New US President Trump took office on 20 January 2025 and immediately issued executive orders, in pursuance of his central policy to “Make America Great Again”. These orders – with more to follow – are widely viewed as "disruptive". Their implementation will have immediate and long-term effects within and between nations, affecting economic and political (including military) processes and events, worldwide.

India is currently the world’s fifth largest economy. India needs to do much, both domestically and with other nations, near and distant, to rise to number three by 2030 as envisaged. The policies and executive actions of the U.S administration, will impact India’s challenging South Asia neighbourhood, including the spectrum of India-China relations. [Ref.1]

This article attempts to appraise the situation in South Asia, as India and its neighbours increasingly engage in military diplomacy and military engagement in furtherance of their respective strategic interests.

India and its neighbours

India has several immediate neighbours. We have land borders with Pakistan and, going clockwise, China, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Bangladesh. Separated by varying distances of ocean, we have Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Pakistan.

China’s naval, economic and commercial power projected into the Bay of Bengal (Myanmar’s Coco Islands); in the north Indian Ocean (Sri Lanka‘s Hambantota) and Maldives; and Pakistan’s Gwadar in the north Arabian Sea, also makes China our most powerful ocean neighbour. This has been dubbed as China’s “string of pearls”. This is without mentioning China’s economic influence in these countries, and in other Indian Ocean littoral states.

What India does militarily, diplomatically, economically and politically affects China and vice versa. This could be in terms of policy, diplomacy, trade-business-commerce, military deployment and capability, status and operation of the domestic economy, social integrity, etc., both in India and in China.

What affects India’s other less powerful neighbours due to their own internal or external events also affects both India and China, although perhaps less directly. The effects of China’s interactions with its land and ocean neighbours apart from India also reflects on India’s actions, reactions and expectations and diplomacy, on the world stage.

Thus, it behoves us to place China at the centre of the “picture”, certainly inasmuch as territorial-economic-political sovereignty and security, are concerned. But first, it is best to take a look at India as an emerging political-diplomatic-military-economic power in South Asia and in the international community.

India – an emerging global power 

India has made tremendous technological strides across diverse fields, by building on the sound scientific-technological infrastructure of yesteryears, and the availability of hardware and software in the recent past. We have especially excelled in the aerospace industry, launching successful missions to Moon, Mars, and Sun, with more under planning, and becoming the fourth nation to achieve unmanned docking of spacecraft. Apart from an assured share in the $400-billion global space market, this capability leverages India’s military capability and political heft.

Even with comparative shortfall in defensive and offensive cyber capability, India’s military has become more technologically advanced, although with dependence for semiconductor chips and processors, and for cyber security software on international vendors. Very recently, the government announced the starting of India’s first commercial semiconductor fab unit as a joint venture between Tata Electronics and Taiwan’s Powerchip Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp, to produce 50,000 wafers/month using (albeit not indigenous) 65, 40 and 28-nanometer technology, in 3-4 years. It is not yet clear in what manner and to what extent, this capability may enhance India’s cyber-military capability.

Building upon the legacy policy of indigenization,  Indian Navy has advanced in increasing its blue-water capability. Indian Air Force remains dogged by depletion of its fighter aircraft with inadequate fresh inductions. How India’s drone capability may compensate for this remains to be seen.

Indian Army continues its reputation of being a credible kinetic field fighting force, traditionally based upon the unrivalled fighting capability of its soldiers and junior leaders. There has been serious manpower depletion – due to stoppage of recruitment during the Covid pandemic – which the government expects will be remedied by the Agniveer scheme. However, the Agniveer scheme is not without its policy, training and operational shortcomings, especially in the short-term. 

The Army’s deployment in internal security duties, and to maintain credible force levels on India’s western, northern, northeastern and eastern borders with its neighbours, calls for preparation to simultaneously handle multiple fronts. This multiple-front challenge requires changes in doctrine, organisation and training for operational jointness of India’s Armed Forces. 

Every military needs boots-on-ground capability. However, advances in robotics-machine learning-AI, and introduction of robotic boots-on-ground supplementing and reducing biological soldiers, are likely to complement remotely controlled armed and unarmed vehicles, which reduce deployment of manned weapon platforms. This will affect the personnel induction and training processes of the Armed Forces.

