A possible war between India and China remains a much-debated subject, especially in Western strategic and media circles. Certainly, both nations must plan for such an eventuality, any responsible military must. Yet the chances of an all-out conflict between the two neighbours remain remote.

In the early 1960s, China was reeling from the disastrous aftermath of the Great Leap Forward. The country was struggling even to feed its people, let alone sustain a prolonged war. India, by contrast, was on a relatively economic upturn but lost the 1962 conflict largely because it was unprepared -militarily, politically, and psychologically. Today, the situation is very different. A war with India is no longer a walkover for China. In fact, any such conflict would inflict severe economic and strategic damage on both sides.

Risks Exceed Rewards

Much of the current tension is linked to the long-standing disputes over Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. Yet neither India nor China appears genuinely interested in transforming these disputes into a full-scale conflict. India is not actively seeking to reclaim Aksai Chin, not because it lacks the will, but because the cost of such an endeavour would far outweigh any gain. Similarly, China’s rhetoric on Arunachal Pradesh does not translate into a realistic military objective. Capturing Arunachal is not feasible without derailing decades of China’s economic progress. For both nations, the risks exceed the rewards.

This is why border clashes, though frequent and sometimes bloody, remain geographically confined and tactically limited. These skirmishes serve China’s real intention, needling India, creating discomfort, and keeping New Delhi strategically distracted. India understands this game and responds firmly yet carefully, avoiding escalation while safeguarding territory.

A Far Stronger India

China’s support to Pakistan adds another layer of complexity. Any conflict ostensibly risks turning into a two-front situation for India. Yet even here, realities have shifted. Pakistan is no longer in a position, economically or militarily, to sustain a prolonged confrontation. China, for its part, cannot openly back Pakistan in a large conflict without jeopardising it's far more important interests in the Indo-Pacific, where its resources are already stretched.

Western defence experts often argue that Pakistan’s history of supporting anti-India militant groups, and India’s increasing willingness under the Modi government to respond with military force, heighten the risk of escalation. Similarly, they highlight the rapid infrastructure development and troop build-up by both India and China along the Line of Actual Control, warning that “sporadic encounters risk miscalculation.” While these are seemingly valid concerns, they largely reflect Western vantage points, shaped by their own anxieties and often by limited understanding of Asian political behaviour. 

The intention here is not to compare the militaries of India and China. On paper, China’s armed forces are far superior, look stronger, and their border regions remain more accessible from the Chinese side than the Indian. Yet this paper advantage does not translate into guaranteed success. After 1962, China has repeatedly tested India, from Nathu-La and Jelep-La to the more recent Galwan Valley confrontation. But it has never dared a full-scale war. India today is far stronger in military capability, infrastructure, political resolve, and global clout.

Lose More Than Gain

China is deeply entangled in multiple geopolitical theatres. It is directly engaged in the Indo-Pacific and indirectly in the Russia–Ukraine conflict and the Middle East. Opening a fresh land war with a newly transformed and combat-experienced Indian military, especially one with unmatched expertise in high-altitude warfare, is not in its interest. A closer examination reveals that much of the “India- China war” rhetoric may be another case of well-known American paranoia. For over two years, the United States warned of an imminent Russian nuclear strike, a prediction that never materialised. American intelligence assessments have a long record of spectacular miscalculations, from Iraq’s WMDs to the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, China’s slowing economy is forcing Beijing to reassess its priorities. The tottering real-estate sector, one of the twin engines of China’s economy alongside manufacturing, has created a domestic crisis of confidence. Consumption is weak, youth unemployment is high, and global investors are wary. The failure of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to generate meaningful economic dividends for partner countries has generated resentment, accusations of debt-trapping, and an erosion of China’s influence. Pakistan itself, China’s “iron brother”, has been hedging by warming up to the United States. The rise of BRICS as an influential grouping further complicates China’s calculations.

In this context, a war with India, one of Asia’s fastest-growing economies and an increasingly influential global player, would be strategically foolish for Beijing. Hence, while low-level clashes may continue, the possibility of a large-scale conflict, as projected by recent U.S. intelligence reports, remains far-fetched. Both countries are acutely aware that they stand to lose far more than they can gain. Despite uneasy relations, several factors actively discourage conflict and strengthen the fragile peace.

Market Realities, Strategic Logic 

China’s economy is under pressure. Bloomberg projects China’s GDP growth may fall to around 3.5% by 2030. Such a slowdown limits China’s ability to sustain its massive defence budget, the BRI, and external military adventures. India, meanwhile, is experiencing stable growth. The World Bank projects India’s GDP growth at 6.5% for 2025 and over 6% in 2026 and beyond, driven by a young population, rising domestic consumption, infrastructure investments, and expanding manufacturing. But even India cannot afford the shock of a full-scale war with China. Both economies are too interlinked with global supply chains to withstand major disruption.Trade also acts as a stabiliser. India–China bilateral trade reached $136 billion in 2022–23, increasing every year, with China enjoying a massive surplus. For China, India remains a large and dependable market; for India, Chinese goods still occupy significant space in industry and consumption. A war would devastate this mutually beneficial yet asymmetrical relationship.

China faces mounting diplomatic challenges. Its relations with the United States and Europe are strained. Taiwan is increasingly assertive, with elections intensifying rhetoric. The South China Sea is unstable, with regional nations resisting China’s expansive claims. Even the BRI is losing credibility, with Italy, its only G7 member participant, considering withdrawal. Beijing simply cannot afford another major distraction. Strategically, China’s focus remains on Taiwan and the maritime theatre. Its policy documents repeatedly emphasise the Eastern Front as its main “strategic direction.” A land war with India would derail China’s primary strategic objectives, dilute military resources, and risk humiliating setbacks.

Finally, both nations are nuclear powers. Any war carries the risk of escalation into the nuclear domain—a scenario catastrophic for the region and the world. Neither leadership is reckless enough to gamble with such consequences.

Perhaps the most decisive factor, however, is the uncertainty of outcome. Despite its superior numbers, the PLA cannot be confident of victory in a high-altitude conflict. The terrain is hostile, supply lines are long, and the weather is punishing. The Indian military is far more experienced, better acclimatised, and increasingly well-equipped. China will not initiate a war where even a stalemate would amount to a moral and strategic victory for India.

In sum, while tensions will persist and tactical confrontations will occur, the probability of a large-scale India–China war remains low. Strategic logic, economic compulsions, geopolitical realities, and the uncertainty of military outcome all point towards caution—on both sides. The fragile peace will hold, not because India and China trust each other, but because both understand the scale of what they stand to lose.

(The author is an Indian Army veteran and a contemporary affairs commentator. Views expressed are personal. He can be reached at  kl.viswanathan@gmail.com )