On 29 September 2023, two terror attacks were reported in Mastung (Balochistan province) and Hangu district (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) in Pakistan. The first one took place in Mastung In what was a fidayeen-style attack, with the attacker detonating himself beside the vehicle of the  Deputy Superintendent of Police, near Madina Mosque on Al Falah Road where people had congregated on the occasion of Eid Miladun Nabi, Prophet Mohammed's birthday). The mosque belonged to the Barelvi sect of Islam which is considered more moderate compared to the hardline sects such as Salafism in Pakistan. The Barelvi sect is viewed as an opposition to the Deobandi movement. Over 55 lives were claimed in the attack.

The second attack in Hangu occurred within hours of the attack in Mastung. The attack targeted a police station’s mosque. The attack took the lives of five people while 12 were injured when the roof of the mosque collapsed from the impact of the blast. The attack in Hangu consisted of two explosions - one at the gate of the mosque and the second within the mosque compound. The casualties in this attack are presumed to be less as one of the blasts happened at the gate. This provided the worshippers some mobility in an effort to evacuate the area.

The news of the attacks drew condemnation from many Pakistani political leaders, including interim Pakistani Prime Minister Anwar ul Haq Kakar, who was in Saudi Arabia for the Umrah pilgrimage. It is interesting to witness the reactions from the government when Pakistan has imposed far stricter blasphemy laws since January 2023.

Targets of Sunni intolerance

According to these laws, a spoken word or sound or gesture or display of any object/ item with the intent of hurting the religious sentiments of an individual is punishable. Several reports of misuse of these laws to detain or punish minorities such as the Sikhs, Hindus, Christians, Ahmadis, Shias and even followers of certain moderate Sunni sects have surfaced from across the country. This has caused much resentment as several individuals are resorting to rebelling or protesting in various provinces such as Gilgit-Baltistan,  Balochistan and Sindh against them. Due to a heightened sense of intolerance to other religious practices, there is a growing sense of radicalization amongst sections of the Pakistani population.

Apart from gurudwaras, churches, and temples being demolished by the government or attacked by certain terror groups, subsects of Sunnism such as the Barelvi are now the new targets of Sunni intolerance. One can infer that the root cause for such radicalization or utilization of Islam to wage violence by certain sects or outfits comes from the sharp politicization of religion in Pakistan.

While Pakistan continues to blame India for the bombings in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,  it fails to introspect on its own internal crises stemming from its policies against its citizens and the military/political support being given to certain radical outfits or groups.

IS-K's strategic underpinning

Terror groups such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS), and its South Asian offshoot IS-K (Islamic Stare Khorasan) have garnered attention through their acts of terrorism using the Salafist narratives to justify their actions and recruit new members. They often discredit the authority of mainstream Islamic scholars and institutions and stick to their own radical narratives which they deem beneficial for their outfits to gain political dominance and influence in areas of their operations.

According to the Combating Terrorism Centre (CTC) WestPoint, IS-K’s July 30, 2023, fidayeen attack in the Bajaur district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), which targeted an election rally, underlines the outfit’s growing geographic emphasis. IS-claimed attacks in KP province, which borders Afghanistan, have exponentially increased from nine in 2020 to 20 in 2021, to 47 in 2022, and 12 attacks during the first six months of 2023.

It is also important to mention IS-K’s motivation for the July 2023 attack on the Jamiat Ulema Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) workers’ convention in KP. The attack was premeditated due to the JUI-F's affiliation with the Afghan Taliban. This itself became a rationale for IS-K to strike anything Taliban oriented, which it views as its rival in waging jihad. Currently, IS-K sees itself as being in a phase of destabilization ('tawwahush'), where it is striving to establish a system of control in the region with politico-military operations.

Evolving network of terror

Post attacks in Mastung and Hangu, no outfit came forward to take claim for the attack. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has denied its involvement. The suspicion, however, is on the IS or another hardline Islamic group. The reason for this arises from the fact that the local affiliates of  IS mimic the tactics of IS to create sectarian conflicts by targeting minority Muslim sects, such as Shias, Barelvis, and Zikris. This comes across as an easy task because of the schism due to their ideological differences and their interpretation of Sharia among different sects of Islam in Pakistan.