IT-IW and cyber warfare requirements are already influencing C4ISR, which are the ruling functions of warfare, battle conduct. It will also influence military doctrine. IT-IW and cyber warfare may dictate the requirements of military power, define the “battlefield of tomorrow”, and lead to replacing much of the traditional boots-on-ground of yesteryears’ armed conflicts. Effective C4ISR for force deployment, rapid movement of reserves, and logistical support for multiple-front capability, are essential.

Military power is necessarily based upon the nation’s economic power. India’s rise as an economic power is somewhat hampered by a rising youth population, a high level of unemployment, and falling health standards. 

It is not clear how improvement in India’s global ranking in military and economic power – a source of new-found pride among some who live and work in weather-controlled environments – can bridge the widening and deepening economic gap in India’s society. The state of public health and social cohesiveness of a country influences its economic and military strength and capability.

The picture of India as an emerging power may not be quite as bright as the government makes it out to be, but reality is that there has been a discernible uptick, especially in recent years.

China’s sphere of influence

India’s largest trading partner is China, with $118.4-billion commerce in 2023-24, and trade deficit of $85-billion. [India’s 2023-24 commerce with the USA is $118.3-billion, with a positive trade balance of $3-billion]. India exports refined petroleum, iron ore and marine products to China, and imports electrical and electronic equipment, machinery, organic chemicals, plastic, medical apparatus and steel, from China. India’s trade deficit, and also the type of Chinese imports (especially electronic equipment), do not contribute to India’s strategic advantage.

China’s 2,000-km Xining-Lhasa rail link projects China’s economic and military interests in Tibet and across India’s Himalayan border. Its road link through India’s Aksai Chin region through Khunjerab Pass into Pakistan, opens its land link to Gwadar port in the north Arabian Sea, and furthers expansion of China’s economic and military interests. [Ref.2] This is part of China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI), to improve trade and economic growth, which China backs with credible military power, both on land and in the oceans.

Territorial claims

Mao Zedong’s "five-fingers policy", likens Tibet to China’s right hand palm. He is reputed to have considered it China's responsibility to "liberate" the regions which the five fingers point to - namely Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and the former NEFA (now comprising India’s seven northeast states). Although this has not been officially endorsed by modern China, it is understood to be one of China’s strategic goals.

India’s pre-Independence RSS leadership is credited with defining ‘Akhand Bharat’ as encompassing the territories of present-day Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tibet, Bharat (India), Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives. Although this has not been officially endorsed by modern India, in April 2022, RSS Sarsanghchalak Mohan Bhagwat claimed that the idea of ‘Akhand Bharat’ could be a reality in the next 10-15 years. [Ref.3]

The political-military implications of these claims, cannot lead to improvement of relations between the two Asian giants, especially if they dictate formulation of their respective strategies. Therefore it is necessary to view the present in terms of India’s neighbours.

Pakistan and Bangladesh

India has had a continuing troubled relationship with Pakistan since 1947. The China-Pakistan axis based upon the dynamic of increasing Pakistan-USA dissonance is not new. But recently, a China-Bangladesh axis has been consolidated by a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership 2024, as part of the BRI, and in furtherance of their strategic partnership of cooperation established in 2016. This partnership was formally entered into on 11.7.2024, during Bangladesh PM Sheikh Hasina’s visit to China. The date is significant because 26-days later, Sheikh Hasina was obliged to flee Dhaka and seek refuge in India.

Following Sheikh Hasina’s 05.8.2024 abdication, Bangladesh has made overtures to Pakistan, brushing aside the latter’s genocide of 1970-71 – a welcome move for Pakistan. Reportedly, Pakistan and Bangladesh will explore "further avenues for enhancing bilateral military cooperation” for “a stronger defence relationship” through “collaborative defence initiatives”, one of which is reportedly Pakistan’s army training Bangladesh’s army within Bangladesh, starting February 2025. This effectively cements a deeply troubling India-hostile relationship, because India has disputed borders with Pakistan, China and Bangladesh.

