After four years and four months since China’s 2020 aggression and twenty-one military corps commanders level meetings, all inconclusive largely owing to intransigence by the Chinese, on 21 October 2024, two days prior to Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping meeting during the BRICS Summit at Kazan, Russia, a “breakthrough” was announced.

India's Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri was reported stating, “Over the last several weeks, Indian and Chinese diplomatic and military negotiators have been in close contact with each other in a variety of forums….As a result of these discussions, agreement has been arrived at patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China border areas, leading to disengagement and a resolution of the issues that had arisen in these areas in 2020…..We will be taking the next steps on this." This also clarified India’s earlier stance of “not an inch of territory has been lost”.

Shortly after the announcement on 21 October 2024, the disengagement process began at two friction points along the LAC and was reportedly completed by 29 October.

Reasons for breakthrough

What were the reasons for this surprise breakthrough? India maintained that its ties with China cannot be normal unless there is peace along the LAC. In all negotiations since the standoff began, India had been pressing for the PLA to disengage from the Depsang and Demchok areas.

One reason was that it was being considered agreeable that conditions be created for Modi and Xi to meet amicably during the BRICS Summit.

One very significant development which the media seems to have missed is that on 2 September 2024, Adani Enterprises, the flagship company of the Adani Group, one of India's largest business conglomerates, established a subsidiary in Shanghai called Adani Energy Resources (Shanghai) Co. (AERCL).

On 3 November 2024, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar made important comments while addressing members of the Indian community at the University of Queensland in Brisbane. He said, "In terms of India and China, yes, we have made some progress. You know, our relations were very, very disturbed... We have made some progress in what we call disengagement, which is when troops were very close to each other, with the possibility that could lead to some untoward incident…. There are very large numbers of Chinese troops deployed along the LAC who were not there before 2020. And we, in turn, have counter deployed. There are other aspects of the relationship which also got affected during this period. So clearly, we have to see after the disengagement, what is the direction we will go."

On 3 December 2024, while addressing the Lok Sabha on the India-China situation, EAM Jaishankar did some plain-speaking. He said, “The House is cognizant of the fact that China is in illegal occupation of 38,000 sq. km of Indian territory in Aksai Chin as a result of the 1962 conflict and the events that preceded it. Furthermore, Pakistan illegally ceded 5180 sq. km of Indian territory to China in 1963, which had been under its occupation since 1948. India and China have held talks for multiple decades to resolve the boundary issue. While there is a Line of Actual Control (LAC), it does not have a common understanding in some areas. We remain committed to engaging with China through bilateral discussions to arrive at a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable framework for a boundary settlement. Hon’ble Members would recall that the amassing of a large number of troops by China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh in April/May 2020 resulted in face offs with our forces at a number of points. The situation also led to disruption of patrolling activities. It is to the credit of our armed forces that despite logistical challenges and the then-prevailing Covid situation, they were able to counter-deploy rapidly and effectively……... The situation arising after our counter-deployment in 2020 called for multiple sets of responses. The immediate priority was to ensure disengagement from friction points so that there would be no further untoward incidents or clashes. This Sir has been fully achieved as I will explain. The next priority will be to consider de-escalation, that would address the massing of troops along the LAC with associated accompaniments. It is also evident that the management of the border areas will require further attention in the light of our recent experiences.”

Jaishankar ended his longish address by informing the House progress made in recent years by way of the Atal Tunnel to Lahaul Spiti, the Sela and Nechiphu Tunnels to Tawang, the Umlingla Pass road in Southern Ladakh and the extended opening of the Zojila Axis. He added the work is progressing on some strategically important roads and airfields in Ladakh, that the adoption of new technologies in high altitude, remote, inaccessible and permafrost areas has been significant and that “all of this reflects the Government’s firm commitment to protecting our borders and ensuring that our armed forces get the facilities and the logistical support that they deserve”.

Revival of SR dialogue

On 18 December 2024, Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval held talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi under the framework of Special Representatives (SR) dialogue on the boundary dispute. The decision to revive the SR dialogue mechanism was taken by Prime Minister Modi and President Jinping in Kazan on 23 October 2024, two days after India and China firmed up the disengagement pact. 

This was the 23rd boundary related meeting between SRs and the first in five years since 2019. In the classic Chinese Communist Party style, Wang Yi stressed “putting the border issue in an appropriate position in bilateral relations”. NSA Doval also called on China’s Vice President Han Zheng during this visit. Prominent points mentioned in the Chinese statement on the ‘six-point consensus’ included: both sides positively evaluated solution reached on border-related issues (resumption of patrolling), both agreed to take measures to maintain peace and tranquillity in border areas; both reiterated to keep looking for a package solution to resolve the border issue in accordance with political guiding principles reached by both SRs in 2005; both agreed  to further refine border area control and rules and strengthen CBMs, strengthen cross-border exchanges/ cooperation, promote the resumption of Indian pilgrims' pilgrimage to Tibet, China, cross-border river cooperation and Nathula border trade.

Issues needing clarifications

Some of a number of issues needing clarification/should be noted are: (a) Out of the 4,000 sq km of territory in Eastern Ladakh that India lost control of since April-May 2020, which includes traditional grazing ground, how much has been vacated. (b) According to an Observer Research Foundation report dated 23 November 2024, there is still a significant amount of disengagement, de-escalation, and de-induction of forces to be completed by New Delhi and Beijing. Pending further negotiations, under the latest agreement, the following friction points were left out—Galwan Valley (PP 14), Pangong Tso (North and South Banks), Gogra (PP 17A) and Hotsprings (PP 15). (PP-patrolling points). These four areas are currently under buffer zones that prohibit patrolling, meaning the status quo ante, has not been restored completely. (c) In July 2017, the government of China’s Tibet Autonomous Region announced plans to construct hundreds of border villages and accompanying infrastructure as part of a major push to develop China’s remote border regions. 

Between 2018 and 2022, reportedly 624 villages were built, with work continuing on additional villages.  These villages, often accompanied by military and dual-use infrastructure, are an important “gray zone” tool enabling China to assert and defend its claims near disputed areas. Many of these are clustered along the eastern sector of the LAC, i.e. Arunachal Pradesh, claimed by China as “South Tibet”

Lt Gen Rakesh Sharma (retd), former GOC of a corps in Ladakh, interacting with this writer, stated,” The issue of prevalent mistrust must be addressed. Extensive confidence building measures agreed to between 1993 and 2013 were not adequate to prevent many fisticuffs, scuffles or long-drawn stand-offs even before 2020……. De-escalation of the PLA to pre-2020 positions remains a far cry, with much infrastructure including habitat created in South Xinjiang and other areas…….and a new procedure of ‘escorted patrols’ should certainly not be agreed to.

In May and June 2020, the Chinese broke all agreements made over half a century. They will not hesitate to break in the future too. Removing some tents is no big deal; one should not be surprised if they do not remove the concrete structures. India must not become complacent but maintain a very close and constant watch while ensuring modernisation/ replacement of weapons and equipment.

(The author, a strategic affairs analyst, is  a former Defence Ministry and Indian Army spokesperson. Views expressed are personal. He can be reached at wordsword02@gmail.com)