The Quad Summit hosted by outgoing President Biden in Delaware on September 21 was a symbol of the Quad’s resilience and strength. Amidst new waves of security challenges and responses in the Indo Pacific region ranging from the newly formed the Squad (Tokyo-Manila-Washington), to Aukus and potential Asian Nato, Quad has been deemed by some to have become increasingly obsolete.

However, the geopolitical and security realities make less sense for Washington to ditch the Quad in favour of the Squad or direct security alliances. While Quad has always been seen as the softer power version of Washington’s quest for China containment in the Indo Pacific, further validated by the focus on rules based order and extended maritime domain awareness, there has never been a shift in its predominant focus on containing China’s regional ambition.

The Quad was established to be a global force for good, benefiting partner countries across the Indo-Pacific—including in the Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean Region. With the synergy and joint partnership of Tokyo, New Delhi, Canberra and Washington the core priorities remain of upholding the rules-based order and in ensuring normative global peace and security are preserved.

Apart from the primary combined role in preserving stability and international order, the Quad is leading ambitious projects in areas of low politics and non conventional threats too. The four powers address pandemics and disease; respond to natural disasters; mobilize and build high-standard physical and digital infrastructure; invest in and benefit from critical and emerging technologies; confront the threat of climate change; bolster cyber security; and cultivate the next generation of technology leaders.

Wilmington summit left its stamp

This summit in Wilmington, Delaware was crucial in several areas. First, it was the last one to be attended by Biden, who was instrumental in the grouping's institutionalisation, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who played a pivotal role in adding political heft to the forum.

Second, this year marks two decades since the formation of the grouping. With the eyes of Russia and China and the growing threats posed by North Korea, and other non-traditional security challenges in the region, the Quad faces a multi-faceted threat setting. The Wilmington Declaration, the joint statement of the Quad leaders after the summit, seeks to address these challenges in a united framework as a message to both foes and allies.

The Wilmington Statement exhibits continuity in responding to the war in Ukraine, and expressed concerns over ballistic missile launches conducted by North Korea and the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear missiles and technologies. The Declaration focused on the ongoing conflict in Gaza as well.

On the China dilemma, Quad's response this year seems sharper. Beijing was called out for disregarding international law and acting unilaterally in the East and  South China Sea, condemning the use of coastguards and maritime militia vessels, which serve as China's tactics for coercive and intimidating manoeuvres.

More maritime cooperation on anvil

Quad's efforts to bolster Maritime Domain Awareness through the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) received a new boost with a new Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific (MAITRI). The Quad also seeks to complement ASEAN, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).

These trails of complementing measures in shoring up regional trust and confidence through disaster responses and providing security bulwarks through deterrence and focus on new threat settings such as cyber security and climate impact are intended to extend the sustainability and acceptance rate of Quad in the region. This differs from Aukus or the Squad in their orientations of hard power deterrence and security formations with operational and interoperability mode of functions.

The four Quad members are united not only by common threats, but by common intent of getting the economic and trade returns among themselves and in extending their version of the Indo Pacific stability and security in halting Beijing’s coercion of regional players.

Having a diverse security and non security domains to leverage on, the Quad presents a more credible actionable deterrence and second strike capacities, with more resilient collaborations ranging from undersea cable security to disaster response and humanitarian relief and upholding common political ideologies of democracy and freedom.

One of the flagship collaborations, the extended maritime domain awareness, differs from other normal conventional maritime interoperability capabilities, in a way which the Squad is not able or not geographically viable to do.

Not a traditional military alliance

The Indian Ocean remains the central geosecurity domain for Quad, with the Indian Navy using this as both a joint capacity enhancer and an extended maritime support from the US as the status quo maritime presence and the growing scales of Japan and Australia. As India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar put it, the overall strength is built on the overarching common binding of democratic polities, pluralistic societies and market economies, providing a stabilising factor in a volatile world.

The Quad, as has been pointed out, is not a traditional military alliance, and contributes to the wider regional order. The level of support and interaction also holds volume, as the Quad includes both leaders’ and foreign ministers’ tracks, while the Squad so far is confined at the defense minister level.

The Quad is not driven by Washington’s quest for China containment alone. Japan, Australia and India each has its own wariness and insecurities with relation to China, with equal if not more intent to check Beijing’s deepening encroachment into their security and economic interests.

Although New Delhi is distinct in its foreign policy approaches as compared to other Quad members, it will want to remain committed to this platform in upholding the regional rules-based order and keeping China in check, even while maintaining its own special ties with Moscow. India is concerned about the security interests of its immediate neighbourhood, including the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Strait and its land border with China. 

However, Quad does create an overarching arc of stability in the region, checking the expansion capacity of Beijing, which will in turn boost India’s regional ambitions that are mutually aligned with the Quad’s objectives.

(The author is a Kuala Lumpur-based strategic and security analyst. Views are personal. He can be contacted at collins@um.edu.my)