Nepal

There is growing political distance between India and Nepal. It began with Nepal’s allegation that  India imposed an undeclared six-month long “blockade” (particularly of petroleum) in September 2015. Nepal also alleged that the “blockade” was because of India’s "discomfort’" about changes to the Nepali constitution, violent ethnic conflict, and Nepal's increasing cooperation with China. Whatever be the truth or otherwise of Nepal’s allegations, the fact is that Nepal has been “infiltrated” by China, and reportedly China even has established military posts in 150-hectares of land within Nepal’s border. Nepal-China trade, enhanced by the Xining-Lhasa rail link, effectively draws Nepal into China’s BRI.

On 20 May 2020, Nepal released a new map of its own territory, claiming a 335-sq km swathe of land at the India-Nepal-China tri-junction, including Kalapani, Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura, in India’s Uttarakhand. This can impact India’s traditional Kailash-Mansarovar pilgrimage route via Pithoragarh, Dharchula and Kalapani to Lipulekh Pass. Incidentally, many Indian pilgrims over the past decade, have chosen attractive tourist packages to fly to Kathmandu, and travel by vehicle to Kailash-Mansarovar and back, thus boosting Nepal’s tourism revenues.

Pakistan is reportedly exploiting Nepal’s unhappiness with India’s Agniveer scheme, to begin recruiting Gorkhas for its army. 

Bhutan

Bhutan's border with Tibet was never officially demarcated. On 16.6.2017, Chinese troops with construction vehicles and road-building equipment began extending an existing road southward into the Doklam plateau, a territory claimed by both China and Bhutan. Two days later, Indian troops advanced through Sikkim towards Doklam, facing off the PLA, and only thereafter Bhutan objected to Chinese presence in Doklam. On 28.8.2017, both China and India announced withdrawal of forces from Doklam. However, China has reportedly constructed a “resettlement village” within territory claimed by both Bhutan and China in the Doklam area.

Bhutan has not joined China’s BRI, but there is increasing trade between them. The growing probability of Bhutan establishing formal diplomatic relations and signing a boundary agreement with China is disconcerting for India because Bhutan may join China’s BRI under pressure. Worse, Doklam’s southern ridges overlook India’s 24-km-wide Siliguri Corridor, which connects India to its seven northeastern states. China’s military surveillance on India’s so-called 'chicken’s neck' is an undeniable strategic threat, especially with its ally Bangladesh to its south.

Chinese advantage in India’s northeast 

The seven states of India’s northeast (erstwhile Northeast Frontier Agency or NEFA) are Assam, Arunachal, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura and Meghalaya. Of these seven states, Arunachal, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram share borders (total 1,600-km) with Myanmar, and Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura share borders with Bangladesh.

The people of these states have filial, cultural and commerce-trade relations, and traditional two-way communication with people across their international borders. A large proportion of the people of these states have ethnic origins of great antiquity, connected with Tibet, Burma (Myanmar) and ancient China.

At Independence, some of the peoples of NEFA took to violence to secure the goal of establishing their own sovereignty, while others made political efforts for a separate state within the Union of India. Thus, political integration of some of these peoples into the Union of India has seen resistance from early days for various political and socio-cultural reasons.

Kangleipak is an ancient Meitei civilization. The Meitei language had a unique script and formalised a written constitution called Loyumba Shinyenin 1110 CE, nine centuries ago! [Ref.4] Kangleipak’s Meitei ruler King Pamheiba converted to Hindu Vaishnava religion in 1714, and renamed his kingdom as “Manipur”, declaring Hinduism as the religion of his kingdom and subjects. On 11 August 1947, Manipur’s Maharaja Budhachandra signed an Instrument of Accession, and in September 1949, signed a Merger Agreement with the Union of India. However, at that time, some Manipuri people’s groups [Ref.4] disputed the merger, alleging duress and lacking public consensus. At present, since May 2023, Manipur is going through armed conflict between its valley-based Meitei people and its hill-based Kuki-Zo people.

The Naga peoples have a centuries-old oral history, but the first written records are of their contacts with the Ahom kingdom in 1228. They remained isolated until their political awakening began with British missionaries entering into their territories. Starting 14 August 1947, the Naga peoples, led by Naga National Council (NNC) leader Phizo, declared independence and refused to be a part of the Union of India. This turned into an armed insurgency in 1956, with the formation of a “Naga Army”. Post-Independence, the ‘Naga peace process’ has seen efforts by successive union governments, but to-date the ‘Naga question’ remains unresolved.

