Japan Shaping New Asian Security Narrative With Taiwan Stance

If Taiwan were to fall, Japan’s security architecture would be fundamentally compromised. The First Island Chain would fracture, opening a northern pathway for Beijing toward Okinawa and Kyushu. Takaichi recognised this reality and voiced what many regional strategists have long acknowledged: Japan has little choice but to act, even at the cost of Beijing’s displeasure.

Collins Chong Yew Keat Dec 16, 2025
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Representational Photo

The recent Sino-Japanese tensions over Taiwan, coupled with Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s comments on defending the island, reflect an underlying power struggle that has long existed but has largely been managed through conventional norms and strategic ambiguity. With her remarks, however, the buck stops with Takaichi.

She has done what no Japanese leader before her has openly dared to do: publicly state that Japan’s own security and national survival are inseparable from the fate of Taiwan. In doing so, Takaichi articulated a strategic truth that has long been whispered and tacitly understood in Tokyo, Washington, and even Taipei, but rarely acknowledged openly for fear of upsetting established norms and unspoken rules.

For Japan, the Taiwan question is neither distant nor abstract. It is not a geopolitical chessboard on which Tokyo plays a peripheral role. It is a direct, critical, and immediate national security concern. Any potential Chinese attack on Taiwan would inevitably affect Japan’s own security and survival, drawing Tokyo directly into the conflict. This is not political rhetoric but a hard military reality.

In recent years, Chinese military blockades and encirclement exercises around Taiwan have already affected Japan’s economic interests, trade routes, and sovereignty concerns. A full-scale invasion would elevate these risks dramatically.

A Chinese strike on Taiwan would not be geographically contained within the Taiwan Strait. If Beijing were to launch a full assault, Washington’s pre-emptive deterrent measures would likely provoke rapid counter-responses from China. In such a scenario, Japan would become a natural and high-priority target for deterrent and pre-emptive strikes. Japan’s Yonaguni Island lies barely 110 kilometres from Taiwan. A blockade around Taiwan would therefore amount to a direct threat to Japan’s own maritime rights and territorial security. Taiwan would not be the sole victim of a forced invasion; Japan would find itself squarely in the crosshairs.

U.S. forces stationed across Japan are indispensable to any American military response aimed at blunting the effectiveness of Beijing’s initial strikes on Taiwan. Beijing is fully aware of this reality.

China’s military doctrine has consequently prioritised the “Japan equation”, recognising that any successful operation against Taiwan would require neutralising Japanese involvement and targeting U.S. bases on Japanese soil. In all plausible scenarios, Japan would be drawn into the conflict. This has long been a reality few in Tokyo were willing to state publicly—until Takaichi did.

A Strategic First Move That Cornered Beijing

Takaichi’s statement was both strategically calibrated and tactically effective in placing Beijing under pressure.

By publicly clarifying Japan’s likely response to a Taiwan contingency, she forced Beijing into a strategic dilemma. Any aggressive counter reaction would reinforce China’s image as the provocateur, as reflected in incidents such as radar locks on Japanese aircraft near Okinawa. At the same time, Beijing’s narrative of restraint was exposed as fragile.

China has long preferred ambiguity to dominate the strategic landscape. Takaichi’s remarks stripped away that ambiguity and replaced it with clarity.

Her position has also pushed Washington towards greater decisiveness, adding pressure to reassess its long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity on Taiwan. While this approach has historically aimed to deter both Beijing and Taipei, it is increasingly strained in an era where Chinese missiles can reach Tokyo within minutes.

Public support within Japan has grown for a more assertive and unapologetic security posture. This reflects a widening national recognition that silence invites danger, while clarity strengthens deterrence.

Going forward, neither side is likely to back down. Takaichi has shown no inclination to retreat from defending Japan’s strategic interests, while Beijing must project strength to satisfy domestic nationalism.

Yet the balance of risk is asymmetrical. Beijing has far more to lose, while Tokyo stands to gain from having seized early narrative and strategic control over regional power dynamics.

Japan’s Credible Deterrence Advantage

Even without nuclear weapons, Japan’s military posture is far from symbolic. The Japan Self-Defense Forces possess one of the world’s most advanced missile defence architectures, an expanding fleet of F-35 fighters, world-class maritime patrol capabilities, and growing long-range strike potential. Japan is no longer a secondary actor. It is a frontline power with substantial deterrent capacity. Although Tokyo does not possess nuclear weapons, Washington remains firmly committed to extended nuclear deterrence in defence of Japan.

This combination—conventional strength, technological sophistication, and the U.S. nuclear umbrella—complicates Beijing’s strategic calculations. Japan enjoys credible deterrence without the political and strategic costs of developing its own nuclear arsenal.

Beijing’s Psychological Warfare—and Its Limits

Aware of its own vulnerabilities, Beijing moved quickly to frame Japan as the “dangerous”, “provocative”, and “unpredictable” actor—an early application of psychological warfare. However, regional actors have not been persuaded, recognising the underlying strategic realities.

If Taiwan were to fall, Japan’s security architecture would be fundamentally compromised. The First Island Chain would fracture, opening a northern pathway for Beijing toward Okinawa and Kyushu. Takaichi recognised this reality and voiced what many regional strategists have long acknowledged: Japan has little choice but to act, even at the cost of Beijing’s displeasure.

Her stance represents both clarity and deterrence. For the first time in years, Japan—not China—is shaping the narrative of Asia’s future security order. Tokyo’s plans to deploy medium-range surface-to-air missiles on Yonaguni Island further reinforce this shift. Such deployments allow Japan to monitor airspace near the Taiwan Strait and establish frontline deterrence against hostile forces approaching from the south.

In a conflict’s opening phase, Yonaguni’s airspace would likely be among the first targets of Chinese missiles and aircraft aimed at neutralising U.S. bases in Okinawa. Deploying Type-03 Chu-SAM systems and surveillance infrastructure strengthens Japan’s ability to intercept early strikes and deny uncontested airspace, sealing a critical vulnerability along its southwestern flank.

This deployment raises the costs of Chinese military adventurism, safeguards Japan’s territorial integrity, and reassures regional partners.Japan’s role as a deterrent remains decisive. Numerous war games and strategic assessments consistently demonstrate that without Japanese involvement, defending Taiwan becomes significantly more difficult. Without access to Japanese bases, U.S. air operations would be severely constrained. In most simulated scenarios, coalition success hinges on Japan’s participation. Beijing understands this reality, which helps explain its forceful and kinetic reactions to Takaichi’s statements. If Japan were to stay out, China’s chances of eventually subjugating Taiwan—despite resistance—would rise markedly. That is precisely why Japan’s position now matters more than ever.

(The author is a Kuala Lumpur-based strategic and security analyst. Views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at collins@um.edu.my.)

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