Bangladesh war of 1971: Pakistan's blinkered vision
But it is interesting to note that 49 years hence, there seems to be no change in how the nation views the civil war and a bloody separation of its eastern province, writes Mahendra Ved for South Asia Monitor
The narrative in Pakistan that India facilitated the breakup in 1971 is perfectly understandable given hostilities generated by the 1947 partition and perennial distrust and hostilities between the two South Asian neighbours.
But it is interesting to note that 49 years hence, there seems to be no change in how the nation views the civil war and a bloody separation of its eastern province.
Media writings in Pakistan marking the anniversary lack any introspection or criticism of the institutions that caused the debacle. The opinion piece in Dawn newspaper (December 16, 2020) by Javed Jabbar, a former federal information minister, is representative of the current thinking in Pakistan. What comes across is a blinkered vision.
Although he does not presently hold an official position, he is a respected figure as a writer, filmmaker, and a voice in Pakistan’s communications field.
A delegate to the International Film Festival of India (IFFI) in the 1970s, Jabbar is also a familiar figure having roots in the erstwhile Hyderabad state. He has made Pakistan's only English language film in 1976, 'Beyond the Last Mountain'. He wrote 'Ramchand Pakistani’ (2008) one of Pakistan’s most significant films about a minority Hindu child and his father in an Indian prison. Shown in India, it was directed by his daughter Mehreen Jabbar.
Military crackdown in East Pakistan
Perhaps, the most important thing in his article ‘From 1971 to 2021,’ to mark the anniversary of the emergence of Bangladesh, is that he makes no mention of eight months of the military crackdown in the then East Pakistan that led to ten million people fleeing their homes. Not counting the armed rebels, he does not refer to the killings of unarmed Bengalis academics, writers, painters and the community of intelligentsia to which he belongs.
In omitting them, Jabbar, although a multi-media personality, ignores numerous writings and hours of television footage and broadcasting time by the international media that highlighted the atrocities East Pakistan authorities committed and those in West Pakistan, where Jabbar resided, kept away from the people.
He laments ‘reluctance’ among fellow Pakistanis “to revisit that year and acknowledge harsh truths about the excesses against Bengalis” who, he says, were “suspected to be secessionists or Indian agents.”
He also adds: “Cruel excesses were also committed against non-Bengalis, particularly onward of March 1, 1971.”
India’s role
As for India’s role, he concludes that while there are various versions and perceptions about the role Pakistan played in its eastern province, “there is virtual unanimity on India’s role in ensuring the break-up.”
For what happened in 1971, Jabbar claims that Z. A. Bhutto tendered ‘an apology’ when he visited Dhaka, post-liberation, in June 1974. This writer, posted as a journalist, reported that visit. There was no apology.
Indeed, in his public appearances, Bhutto came across as indifferent and at times, defiant. Visiting the National Martyrs’ Memorial outside Dhaka as required by protocol for visiting heads of government, he wore a golf cap, barely touched the wreath placed at the memorial, and did not bow. He stood uneasily while the national anthems were played.
Jabbar quotes late J. N. Dixit, India’s then deputy high commissioner to Dhaka (later Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor) on that visit. In his book “Liberation and Beyond: Indo-Bangladesh Relations,” Dixit was supposed to be “disturbed by the slogans against India that Shaikh Mujib raised on the streets during the welcome for Bhutto.”
For Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who was playing the host, to have “raised slogans against India” would be unthinkable. There indeed were anti-India slogans when Bhutto’s motorcade (with Sheikh Mujib) passed. They were raised by non-Bengalis stranded when Bangladesh was liberated. Called ‘Biharis’ they considered themselves Pakistani nationals and wanted to be repatriated. Save an estimated one lakh, accepted by former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, they remain in Dhaka as Pakistan has refused to take them.
However, as per Jabbar, Bhutto “received a tumultuous welcome” and concludes: “The frenzied enthusiasm was all the more remarkable because he was seen by many as a major cause of the 1971 crisis.”
History, however, records Bhutto’s role differently. Then military ruler Gen. Yahya Khan, could not but have factored Bhutto’s refusal to cooperate with the Awami League that had won the majority seats in proposed National Assembly in the 1970 elections.
'Mutual tendering of apology'
Besides Bhutto, Jabbar recalls former president Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s “expression of regrets” during the latter’s Dhaka visit. Musharraf did.
Jabbar now favours a mutual tendering of apology, with Pakistan making the first move and Bangladesh doing the same reciprocally.
It is not clear if Jabbar is reflecting Islamabad’s current thinking in the wake of recent Islamabad-Dhaka diplomatic moves, including Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina talking on the telephone to her counterpart, Imran Khan.
But Islamabad and presumably, also Jabbar, have a problem with Dhaka “promoting demonizing of Pakistan Army” and conducting “war crimes” trials and convicting several Jamaat-e-Islami leaders for their alleged role as young activists of Islamist militia that complimented the army’s attacks on the civilians in 1971.
Jabbar complains: “Through grossly unfair show-trials and executions of some people accused of collaboration, through diatribes in discourse, two generations of Bangladeshis have been given a biased view of Pakistan.”
'Myth and reality'
Islamabad officially holds that these trials should not have taken place after Sheikh Mujib had in 1974 agreed to forget the past events. Although Hasina is not mentioned, this point of serious disputes begins in 2009 when she became Bangladesh prime minister.
Writing in the Daily Times (December 17, 2020), Naeem Ahad quotes a Bengali from erstwhile East Pakistan now settled in England to list “myth and reality” of the “tragedy of 1971.”
“Dr. M Abdul Mu’min Chowdhury, a native of Sylhet and now lives in England. He is one of the writers who has done nothing less than tear through the fabric of fables to solve some mysterious myths that have been formed around the creation of Bangladesh. Among them is the fiction that Pakistan Army savagely killed 3 million people and raped 300 thousand women during the 9 months’ unsuccessful fight to preserve the integrity of a united Pakistan.”
The same newspaper carries another article on the same day by Shahrukh Mehboob, entitled “East Pakistan: A Stolen Victory”.
Critical of the military leadership of the day, he recalls: “India stole a victory from Pakistan in 1971 at Dacca. As the people watched petrified with grief, the Armed Forces begged for battle and continuation of the struggle; they were prepared to offer a sacrifice of their very lives to save the integrity and honor of their country. Their commanders, however, whose weak wills had been conquered, abjectly and ignominiously, surrendered.
“The top brass of the time had ascended to high command, in spite of character defects caused by lust, greed cowardice, and a host of other similar weakness that plagued them, besides their astonishing lack and ignorance of our nation’s cultural values and stunning professional incompetence.”
Interestingly, some of the writers cite the praise of Pakistani armed forces made, with what can only be sagacity of a victor, by the then Indian Army chief, General (later Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw.
Revisiting 1971
Jabbar sees the year 2021 as “an opportunity for Pakistan’s political and military leadership to revisit attitudes to 1971.” He argues that “the truth that the conflict was an attempt to preserve state unity and not a willful assault on the Bengali people can be reiterated.”
Jabbar applauds “the courage with which the outnumbered, under-supplied Pakistani troops defended the country. There were only about 34,000 combat soldiers out of about 45,000 troops deployed. They faced about 250,000 Indians and about 150,000 Mukti Bahinis.”
Since Jabbar seems to reflect the official version of the role the Pakistan Army in 1971, when the then chief was also ruling the country, he can hardly be expected to dwell on how “two generations of Pakistanis” have been given a “biased view” that has helped perpetuate its role in Pakistan’s polity.
(The writer is President, Commonwealth Journalists Association (CJA). The views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at mahendraved07@gmail.com)
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