The Centre for Eastern and North East Research Studies  Kolkata (CENERS-K) organised a webinar on the "Situation in the Northeast and its effects on India's Act East Policy".  Participants included senior diplomats, military veterans, police, academics and journalists with long experience of service and living in the Northeast Region (NER).

Important issues that emerged out of the deliberations and its recommendations are summarised below as under:

All speakers described an improved security situation and a much lower insurgency violence profile. Manipur however continues to have the highest violence profile in the Northeast. Notwithstanding the above, the incidence of reported crime (including insurgency) in the entire NER is less than 2 per cent of the annual 5 million IPC (Indian Penal Code) cases reported countrywide. Yet the perception remains that the region is ‘unfriendly’ to outside investment. Why? Crime cannot be the only reason: poor rates of conviction in states like Assam and Manipur, the exceptionally high proportion of cases under special laws like UAPA and the high quantum of offences relating to public order hint at sub-surface fault lines. The continuance of AFSPA in several states also negates assertions of a return to normalcy. Also, the near absence of corruption cases registered despite a perception of widespread graft, the negligible cases registered under categories like the Forest Act, Wildlife Protection Act and Environment Act, suggests weak enforcement machinery. 

Speakers pointed out the other flaws in the policy as given below and expressed concern over issues of poor governance. There is discontentment amongst the local population over other issues and there may be a great deal of violence over the same in the near future. These problem areas are as given in the forthcoming paragraphs –

1.    National Register of Citizens: There is a strong probability of individuals not being granted citizenship taking up arms and joining dormant insurgent groups of the Muslims, Adivasis, Bengalis, Chakmas, Brus, Rohingyas, etc. The start point is obviously in Assam, but it may progressively spread to other states of the Region.

2.    Citizenship Amendment Act: The enforcement of this Act and grant of citizenship to all non-Muslims, including Bengali Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, etc. will be opposed by many in the Northeastern states.

3.    Islamic Fundamentalism: With many Muslims not being granted citizenship, the above issues are giving rise to much greater Islamic fundamentalism, which may now become a major threat in the NER, particularly in Assam. The Taliban takeover Afghanistan and support there from fundamentalist groups may aggravate the situation further.

4.    The Naga Accord: Nagaland, Arunachal, Assam and Manipur are likely to be adversely affected as it would give rights to certain Naga tribes, which the perceived aborigines do not have. Also, it implies doing a deal with certain tribes wherein only they get benefits. Other people of NER are also unlikely to accept giving special treatment to the Naga tribes. The demand of the NSCN (I&M) for a separate constitution and flag and the delay in implementation of the Accord has resulted in uncertainty over its implementation and a fear of violence in implementing the same. It has also resulted in a major drop in the economic performance of both Nagaland and Manipur.

5.    Autonomous Regions: The creation of autonomous regions for the Nagas in all three states is also not likely to be acceptable to the other North East Region states or tribes.

6.    Drugs and Narcotics: All insurgent groups in Manipur will battle to control the lucrative smuggling ring at Moreh and other entry points. There is a strong drug and smuggling mafia in the region; this is a potential flash point, particularly in the border states.

7.    Differential in Development/Industrialisation: There is a lack of local involvement in development - everything is centrally controlled and is Assam-centric. States need to amend land and labour laws and modify their outlook for this to work, failing which there may be law and order problems due to disparate development.

8.    Article 370/371: The abrogation of Art 370, 35A and the removal of Jammu & Kashmir’s special status are viewed by everyone as a ‘breach of trust’. People in the NER fear that New Delhi may also abrogate Article 371 (giving special privileges to some northeastern states) and the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution.

9.    Religious Politics: Religious politics as being witnessed in Assam and Tripura may adversely affect politics and insurgency in the region, including creating a much greater degree of Islamic fundamentalism. This is also likely to result in major political changes and associated violent ethnic sub-nationalism, the struggle for limited resources, and the demand for ethnic homelands for indigenous people or self-determination may now increase.  The recent grant of Scheduled Tribe status to six tribes in Assam only increases rivalry amongst all tribes for special status. Failure to grant it to the Meitei and some others has only angered them against Delhi and will undoubtedly fuel more insurgency.

10.  Insurgency: Notwithstanding the fact that Indian security forces have succeeded in keeping the situation under control, there is a lot of undercurrents that could cause the situation to explode in almost all the states. This needs to be observed particularly as China is now actively supporting Indian insurgent groups. 

11.  Border Disputes: Assam shares a border with all northeastern states, Manipur shares its borders with Myanmar, and Mizoram with Myanmar and Bangladesh. Border disputes of all the NER states with each other are counterproductive and adversely affect the economic development of the region. Unless these disputes are resolved there will be violence and the issue of ‘Acting East’ will be adversely affected.