The Mizo people claim origins from the ancient Chhinlung civilization, migrating in ancient times from China through present Myanmar into present Mizoram. [Ref.5] Political awakening among the Mizos took shape in April 1946, with the formation of the Mizo Common People's Union. The Mizo National Front (MNF) was formed in October 1961. Under Laldenga, MNF announced the goal of achieving sovereign independence of Greater Mizoram for Mizo people. Their demand grew militant and large-scale disturbances broke out in February 1966, resulting in MNF being outlawed by the Government of India in 1967. The Union Territory of Mizoram was formed in January 1972, and Mizoram became a state in February 1987.

The purpose of recounting the political events in some of these states is to point at the strong Chinese influence, especially in present times. China seeks to bolster its influence in the region – which is de facto and de jure politically part of the sovereign territory of the Union of India – by its territorial claims. Chinese have smuggled weapons into this region to revive militancy, as reported by Indian security forces way back in 2011. [Ref.6] Such interference appears to have been enlarged in present times, to include illegal opium trade.

India is on a long and difficult road to put an end to social and political unrest in its northeastern states. This is to China’s advantage.

Myanmar

Myanmar, presently under military rule, is importing arms, ammunition, and drones from China to fight the armed ethnic minority groups demanding autonomy. [Ref.7]

China has supplied Myanmar with jet fighters, armoured vehicles and naval vessels, and has trained Burmese army, air force and naval personnel, since 1989. Thus, China had access to Myanmar's ports and naval installations, plus strategic influence in the Bay of Bengal, in the wider Indian Ocean region and in Southeast Asia.

Coco Islands are the northernmost islands of the Andaman and Nicobar island chain. In British times it was transferred to British Burma and is now with Myanmar. It is ideally situated for monitoring sea and air movements in the Bay of Bengal. Reportedly, Myanmar leased these islands to China in 1994.

In 1998, then Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes claimed that China intended to build a major naval base on Coco islands. China and Burma denied it. However, in 2014, Air Marshal P. K. Roy, C-in-C of India’s Andaman & Nicobar Command, stated that China has been developing a runway on Coco Islands for civilian purposes, and civilian infrastructural developments were not a threat to India. [Ref.8]

In 2023, India raised serious concern over Myanmar allowing China to establish monitoring and surveillance facilities in Coco Islands to track India’s missile launches off the Balasore test range in Odisha, and surveil Eastern Naval Command at Visakhapatnam, and Andaman & Nicobar Command. [Ref.9]

Thus, China influences Myanmar’s 1,600-km land border with four states of India’s northeast and India’s assets in the Bay of Bengal.

Sri Lanka

The geo-economic importance of the Indian Ocean for China’s energy needs have caused China to extend its BRI reach into Sri Lanka, by financing infrastructure projects. [Ref.10]

Changing Hambantota fishing harbour into a modern international deep water shipping port was part of Sri Lanka’s development plans in 2002. Sri Lanka sought investment for the project, and China offered terms acceptable to Sri Lanka. The agreement for this project was approved by Sri Lanka’s Parliament, but the agreement document was not made public.

The first phase construction of the Hambantota International Port (HIP) was started in 2008, and HIP was opened for traffic in November 2010. In all, China Merchant Port Holdings (CMPH) invested $974-million in HIP.

Sri Lanka was unable to repay its debt. Hence, Hambantota Port Construction Agreement between Sri Lanka and China was signed on 29 July 2017, allowing CMPH to own 85% equity in HIP. HIP is held on a 99-year lease granted by Government of Sri Lanka to CMPH to develop, manage and operate the port area. HIP was handed over to CMPH in December 2017. [Ref.11]

India had objected to Sri Lanka for permitting a PLA Navy research survey vessel to dock at HIP and operate in its vicinity. Sri Lanka had acceded to India’s objection by imposing a 1-year moratorium ending 31.12.2024, on foreign research vessels operating or docking at HIP. When Sri Lankan PM Anura Dissanayake met Indian PM Narendra Modi in Delhi in December 2024, he gave assurance that Sri Lanka would never allow its territory to be used for “any activity that could be adversarial to the security interests of India or might pose a threat to the stability of the region”.

