Recent media reports indicate that authorities are investigating the unauthorised circulation of a manuscript titled “Four Stars of Destiny” reportedly written by a former Chief of Army Staff, Gen M M Naravane. The excerpts quoted here are drawn from portions of the manuscript that are already circulating widely in the public domain, though purportedly unofficial digital copies.

I wish to raise issues that are not widely discussed, though they are important; probably more critical than "Hot Potato"-like incidents which could themselves be results of deeper issues - the reasons that such incidents repeat occasionally.

The issues “creating a storm,” in the opinion of a large section of the media and detractors:

1. The government’s withholding permission to publish the original book
2. The controversy regarding the Agnipath scheme
3. The “Hot Potato” affair

There has been extensive discussion on these issues, mostly partisan in nature, as is the fate of most topics in the public space, whether in the media or among so-called “experts.” There is hardly any quality discourse aimed at finding solutions to the decades-old, festering problems along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the de facto border, between India and China. As usual, public opinion appears to be “captured” by contrived controversies. So much for our thriving democracy, where everyone seems eager only to “hold the authorities accountable” in the name of preserving democratic values, as if that is the be-all and end-all.

Withholding Permission

The impression being created is that publication of the book has been withheld because of the author’s remarks on Agnipath, the short-term recruitment scheme of the Indian Army, and/or due to action or inaction connected with the “Hot Potato” incident. However, any discerning reader would notice that several “live” operational matters along the LAC are discussed in considerable detail. The question therefore arises as to who is competent to determine whether sensitive issues are involved; the media, the public, or the authorities?

If the manuscript had been submitted by the publisher or the author for vetting by Service Headquarters before printing, these issues might, in all likelihood, have been resolved by now.

Regarding the Agnipath scheme, it is evident that the concept was mooted and progressed by Gen Naravane before being introduced, albeit in a modified form. There is no mention of the issue being discussed with all stakeholders at any stage.

The “Hot Potato” Remark

The matter of the “hot potato” also raises a different reflection - the power of language. Language is a defining element of communication and can create varying effects within any narration. The choice of words, sequence, and emphasis can significantly influence how an event is perceived, even when the factual content remains unchanged.

For instance, after the initial conversation with the Northern Army Commander, what if the writing had been framed as follows:

“I had clear orders not to fire until ‘cleared from the very top’. A flurry of calls with the RM, EAM, NSA, and CDS followed, during which I explained the situation and laid out our immediate options. To each of them, my question remained the same, ‘What should we do?’”

No change in narration until 2230 hours.

“And finally, at 2230 hours, after approximately two hours and fifteen minutes from receiving the situation report from Northern Command, the RM called back to inform me that the PM had been spoken to and had given me a free hand to deal with the situation. Taking that decision carried enormous responsibility — a weight that struck with sudden and unmistakable force.”

The rest unfolds as narrated.

Would this style of narration create the same “controversy” as “Jo Uchit…” and “hot potato”?

More often than not, the manner of expression shapes perception more than the message itself.

The Missed Points

Beyond the “controversial” subjects creating storms, as it were, in current media discussions, there are deeper and more enduring issues with China along the LAC that the nation has been grappling with for decades. Commentators and experts often give these matters a pass because they are neither politically attractive nor commercially “saleable” to the public.

I do not intend to discuss all of them. I will cite a few examples from what is circulating in social media for readers to form their own judgement.

The following excerpts are drawn from portions of the manuscript that are already circulating widely in the public domain through unofficial digital copies. Extracts from the document are reproduced in italics.

Losing Territory 

“Did we lose any territory? That is a moot point, in the absence of any demarcated boundary.”

The nebulous boundary has always been an issue which China has been exploiting for decades. This matter has been dragging for decades.

“Whenever these meetings took place, and many more would happen in the future, there were no records or minutes of the meetings. The decisions arrived at were only in the nature of ‘in-principle’ agreements subject to ratification at appropriate levels on both sides. This arrangement had an inherent drawback in that what was said and understood by either party could be at variance depending on individual perceptions, and there was no method to protect against any retraction from what had been agreed upon ‘in-principle’. This was to have repercussions later on.”

This is a well-known aspect which does not find a place in discussions regarding Chinese “incursions” along the LAC.

“This would become a recurring feature in the negotiations, in that the PLA would assume that all their proposals had been accepted whereas they had only been heard.”

This little-known tactic of the PLA remains in the shadows.

On Chinese Strategy

“The end state was clear, a return to the status quo, but what could be or should be the lines of operation leading to that end state? There was no question of accepting a partial pull back. As the NSA, Shri Ajit Doval, pointed out, it is the Chinese strategy to come forward five steps, then go back one step and make it appear like a great concession, yet ultimately gaining in classic salami slicing tactics. The EAM was also quite clear that we should not be in a hurry to accept any partial solution but continue to negotiate from a principled position.”

The LAC Challenge

“We (the Army) wanted an early resolution, but he (EAM) had another perspective. ‘The longer the talks draw out,’ he said, ‘the better, as positions we now hold become semi-permanent and in time …..’. This perspective certainly influenced the manner in which we went about creating infrastructure in preparation for the long haul.”

India needs to evolve a comprehensive and integrated strategy for the defence of the LAC, one that brings together military preparedness, diplomatic engagement, infrastructure development, technological surveillance, economic resilience, and informed public communication. Such a strategy cannot remain confined to closed institutional silos; while operational specifics must remain confidential, the broad contours of national intent and preparedness should be placed in the public domain. Transparency at the strategic level strengthens public confidence, builds national consensus, and signals clarity of purpose to adversaries. The LAC challenge is neither episodic nor short-term; it is a continuing national endeavour that demands coordinated thinking, institutional continuity, and sustained public awareness

(The author is an Indian Army veteran and a contemporary affairs commentator. The views are personal. He can be reached at  kl.viswanathan@gmail.com )