The followers of the Barelvi sect have often stressed the veneration of  Prophet Muhammad and Sufi saints.  The birth anniversary of the Prophet is celebrated with music and dancing. Barelvis perform a ritual called ‘group dhikr’. This is a synchronised movement of the body while chanting the different names of God. They also participate in qawwalis. This is often viewed as heresy by some hardline sects who correlate these practices on the same lines as idol worship or as “Hinduaana”. According to Deobandis or groups like IS-K, the practices of Balrevis are 'haram' (taboo in orthodox Islam) and at times regard them as 'kafirs' (nonbelievers). The likelihood of IS-K’s involvement in the attack may come as no surprise either, especially when their chief Shahab al-Muhajir has been censuring the Barelvi community in their publications, referring to them as "infidels" allied with the Pakistani state.
Since IS-K has connected the Taliban with Barelvis and Saifis, this becomes a logical reason to make the Barelvis the target, especially in the light of their history of attacking Sufi shrines in Balochistan and Sindh and assassinating  Barelvi leaders in Peshawar.

In order to comprehend the evolving landscape of militancy in Balochistan and KP, it is vital to mention the course of the transformation of certain outfits that later merged or had leaders who joined IS-K. By 2015, IS Central announced the establishment of the Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISKP). This network was divided into two groups. The first group had TTP members who resonated with Salafi or anti-Shia sectarian ideologies. Most of these recruits came predominantly from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and South Waziristan. The second group consisted of militants from   Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LeJ). This was a banned militant group and exhibited anti-Shia tendencies.  The members of this outfit were recruited from Balochistan and northern Sindh. In order to consolidate the militant groups like Lej, TTP, and the jihadist networks focusing on Kashmir, IS Central established the Islamic State Province of Pakistan (ISPP) in May 2019.

 This helped in distinguishing and separating the IS administrative responsibility between that of Pakistan and the Afghan-centric ISKP. In 2021, however, the entire Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, previously under the ISPP, merged into ISKP’s organisational structure following orders from IS Central.

In the 90s, India's Punjab state experienced a massive crackdown on terrorism. During this time, several Lej members were anticipated to have fled to densely populated areas in Balochistan, while others sought refuge in madrasas run by Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). In Balochistan, Lej was responsible for inciting the local militants on the basis of their anti-Shia and anti-Iran rhetoric to target the Hazara Shia community.  During the course of this time. Lej worked as a freelance entity with groups such as Al-Qaeda, TTP etc

In 2015, Usman Saifullah Kurd, an important core commander of Lej, was killed along with an aide in a raid done by Pakistan security forces in the Sariab area. Since then, Lej began to weaken and over time started to disintegrate.  In 2016,  a madrassa run by SSP-affiliated religious leader Mufti Hidayatullah was demolished by Pakistan forces, as it was involved in providing safe haven to LeJ members. With the collapsing influence of Lej, Hidayatullah and a few individuals from Lej joined IS-KP or IS-K as it is now known among terror watchers. Currently, many Lej members are operating as IS-K operatives. IS-K has managed to also align with other anti-Shia outfits such as Hafeez Brohi to meet its agenda. By 2021, a faction of LeJ Balochistan,  renamed itself the Saifullah Kurd faction, under Khushi Muhammad, and later merged with the TTP.

Rising extremism and the blame game

With IS-K gaining influence over the jihadist networks in Pakistan in a bid to expand its foothold in the South Asian region,  it poses a security threat to the entire region. Apart from aligning with various Kashmir-centric jihadist terror outfits against India, ISK is trying to gain popularity with the Uighurs and the Huis of China as well by providing safe havens to them. In many cases, the IS Central has provided aid and training to jihadi fighters and provided safe passages for them to Turkey and Iran.

The inability of the Pakistani government to curb extremism even while indulging in the familiar blame game against India has only compounded the problem. After having failed in its Afghan gambit to influence the Taliban, Pakistan is burdened with a grave security challenge of a rising IS-K and mounting insurgency threats. Common sense would dictate that it cleans up its own house before it covets a neighbor's territory!

(The writer is an Indian research analyst specializing in AF/Pak region and counter-terrorism. Views are personal. She can be contacted at aparnarawal@gmail.com)