The sixth round of the China-Afghanistan-Pakistan (CAP) foreign ministers’ dialogue—also referred to as the China-Pakistan-Afghanistan Practical Cooperation Dialogue (CAPPCD)—was held in Kabul on August 20, 2025. The meeting opened the door for a trilateral partnership aimed at extending China’s flagship initiative, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), into Afghanistan, a project being described as CPEC 2.0. The development has once again raised concerns for India.

The CAP trilateral mechanism was first initiated by China on December 26, 2017 to enhance cooperation and involve Afghanistan and Pakistan in expanding China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The idea of extending CPEC into Afghanistan was articulated as early as the second CAPPCD meeting in Kabul in 2018, where the three countries agreed to cooperate under the BRI and within the framework of the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA).

A New Geopolitical Context

This latest development comes amid rising tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and shifts in India-China relations against the backdrop of US President Donald Trump’s trade tariffs on key allies, including India. China has long sought to extend CPEC into Afghanistan, and these talks provided the first formal foundation for that vision.

India, however, has consistently objected to CPEC because it passes through Gilgit-Baltistan—a region India claims as part of Jammu and Kashmir and which it says Pakistan has illegally occupied since 1947. The CPEC extension thus raises fresh concerns about India's sovereignty.

China’s Engagement with the Taliban

The expansion of CPEC follows four years of sustained Chinese engagement with Taliban officials, with Beijing seeking assurances about the stability of Taliban rule. The Taliban, in turn, are attempting to present a more progressive, economically focused image in their second term, seeking development, legitimacy, and international acceptance.

China has taken several steps to entice the Taliban, including becoming the first country to accredit a Taliban-nominated ambassador to Beijing. Beijing often moves quickly to fill the vacuum left by the United States—whether in Afghanistan or elsewhere—and is applying the same approach in the evolving US-India trade dynamic.

For their part, Taliban leaders have emphasised economic reform in their recent messaging and appear eager to soften positions on contentious issues, including those involving India.

CPEC 2.0: Promise and Precariousness for Afghanistan

The Taliban government hopes the CPEC extension will bring investment, infrastructure, and broad-based economic development. Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar outlined major proposals, including the Peshawar–Kabul highway, which would expand Afghanistan’s access to Gwadar Port in Balochistan—plans to which China has already agreed.

However, Afghanistan would do well to note lessons from its neighbours. Pakistan’s economy has been strained by heavy dependence on Chinese loans, and the overall benefits of CPEC have been far lower than Islamabad initially promised. While Pakistan projected CPEC would contribute 6.43% to its GDP by 2030, the current figure stands at only 2.6%.

Why Stability Between Pakistan and Afghanistan Matters 

For China, promoting stability between Pakistan and Afghanistan is essential. Increased engagement with Afghanistan supports stability in neighbouring Xinjiang province. Establishing connectivity through the Wakhan Corridor under CPEC 2.0 could help Beijing secure assurances that Uyghur militant groups will not operate from Afghan soil.

Pakistan, meanwhile, sees CPEC expansion as a means to undercut India’s claims over Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (POJK). However, Islamabad has struggled to capitalise on CPEC and ongoing instability—including attacks on Chinese workers by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)—continues to threaten the 62 billion-dollar project. Pakistan accuses both groups of operating from Afghanistan with support from elements within the Taliban regime.

This raises critical questions about whether Afghanistan can guarantee the security necessary for CPEC’s success.

Strategic Risks And Road Ahead

CPEC 2.0 is expected to serve as a major leverage tool for China to access Afghanistan’s untapped natural resources and enhance connectivity to Pakistan and Central Asia. However, for Afghanistan, the initiative may be more of a challenge than an opportunity. Countries such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives have already faced severe economic consequences from poorly structured Chinese-funded projects.

A strained Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship is also not conducive to Chinese interests. Pakistan’s unilateral military actions inside Afghanistan against TTP targets and its historically unreliable diplomacy may further erode trust.

China, with deeper financial resources and political influence, is likely to dominate economic opportunities in Afghanistan. Although India continues to object to CPEC as a violation of its territorial claims in POJK, its engagement with the Taliban-led government is set to continue, driven by strategic necessity.

However, India’s role in Afghanistan may face obstacles due to:

• Continued US-Iran tensions

• Strains in India-US relations

• Resulting complications for India’s strategic access to Iran’s Chabahar Port, a key route to Afghanistan

These factors may push Afghanistan to rely more heavily on China.

(The author is a doctoral candidate at Kumar Bhaskar Varma Sanskrit and Ancient Studies University, Assam. He has served as Research Associate in a Defence Research and Development Organisation-sponsored project. Views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at duttabhaskarjyoti51@gmail.com.)