However, Sri Lanka has not renewed the moratorium, and gone further to sign a MoU with China on bilateral cooperation in maritime domain matters. This allows Chinese research vessels to operate in the region. [Ref.12]

Sri Lanka cannot but be aware of the implications of China using HIP for covert military purposes. Sri Lanka has seemingly  chosen to align its interests with China, even at the cost of incurring India’s displeasure. By this choice, Sri Lanka has made itself a virtual outpost for China and alienated itself from India for the foreseeable future.

Maldives

India has historical and cultural ties with the Maldives, but established political and diplomatic relations in 1965 after it became independent. Since then India and the Maldives have developed close strategic, military, economic and cultural relations. India has enabled Maldives' development, building a hospital, an institute of technical education, a faculty of hospitality & tourism, and introducing technology in education.

In 1988, at the request of the Maldivian government, India sent paratroopers, who defeated an armed attempt made to overthrow the government. In 2006, Indian Navy gifted a fast-attack craft to Maldives Coast Guard, and trained its personnel. In 2009, when Maldives feared that pirates would occupy one of its islands, India provided military assets and surveillance capabilities, and conducted annual joint military exercises. In 2014, Maldives sought India’s urgent help to handle the drinking water crisis in capital Malé, when its only water treatment plant collapsed. India immediately responded, sending bottled water in military transport aircraft, naval ships to produce fresh water using their onboard desalination plants, and army engineers to restart the water treatment plant. During the 2020 Covid pandemic, India extended financial, material and logistical support to Maldives. In 2021, Maldives signed a $500 million agreement with India for a 6.74-km bridge link connecting Malé with three of its islands, using a $100-million grant and $400-million credit from India. India provided $50-million credit to Maldives for defense projects, including development, support and maintenance of Maldives Naval Base. In 2024, Maldives and India inaugurated water and sanitation projects worth $100-million, benefitting 32 Maldivian islands. Today, of Maldives expectation of international grant in aid, India may provide 72%, amounting to $104-million.

China established diplomatic contact with Maldives in 1972, but established its embassy only in 2011. Maldives joined China’s BRI in 2014. Since then, Maldives has borrowed about $1.4-billion from Chinese banks, in addition to China’s large investments for infrastructure projects. In March 2024, Maldives signed 20 new agreements including receiving financial and military assistance from China.

Thus, Maldives is using both India and China, in its own interest. However, it is possible that China’s considerable economic and financial capability may outpace India in Maldives, just as in Sri Lanka.

India-China relations

China’s pervasive and growing economic (finance, infrastructure, trade, and energy sectors), diplomatic, and overt/covert military influence, in Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, India’s northeastern states, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Maldives, and back to Gwadar in Pakistan is amply evident. The recent bonhomie between Bangladesh and Pakistan, both under China’s influence, raises fresh challenges for India’s security.

Accompanying this virtual encirclement, China has greatly increased its army and air force presence right across Tibet and in Aksai Chin. In recent years, China’s encroachment by"‘salami-slicing" into India’s territory, at several places in shared land borders, have caused military faceoffs and conflicts. China’s incremental economic-political moves in Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Maldives discussed above, and its naval presence in the Indian Ocean, are to India’s disadvantage.

In 2007, India joined the Quad, and together with Australia, Japan and USA, worked for “a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region” without political or military interference. China views this with hostility, as being meant to counter China’s rise.

In this background, India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar said that earlier India-China relations were due to “misreadings” by past policy makers, whether driven by “idealism or absence of realpolitik”, and that the India-China relationship is trying to disentangle itself from the complications arising from the post-2020 border situation. Future relations should be based upon “mutual trust, mutual respect and mutual sensitivity”, and that India has to prepare for “expressions of China’s growing capabilities”.

In response, China called for viewing China-India ties from a strategic height with a long-term perspective, focussing on development and cooperation. [Ref.13]

Diplomatic niceties aside, India has greatly improved road and military infrastructure in the Himalayan regions, [Ref.14] and plans to extend its military-economic power by creating tourism-commercial-surveillance infrastructure in Lakshadweep, Minicoy and Greater Nicobar. However, this has been reactive to China’s economic, military and geopolitical initiatives and growth.

