Realpolitik is an approach to foreign policy wherein the preservation of the state and promotion of its national interests constitute an ultimate and primary goal. It concentrates on the political and tactical stratagem designed to penetrate the idealistic approach of social and moral ground and bases itself upon the actual need of the state at a given time.
 
India’s response to the return of military rule in Myanmar and the arrest of deposed state counselor Aung San Suu Kyi and other political leaders of the erstwhile rulers National League for Democracy (NLD) is a classic example of a realpolitik approach. The option is in stark contrast to New Delhi’s idealism policies with the democratically led government of Myanmar in establishing a healthy connection and tuning the bilateral relations to a new height.

Despite being a torchbearer of democracy, India seems to be the only neighbor to remain silent on the coup. Such reluctance could be because of the geostrategic position of Myanmar and its importance in India’s foreign policy objectives.

Moreover, China’s engagement with the region driven by its large sum of economic assistance and political leverage in the world community may have also contributed to India’s strategic silence about the coup.

Security concerns

On a larger framework, India’s realpolitik option stems from three pressing concerns that have played a significant part in the larger India-Myanmar relations. One of them is the security cooperation that India shares with Myanmar in fostering peace and stability in its borders. New Delhi is of the view that criticizing the actions of the Myanmar army will endanger the greater benefit of security cooperation that India has shared with Myanmar in recent years.

Ever since India’s inception of the Look East Policy, security cooperation with Myanmar has been the fulcrum of engagement between the two nations. The success of Operation Golden Bird (a joint India-Myanmar military operation that led to the elimination of dozens of terrorists active in India’s North-East) of 1995 and the Hot Pursuit Operation of 2015 (a cross-border operation against insurgents belonging to NSCN-K) prove the security cooperation has brought a stable environment in the border areas and confidence in the engagements between the two nations.

In recent years, India-Myanmar security cooperation has steadily improved. There were high-level official visits followed by dozen of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for securing peace, security and stability.

The China factor

Similarly, India’s realpolitik in Myanmar also stems from the China factor. India’s engagement with Myanmar can be viewed mainly through the prism of its rivalry with China as far as Southeast Asia, and particularly Myanmar is concerned. The China factor in India-Myanmar relations can be traced to the asymmetrical phase of the 1990s wherein India was caught in a dilemma over its policy formulation towards Myanmar.

It is because of India’ post-independence idealistic position towards Myanmar and New Delhi’s diminishing role as a regional counterbalance to China after the 1962 conflict that Myanmar's foreign policy formulation tilted more towards China. Beijing, on its part, treated Myanmar as fundamental to its security and grand strategy for the 21st century.

In this regard, China succeeded in pulling Myanmar into its orbit of influence and the two countries enjoyed the closest relationship of all time with cooperation ranging from military to economic to socio-cultural dimension. Besides, China was the first nation with whom Myanmar had signed its weapon deals worth USD1.2 billion in the 1990s which was followed by another agreement worth USD 400 million in 1994.

These deals managed to bring in new weapons for Myanmar’s armed forces. Apart from the military cooperation, China also extended its development assistance to Myanmar, like building an 85-meter jetty to naval facilities on Great Coco islands, establishing modern reconnaissance and electronic intelligence system, building a deep seaport in Kyaukpyu in the Rakhine state.

Such political maneuvering and strategic gameplay helped China position itself as a dominant actor in Myanmar.

Similarly, China's assistance to the secessionist movement in Northeast India adds to India’s concerns. Reports have indicated that various militant outfits of Northeast India had received credential support, training and equipment from Beijing. The Deccan Chronicle reported in 2017 that the Chinese are trying to reach out to militants from the northeastern states operating from their base in Myanmar.

Amid pervasive expansion of Chinese influence in Myanmar, New Delhi doesn’t want to give further space to Beijing and feels the best option is to remain silent on the Myanmar military’s actions.

Act East policy

Thirdly, as India’s Act East policy in promoting economic, strategic and cultural relations with the Southeast Asian region gains momentum, New Delhi doesn't want any hurdles in the way.

India currently has several developmental projects in Myanmar, including the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, construction of Trilateral Highway, etc which aim to connect Myanmar with Northeast India by integrating the economy of the region through improved trade and connectivity with Southeast Asian countries. A good working relationship with the Myanmar military would be a crucial factor in this regard as otherwise India’s million dollars worth of investment in Myanmar could come under threat.

Thus, while the United Nations and various countries condemned the military takeover and imposed sanctions on the military junta, India on its part took a more measured approach to the unfolding situation.

New Delhi states it has steadfastly supported the process of democratic transition in Myanmar and believes that the rule of law and the democratic process must be upheld. However, interestingly New Delhi didn’t explicitly criticize the Myanmar military or Tatmadaw, as it is called, or condemned its represssive actions.

Similarly, India even sent a representative for the annual parade held in Nyapidaw as a mark of a good working relationship with the military. Indeed, India’s attendance was significant as it was the only major democratic nation alongside Bangladesh to offer its validity to the military coup in Myanmar.

Similarly, New Delhi on the pretext of humanitarian assistance provided nearly 1.5 million doses of the Covid-19 vaccine to Myanmar. Such assistance is seen as part of a broader diplomatic effort to deepen ties with the military and push back against the political and economic dominance of China in the region.

Underlying concerns

However, some underlying concerns may restrain New Delhi going ahead. The continuous pressure from the democratic voices around the globe might prompt India to opt out of such actions. As for courting friendship with the Myanmar military, it might have wider epercussions on its larger foreign policy goals.

More importantly, the formation of a National Unity Government (NUG) to bring together pro-democratic activists and ethnic minorities might pose a concern for New Delhi’s realpolitik approach. With a violent conflict raging in Myanmar following the military coup, the chance of a fresh civil war cannot be ruled out as various ethnic communities there have apparently taken up arms to protect themselves.

Such a situation may pose a strategic concern for India as it has high stake investments in Myanmar. As New Delhi has been soft towards the Myanmar military, chances are more that the ethnic armed groups might attack India’s strategic assets. Moreover, these ethnic groups are also well aware of the complete disparity between New Delhi and the Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland NSCN-K. And these ethnic groups might provide an added advantage to the NSCN-K in its pursuit of creating instability in the border regions of northeast India.

At present no such activities have occurred but, in the near future, everything is possible, particularly when the stakes are high and the options limited.

Therefore, India needs to carefully revisit its realpolitik approach in Myanmar from a wide perspective. The geo-strategic and geo-economic needs have indeed pushed New Delhi to the pragmatic option; however, the results are also very disturbing when we look at it from a wider angle. As such, New Delhi needs to sit down and finetune its action in Myanmar in a way that its strategic interests are protected and its foreign policy values are met by engaging with all the representatives of Myanmarese society.  

(The writer is a Ph.D. Scholar in the Department of International Relations, Sikkim University, India. The views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at pematseten5@gmail.com)