12.  Foreign Policy: In case the National Register of Citizens, the Citizenship Amendment Act and the Hindutva propaganda continue, and we also fail to resolve the Teesta waters issue with Bangladesh, we may well see Bangladesh restarting their support to NER insurgents. Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) also remains active in supporting them, though to a lesser extent than earlier. It is important that we manage our relations with Myanmar extremely carefully, particularly in light of the recent coup, Chinese controls and the rampant insurgency and conditions of near civil war in Myanmar. Also, our Kaladan Asian Highway projects are likely to be adversely affected. The Chinese-controlled RCEP will also adversely affect the Act East Policy. There are many in the NER who openly say that if New Delhi is unable to maintain good relations with its neighbours  then the problem is with New Delhi and that it will inhibit the development of the region,

13, Dissatisfaction of Tribals: Those who understand the tribal insurgency in Tripura fervently plead for the dissolution of the R Gumti Hydel project and the resettlement of a large number of affected tribals on the land so reclaimed to resolve tribal dissatisfaction. In addition, it must be noted that Tripura is one of the major gateways to the NER and Myanmar from Kolkata and through Bangladesh. This linkage has to be hence developed and nurtured particularly with Bangladesh and the Rakhine State of Myanmar. The Kolkata–Bangladesh–Silchar coastal/river route is also vital and must be developed. Relations and trade with Bangladesh are hence critical to the Act East Policy and development of the NER.

14. Act East Policy: Those in authority may please read the book written by Professor Guru Das of Silchar University. He has presented a detailed economic analysis wherein he explains that the Act East Policy in its present form overland is not really economically viable. At the moment, there is a top-down approach; there has to be a bottom-up approach involving the local population.

*Given the multiple objectives of AEP, is the Union Ministry for Commerce, External or Home affairs the lead/nodal ministry? Suppose one examines the origin of the Act East Policy the Ministry of External Affairs quite rightfully claims it to be its policy. In that case, there is therefore a clash of interests with other Ministries and DONER who are required to put the internal parts into effect. If the Commerce Ministry, what are the Market Access or Export Promotion initiatives taken? Are there proposals under consideration to notify NER as an SEZ or identify areas such as biotechnology that can be promoted or set up export-oriented units that create value chains with ASEAN? What about duty/excise exemptions to promote exports?

*In 2018 NITI Aayog declared it would be the “facilitator and catalyst for the Act East Policy”. The focus was on “Connectivity, Culture and Commerce. It set up a ‘NITI Forum for the NE’. What are the special schemes taken up, have inter-ministerial consultations taken place, and what are the pragmatic initiatives taken for closer linkages of NER with ASEAN?

*Is DONER the right ministry to coordinate and review initiatives? Could it work out a road map that outlines objectives backed by credible feasibility studies, estimates funding to be drawn from the NLCPR and clarifies the inter-ministry process? Would separate AEP departments /cells in NER states promote greater engagement? How has Assam’s Act East Department facilitated AEP?

*From the initial concept of promoting economic linkages, AEP was a counter-balance to China’s growing influence. Have initiatives like BRI and RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) impacted this perception? Has the shift of India’s focus to the Asia-Pacific maritime domain, and initiatives like Neighbourhood First and Asia Africa Growth Corridor made a NE-centred AEP less relevant to its strategic calculus vis-à-vis China? Is it therefore time to facilitate a bottom-up approach, limiting the objectives of AEP to just facilitating MSME commerce and services, and to strengthening traditional cultural linkages? Also, Bangladesh has a common border with several states in NER, and significant commercial, cultural and connectivity linkages. How can it be made integral to AEP? Similarly, Myanmar and Thailand could be stepping stones to an ASEAN outreach. The first milestone should therefore be achievable initiatives under AEP to increase the ‘culture and commerce’ linkages of NER with Bangladesh and Myanmar/Thailand. External funders like ADB, WB and JICA have increased funding to the region. How has this been tied up with the objectives of AEP, apart from connectivity through roads?

A clear road map is needed for AEP, with feasible objectives centred on NE states, concrete facilitating schemes and clear funding sources. The narrative of a “secure Northeast’ is necessary but not an impossible constraint. More important is an ‘all-of-government’ systematic approach

For ‘Act East’ to work, it is imperative that industry be set up in the Northeast, with particular emphasis on value addition to products from the region, and trade based on the same – or tourism in all its facets. Locals also have to be consulted and psychologically tuned to do so.

15. Connectivity: Both physical and mental connectivity is essential – while external physical connectivity is being developed, internal connectivity is lacking both in physical and mental terms. A case in point is Myanmar refugees – Delhi desires they be barred from entry whereas the NER states demand they be allowed entry as they are their kith and kin. Relations with Bangladesh are another. The third example is relations between the NER states which is bad – Delhi is not paying adequate heed to these issues and lacks understanding of inter-state relations for projects. The NEC/DONER ministry is also non-functional and has no clout. Most states for a multitude of reasons lack funds even to pay pensions -  forget development projects.

The question also arises – is  Delhi losing focus and getting diverted from the AEP by QUAD, Chinese influence on RCEP, and so on. If so then Delhi must decentralise the AEP to make it effective

In conclusion, we see a challenging period ahead for the NER unless suitable remedial measures are taken.

(The author is an Indian Army veteran and currently president of Research Centre for Eastern and North Eastern Regional Studies (CENERS-K) Kolkata.  Views are personal)