia. That is not a sentimental statistic; it is a structural fact.

BNP’s “Bangladesh First” manifesto promises ambitious infrastructure development, expansion of port capacity, and a target of generating 35,000 megawatts of electricity by 2030. Those are not achievable in a vacuum. They require capital, connectivity, and stable supply chains. India matters here.

Indian investments in power plants, cross-border electricity transmission, and railway modernization have already created an integrated energy and logistics network. A government serious about growth does not rip out functioning circuits to prove a point. It improves the terms, renegotiates where necessary, and insists on transparency—but it keeps the lights on.

A Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), long discussed but never finalized, offers BNP a platform to reset trade on more equal footing. Lower tariffs, harmonized standards, and smoother customs processes would benefit Bangladeshi exporters as much as Indian suppliers. Pragmatism is not capitulation. It is competence.

There is also the matter of connectivity to India’s Northeast. Bangladesh’s ports (Chattogram and Mongla) can serve as gateways for landlocked Indian states. In return, Dhaka can secure transit fees, infrastructure upgrades, and deeper integration into regional supply chains. Done transparently, such arrangements strengthen sovereignty rather than weaken it.

Economic nationalism, if it is to be taken seriously, must produce growth. Growth requires stability. Stability requires cooperative neighbors.

Lessons from 2001–2006

New Delhi’s anxieties are not imaginary. During BNP’s previous tenure from 2001 to 2006, India accused Dhaka of allowing northeastern insurgent groups, including elements of ULFA, the Assamese insurgents, to operate from Bangladeshi soil. The infamous Chattogram arms haul remains etched in Indian strategic memory. 

Whether one accepts every Indian allegation or not, perceptions shape policy. The Siliguri Corridor—the narrow “Chicken’s Neck” connecting mainland India to its Northeast—is strategically vulnerable. Any hint of militant activity across the Bangladeshi border heightens Indian alarm.

BNP today has an opportunity to break decisively with that era. A public commitment to zero tolerance for anti-India insurgents, reinforced by intelligence-sharing mechanisms and visible counterterror operations, would reassure New Delhi and stabilize the frontier.

Security cooperation does not negate sovereignty. It strengthens it. A state that controls its territory projects authority; a state that allows ambiguity invites suspicion.

There is also the issue of minority protection. Reports of attacks on Hindu communities, whether exaggerated or real, travel quickly across borders and inflame domestic politics in Indian states. BNP must understand that internal communal harmony is no longer a purely domestic affair. In a hyper-connected age, local incidents acquire geopolitical weight. A mature government anticipates this and acts preemptively.

The Hasina Question: Law, Not Theatre

One immediate flashpoint is India’s decision to shelter former prime minister Sheikh Hasina . BNP leaders have demanded her extradition, reflecting strong domestic pressure and expectations among party cadres. But diplomacy is not street theatre.

An overly aggressive public campaign risks cornering India into defensive postures. A quieter, law-based approach—framing extradition requests in judicial rather than rhetorical terms—would serve BNP better. Let the courts speak. Let documentation lead. Quiet negotiation often succeeds where megaphone diplomacy fails.

India has already signaled willingness to engage the new government. Early congratulatory messages and outreach suggest that New Delhi understands the political shift in Dhaka. That window will not remain open indefinitely.

Border, Water, and Migration

No India–Bangladesh relationship is complete without acknowledging perennial disputes: river water sharing, border killings, and undocumented migration. The Teesta water-sharing agreement has languished for years, entangled in Indian federal politics. BNP can revive negotiations, but it must do so with patience. Indian state governments—especially West Bengal—play decisive roles. Shouting at New Delhi will not move Kolkata.

Border shootings by India’s Border Security Force remain emotionally charged within Bangladesh. Addressing these requires institutional mechanisms—joint patrols, non-lethal enforcement protocols, and regular flag meetings. Quiet progress often yields more than nationalist posturing.

Migration, meanwhile, has become politically explosive in several Indian states. BNP must recognize that inflammatory rhetoric in Assam or West Bengal can derail otherwise productive bilateral agendas. Calm engagement and data-sharing offer a path forward.

Geopolitics: China and Pakistan Variables

South Asia today is not insulated from global power competition. China’s expanding footprint through infrastructure financing and defense cooperation offers Bangladesh options. Pakistan maintains symbolic resonance within segments of Bangladeshi politics. But diversification must not morph into triangulation.

A deliberate drift toward Beijing or Islamabad as counterweights to India would alarm New Delhi and risk regional polarization. Bangladesh’s strength lies in balanced diplomacy—engaging China economically, maintaining relations with Pakistan, but grounding its immediate neighborhood policy in stability with India.

History offers cautionary tales. Smaller states that attempted to leverage great-power rivalries often found themselves squeezed rather than empowered. Sovereignty thrives on equilibrium, not brinkmanship.

The Domestic Dimension: Rhetoric vs. Responsibility

BNP has previously flirted with “India-Out” rhetoric. Such slogans may energize crowds, but governing demands a different vocabulary.

The 2026 election victory gives BNP legitimacy. It also imposes responsibility. Tarique Rahman’s language of “equality and mutual respect” strikes the right tone. Equality does not mean symmetry in size or power; it means clarity in expectations and firmness in negotiation.

Bangladesh does not need to be subordinate to India. Nor does it benefit from reflexive antagonism. Mature diplomacy lives in the space between those extremes.

The Strategic Imperative

The post-Hasina era presents BNP with a rare strategic opening. By resetting relations with India, the party can secure economic momentum, reassure investors, and stabilize borders at a time of regional uncertainty.

South Asia has witnessed too many cycles of suspicion and recrimination. The alternative is not naïve harmony but structured cooperation: institutional dialogues, regular high-level visits, defense exchanges, and cultural engagement.

People-to-people ties matter. Millions of Bangladeshis travel to India annually for healthcare, education, and tourism. Simplifying visa procedures, encouraging academic collaboration, and promoting cross-border cultural festivals can soften hardened perceptions.

Statesmanship requires long horizons. The grievances of yesterday should not dictate the opportunities of tomorrow. BNP now governs a nation of more than 170 million people. It cannot outsource its geography. It cannot ignore its largest neighbor. And it cannot afford policies driven by nostalgia or resentment.

The choice before the BNP is not between pride and pragmatism. It is between performance and paralysis. If it chooses performance—anchored in economic realism, security cooperation, diplomatic tact, and geopolitical balance—Bangladesh can emerge as a confident regional actor. If it chooses paralysis, South Asia will revert to its familiar rhythm of mistrust. Geography, history, and shared cultural heritage means that India and Bangladesh cannot wish away each other.

(The author is a political and strategic analyst based in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Views expressed are personal. He can be reached at writetomahossain@gmail.com)