Remedying India-China asymmetry

There is a discernable differential between India and China in both economic and military power. This dictates their inter se relations. Proactively addressing and remedying this asymmetry to establish a workable, long-lasting, non-confrontational equilibrium with China is a challenge for India.

It should be the focus of India’s national security institutions and strategy think tanks, especially in the background of a world order changing due to "disruptive" U.S initiatives.

(The author is an Indian Army veteran settled in Mysuru, Karnataka. His areas of interest are developmental and strategic affairs. He has over 900 published articles in these areas, and over 80 published papers in niche areas of interest. Views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at sg9kere@live.com )

References (hyperlinked in the text)

1. “India’s challenging neighbourhood diplomacy”; <https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2024/09/indias-challenging-neighbourhood-diplomacy/>; International Institute for Strategic Studies; Volume 30; September 2024.

2. PTI; “India protests China’s creation of two new counties in Aksai Chin, objects to Brahmaputra Dam proposal”; <https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2025/Jan/03/india-protests-chinas-creation-of-two-new-counties-in-aksai-chin-objects-brahmaputra-dam-proposal>; Indian Express; January 3, 2025. 

3. “Akhand Bharat will be reality in next 15 years, says RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat, Owaisi asks on what basis“; <https://www.indiatvnews.com/news/india/akhand-bharat-will-be-reality-in-next-15-years-says-mohan-bhagwat-rss-chief-2022-04-14-769808>; India TV; April 14, 2022. 

4. S.G.Vombatkere; “Manipur – a story spanning 1,990 years”; <https://countercurrents.org/2023/08/manipur-a-story-spanning-1990-years/>; Countercurrents.org; August 28, 2023.

5. Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, Aizawl; “About Mizoram; <https://mizoram.nic.in/about/history.htm>; Accessed on January 19, 2025. 

6. Sandeep Unnithan; “Chinese agents smuggle arms to revive militancy in north-eastern India”; <https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/investigation/story/20110606-chinese-agents-smuggle-arms-to-spread-militancy-in-north-east-746248-2011-05-28>; India Today; June 6, 2011. 

7. “China Filling Huge Arms Order Placed by Myanmar Junta”; <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/myanmar-china-watch/china-filling-huge-arms-order-placed-by-myanmar-junta.html>; The Irrawaddy; July 9, 2024. 

8. Jayanta Gupta; “Runway, other infrastructure being developed at Coco Islands”; <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/kolkata/runway-other-infrastructure-being-developed-at-coco-islands/articleshow/30063312.cms>; The Times of India; February 8, 2014.

9. Shishir Gupta; “India raises Chinese surveillance facilities at Coco Islands with Myanmar”; <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-raises-chinese-surveillance-facilities-at-coco-islands-with-myanmar-101687066499579.html>; Hindustan Times; July 18, 2023. 

10. Shantanu Roy-Chaudhary; University of Oxford; “China, the Belt and Road Initiative and the Hambantota Port Project”; <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27027759>; St.Antony’s International Review 15 No.1 (2019); pp.153-164.

11. Johnathan E. Hillman; “Game of Loans: How China Bought Hambantota”; <https://www.csis.org/analysis/game-loans-how-china-bought-hambantota>; Center for Strategic & International Studies; April 2, 2018.

12. Anirban Bhaumik; “Delhi keeps close watch as Colombo lets ban on Chinese spy ships expire, moves to ink maritime pact with Beijing”; <https://www.deccanherald.com/india/delhi-keeps-close-watch-as-colombo-lets-ban-on-chinese-spy-ships-expire-moves-to-ink-maritime-pact-with-beijing-3363136>; Deccan Herald; January 20, 2025.

13. “China-India ties should be viewed from strategic height, long term perspective: Beijing”: <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/sino-india-ties-should-be-viewed-from-strategic-height-long-term-perspective-china/article69125110.ece>; The Hindu; January 22, 2025. 

14. Col Anil Bhat; “With eye on China, India enhances strategic border infrastructure with world-class construction”; <https://www.southasiamonitor.org/indo-pacific-china-watch/eye-china-india-enhances-strategic-border-infrastructure-world-class>; South Asia Monitor; January 17, 2025.