The involvement of foreign troops in disaster relief operations in Sri Lanka underscores how real-world exigencies continue to shape geopolitical realities. It also illustrates how such circumstances can compel ruling elites in smaller states to recalibrate positions that once appeared ideologically rigid. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who has welcomed foreign forces to assist Sri Lanka during the recent crisis, had earlier taken a markedly different stance. As a Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) Member of Parliament in 2009, he strongly opposed the presence of U.S. military personnel on Sri Lankan soil, alleging that Washington was planning to establish a missile base at the strategically important Trincomalee naval port.

These allegations surfaced during a visit by the U.S. Pacific Fleet Command, led by Major General Thomas L. Conant, ostensibly to oversee a school rehabilitation project in Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province. The project was jointly funded by the U.S. Pacific Fleet Command and USAID. While the claims were never substantiated, they became part of a recurring narrative within Sri Lanka’s domestic political discourse on foreign military involvement.

Ideological Resistance To Strategic Cooperation

Although U.S. military deployments overseas are common, their presence in Sri Lanka has historically been rare. For the first time, both Indian and American troops are now actively engaged in rescue and relief operations on Sri Lankan soil. This marks a significant departure from past sensitivities surrounding foreign military footprints in the island nation.

As part of expanding Sri Lanka–U.S. defense cooperation, Trincomalee hosted the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Sri Lanka 2024 exercise on April 21, 2024. The exercise brought together the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and the Sri Lanka Navy to enhance maritime security capabilities. It also included joint activities involving the U.S. Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team (FAST) and their Sri Lankan naval counterparts.

Bilateral ties were further strengthened with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on November 14, 2025, formalising a defence partnership between the Montana National Guard, the U.S. Coast Guard District 13, and the Sri Lankan Armed Forces. The agreement reaffirmed a shared commitment to regional stability and maritime security in the Indo-Pacific.

India’s Enduring Strategic Sensitivities

Historically, New Delhi has been deeply wary of American military activity in Sri Lanka, viewing it as a potential threat to India’s national security. During the Cold War, suspicions were rife that President J.R. Jayewardene was negotiating to grant the Trincomalee port—one of the most strategically located harbours in the Indian Ocean—to the United States for military use. While the Cold War has long ended, the narrative of Washington’s interest in Trincomalee continues to resurface periodically in Sri Lankan politics.

In 2019, concerns were revived when the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis operated near Sri Lanka and used the Bandaranaike International Airport for temporary cargo transfers. Similar allegations resurfaced in October 2025, when a former Sri Lankan minister claimed that agreements had been reached to establish a U.S. naval base in Trincomalee.

During the Cold War, Jayewardene’s pro-American orientation caused deep unease in India, then led by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Professor Rohan Gunaratna, in his book India’s Intervention – The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, cites R.N. Kao, the first chief of India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), said: “Sri Lanka became a seat for outside influence we considered not very friendly toward us. Naturally, it caused some concern.”

India’s apprehensions intensified in 1981 when Jayewardene lifted a nine-year ban on foreign warships in Trincomalee harbour, allowing U.S. naval vessels to refuel there. New Delhi interpreted this as a step toward converting the port into an American naval base. Sri Lanka’s growing ties with Israel further fuelled Indian suspicions. Gunaratna records Jayewardene’s blunt response to Gandhi’s objections: “When Mrs. Gandhi told me to send the Israelis away, I told her that I will do so if she closes the Israeli consulate in Bombay.”

At the height of Cold War tensions, Mrs Gandhi reportedly adopted a hardline approach toward Colombo. According to Gunaratna, she even approved a contingency plan to invade Sri Lanka. By August 1984, the Indian Army’s Fifteenth Independent Paratroopers Brigade was allegedly prepared to seize Sri Lankan airstrips. The plan became public after secret Indian defence files were leaked to the press by a French agent, highlighting the extent of India’s alarm over Sri Lanka’s Western alignment.

India’s strategic anxieties eventually led to direct intervention in Sri Lanka’s internal affairs, including covert support to Tamil militant groups, culminating in the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987. Reflecting later on these events, Jayewardene acknowledged the risks of alienating India. In an interview with The Times of London before signing the Accord, he admitted: “I had turned to many countries for military help, but none had been forthcoming.”

Transformed Geopolitical Landscape

Today, the regional and global geopolitical environment has changed fundamentally. India and the United States—once divided by Cold War alignments—are now, in former U.S. President Barack Obama’s words, “indispensable partners.” While India does not endorse every U.S. position, particularly on issues such as Russia, its resistance to American activities in the region has visibly softened. New Delhi has also forged close strategic ties with Israel, reflecting its evolving foreign policy calculus.

The sight of Indian and U.S. troops working alongside each other during Sri Lanka’s recent flood disaster symbolises this transformed relationship and their shared commitment to addressing challenges in the Indo-Pacific. As Sri Lanka charts its future, one reality remains unavoidable: foreign influence—overt or subtle—continues to be an inextricable element of its political and strategic landscape.

(The author is Chief Editor, Eelandau Daily, and Executive Director, Centre for Strategic Studies–Trincomalee (CSST), Sri Lanka. Views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at jjathi@gmail.com / director@trincocss.org / www.trincocss.org. )