Since the late 1970s the Indian Army has been paying a high price of losing good soldiers in an asymmetric warfare waged by Pakistan, which involves having large bodies of troops committed on the ground for dealing with a handful of the enemy. For each and every Indian officer/soldier killed, over thousands of firefights with the enemy from across the border, the Indian Army has been paying the price. Outsourcing anti-India operations to terrorists, often in the form of foreign mercenaries, is a very cheap option without committing Pakistan Army troops on the ground. While in the asymmetric war, India security forces do succeed in killing or catching terrorists, terrorist success can only be neutralised through firm and punitive action immediately. And the punitive response should not be confined only to the local area but should include striking at terrorists camps concentrated in areas beyond the Line of Control (LoC).

Abrogation of Article 370 and 35 A in Jammu and Kashmir made Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment livid and even more determined to continue the proxy war against India by exporting terrorists, despite the separatists /overground support in the Valley becoming scarce. The way the abrogation was coordinated was a blow to the separatists – both overt and covert - but the continuance of attacks by Pakistani terrorists and later targeting of Hindu Kashmiri Pandits who returned to the Valley and begun working there, only proved that the neutralisation/disabling of separatists is still far from complete. Not only were there still enough separatists around to assist Pakistani terrorists, but were increased to be used in Jammu division, as indicated by two terrorist attacks of April 20 at Bhatta Durian, Poonch and May 05, 2023 at Kandi forest, Rajouri and some earlier ones in 2022.

What also became evident was that Pakistani terrorists had managed to create safe hideouts in the dense border forests to escape the security dragnet. There are reportedly three to four militant groups active in the districts of Rajouri and Poonch and considering the modus of these attacks, it is most likely that Pakistan Army’s involvement has extended to participation as done earlier by forming battle teams (BATs), which are a mix of terrorist and Army soldiers/specialist troops.

Frequency of timed attacks

However, it is the two terrorist attacks in the Poonch-Rajouri areas in Jammu division from April 20 till May 4, 2023, which claimed the lives of ten Indian Army soldiers without any terrorists being killed or caught, which accentuated the urgent need to review intelligence gathering/counterintelligence and its operating procedures. Because it seemed quite clear that though Pakistan and its army too may be in turmoil, its organisers of terrorism against India are still active. And also, these two attacks were timed with two summits in India, the SCO Summit attended by the Pakistan Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto and the G 20 Summit.

The attack on April 20, 2023, was at Bhatta Durian, Poonch where a Rashtriya Rifles vehicle bringing eatables for that evening’s Iftar was ambushed, attacked with grenades and fired at with steel-core bullets till it caught fire, killing five personnel and injuring another. While People’s Anti-Fascist Front (PAFF), a proxy wing of Jaish-e-Mohammed, had claimed responsibility for the attack, there were also reports suggesting that it was done by Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT).

On the morning of May 05, 2023, a team of Army’s Special Forces commandos, Rashtriya Rifles soldiers, J&K Police and the CRPF entered Rajouri’s Kandi forest, acting on specific information that the perpetrators of the April 20 terrorist attack at Bhatta Durian had taken shelter in a network of caves covered by thick foliage. As they closed in, the terrorists triggered a hidden explosive before opening heavy small arms fire killing five Indian commandos.

Both these attacks launched in rough terrain, azverse weather conditions including rain resulting in five soldiers getting killed before any terrorists could be killed or caught are indications that these terrorists had been in that area long enough for them to observe their target unit/troops and plan their attacks and escape routes.

Since mid-2024, the extent of attacks in areas besides Poonch and Rajouri, began stretching to include Kathua, Udhampur and Doda. Also it was reported that the Pak Army’s elite SSG (Special Service Group) had been added to “enhance the effectiveness” of the terrorist attacks.  This was an area which had been declared as ‘militancy-free’ in 2010 or so.  

Slipups in intelligence?

In past years, Indian Army was making its Pakistani counterparts pay by way of bombarding its locations/defences along the Line of Control (LoC). However, as per an agreement between India and Pakistan in February 2021, this practice was stopped for the sake of peace for the civil population residing in the LoC belt. Otherwise, the Pakistan Army was paying at least some price for every terrorist attack in the Kashmir Valley by terrorist groups that it supports.

Another development reported is that attempts are on to mislead Indian Army and security forces (SFs) by providing them false/misleading inputs and thereby trapping and killing them. There have also been reports of Indian Army units slipping up on basic counter-terror operations drills/operating procedures, particularly related to route-cleansing/protection. The Bhatta-Durian incident suggests that the movement of the vehicle at a particular time daily for getting food for Iftar could have made attacking it easier. 

It must be ensured that areas of Poonch, Rajouri and others, which are with dense foliage are observed/monitored by effective means backed by satellite imagery from NTRO (National Technical Research Organisation) and drones. During the tenure of former Army Chief General V. K. Singh (2010- 2012), there used to be a Technical Support Division (TSD) of the Army which used to provide valuable counterintelligence for counter terror operations in J&K. This was unfortunately disbanded following reported friction between Gen Singh and the politico-bureaucratic establishment which accused that the TSD was spying on the government. 

Also, Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) must be made at least as effective, if not more, than Israel’s Mossad. It should have the capability to eliminate terrorist leaders and prevent/pre-empt attacks. In 2002, when this writer interviewed the then Israeli Ambassador, David Affec to mark 10 years of India-Israel diplomatic relations, he stated that India has very good, powerful and professional armed forces who must be used to defend the country’s security and that the government must have the political will to do so. Former Prime Minister I.K. Gujral (December 1919 – November 2012) majorly downgraded R&AW’s covert  trans-border intelligence and strike capability 

Need for better integration

Former Army Chiefs late Gen BC Joshi and Gen Shankar Roychowdhury, who this writer often accompanied on their visits to J&K, always kept reminding troops there that they were in a state of war and that they should take all precautions, keep following all relevant battle drills/procedures and avoid unnecessary loss of life while causing maximum damage to the enemy/terrorists.

Apart from those mentioned, some very important and urgent actions required to be taken or old ones to be reviewed are: (a) Improve ‘humint’ (human intelligence) to detect separatists/supporters in the Valley and districts of Jammu Division. (b) Improve/ensure wide and effective coverage of all areas by satellites, cameras and drones. (c) Under no circumstance should the Army’s numerical strength be reduced in the region and neither should Army’s presence be reduced. J&K is a sensitive and vulnerable border state, where Army’s presence should remain unreduced. (d) Surgical (Army’s special beyond border operations) strikes and Balakot type air attacks must be repeated to target terrorist leaders and concentrations. So far both these meticulously planned and executed strikes have been launched once each, which proves that we are capable. In these circumstances they are certainly not enough and must be repeated often enough till the jihadi setups in Pakistan are neutralised.

With great progress that has been made after abrogation of Article 370 in J&K on infrastructural development and connectivity by way of roads, bridges and tunnels in the world’s most challenging terrain of the Himalayas, there is even more need to substantially enhance and upgrade security to guard all these assets, which have become very attractive targets for sabotage. Meaningful integration of all intelligence and security agencies/organisations is thus imperative.

(The author, a strategic affairs analyst is former spokesperson, Defence Ministry and Indian Army. Views expressed are personal. He can be reached at wordsword02@gmail.com.)