Bangladesh, a nation of 170 million. finds itself in a position that could alter regional dynamics in South Asia and beyond. The country is no longer just a peripheral state wedged between India and Myanmar. It has become a focal point in the quiet but consequential contest between great powers, mainly the United States and China. Moreover, its own choices risk reshaping relations with India, the Bay of Bengal, and the broader Indo-Pacific.

A Geography That Dictates Politics

Bangladesh’s geography is exceptionally strategic. It sits at the crossroads of South and Southeast Asia, with uninterrupted access to the Bay of Bengal. For the United States, which is shifting its global posture from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific, Bangladesh offers potential maritime access in a region where China’s naval reach is expanding. For Beijing, Bangladesh is no less valuable: it provides an alternative to the Malacca Strait chokepoint, a pressure valve for Chinese trade routes, and a vantage point from which to keep an eye on India.

Myanmar, another neighbor, is already deeply within China’s orbit, hosting pipelines, ports, and infrastructure financed by Beijing. India, meanwhile, is a natural geographical partner but an increasingly uneasy political one for Dhaka. The result is that Bangladesh—by accident of geography and by consequence of political realignment—is the most viable option for outside powers looking to project influence into the Bay of Bengal.

India: Friends to Friction

The ousting of Hasina has altered the fabric of Bangladesh-India relations. For decades, India was enjoying an indispensable partnership with Hasina, particularly in security and counterterrorism cooperation. But India’s unyielding support for Hasina—even as her government faced mounting domestic criticism—has left a sour aftertaste in Bangladesh’s public opinion. Add to that perennial disputes over river water sharing, border skirmishes, and India’s refusal to extradite Hasina after her removal, and relations have sunk to their lowest point since 1971.

The anti-India sentiment is not merely emotional but strategic. Every diplomatic vacuum leaves space for another power to fill it. China has been quick to step into the breach, extending its economic, military, and political footprint in ways that India is now scrambling to counterbalance.

China: The Patient Player

Unlike Washington, which often laces its diplomacy with lectures on democracy and human rights, Beijing has perfected the art of positive diplomacy. China has dealt with every Bangladeshi leader since independence, from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to General Ershad to Khaleda Zia to Hasina herself. After 2016, Chinese investment in Bangladesh accelerated dramatically under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), building power plants, ports, and bridges.

In the post-uprising era, Beijing has sharpened its appeal. It stepped in with arms sales after Washington declined to provide defense equipment. It offered duty-free access to Bangladeshi products at a time when Dhaka desperately needed new markets. And it welcomed Yunus’s interim government with investment pledges that few others were willing to match.

But the partnership is not without pitfalls. The Sri Lankan experience with Hambantota port and Pakistan’s struggles with Gwadar serve as cautionary tales of Chinese financing: loans that appear generous at first can metastasize into debt traps, particularly when tied to conditions requiring Chinese technology, labor, and repayment in yuan. Bangladesh’s trade deficit with China continues to widen, as its exports remain limited and undiversified. In effect, much of the money invested flows back to China rather than embedding itself in the Bangladesh economy.

United States: A Conditional Ally

The United States, too, matters enormously for Bangladesh. Washington is not merely an ideological promoter of democracy but also a key player in trade, migration, and counterterrorism cooperation. Yet its engagement with Dhaka has been marked by inconsistency. The suspension of GSP privileges after the Rana Plaza tragedy in 2013 and sanctions  over human rights issues highlight the risks of over-dependence on Washington’s good will.

Still, America remains a necessary partner. It is central to global recognition of Bangladesh’s interim government, to resolving the Rohingya refugee crisis, and to broader questions of trade access and climate finance. For Dhaka, the challenge is not whether to work with Washington but how to do so without appearing submissive.

Perils of Overdependence

What Bangladesh cannot afford is overdependence on any one power—whether China’s infrastructure loans, America’s conditional aid, or India’s neighborhood dominance. History offers sobering lessons. Pakistan, by tethering itself too tightly to Washington during the Cold War, found itself discarded when U.S. interests shifted. Sri Lanka, by becoming overly reliant on China, ceded control of its ports. Smaller states caught in the great power competition rarely emerge unscathed.

Bangladesh risks the same fate if it tilts too sharply in one direction. If it leans too heavily toward Beijing, it may find itself in a debt trap and diplomatically isolated from the West. If it leans too heavily toward Washington, it risks Chinese economic retaliation and reduced access to vital infrastructure investment. And if it alienates India altogether, it loses not only a neighbor but also a natural buffer in times of crisis.

Diplomatic Gamble

The Yunus-led interim government appears, at present, to be leaning toward China. That makes sense in the short term: Beijing offers quick cash, infrastructure projects, and military hardware without raising questions about democracy or human rights. Yet the government’s near-total neglect of India is strategically reckless. Geography cannot be wished away, and antagonizing one’s largest neighbor is rarely a sustainable policy.

At the same time, Dhaka’s balancing act between Washington and Beijing is precarious. The United States has demonstrated its ability to use both hard and soft power—from suspending trade privileges to raising human rights concerns—as leverage. China, for its part, is increasingly unwilling to tolerate signs of alignment with American initiatives like the Quad. Caught between these poles, Bangladesh risks becoming a pawn in someone else’s game.

Toward A Balanced Strategy

What, then, is the prudent path? Bangladesh’s best strategy lies in calibrated equidistance. It must accept Chinese investment but on terms that prevent debt dependency. It must cultivate ties with Washington but without allowing American agendas to dictate its domestic politics. And it must repair relations with India—not out of affection, but out of necessity. The Rohingya crisis, water sharing, cross-border trade, and migration issues cannot be solved without Indian cooperation.

Bangladesh can draw inspiration from countries like Vietnam and Indonesia, which have managed to navigate between China and the United States without surrendering autonomy. Both have leveraged geography and economic potential to keep outside powers interested but not dominant. Dhaka should aim for the same.

Choice of Alliance 

Bangladesh today stands at a crossroads. The uprising has disrupted old alliances and created new opportunities, but it has also exposed the dangers of overreliance and shortsighted diplomacy. The country can either allow itself to be swept into the zero-sum rivalry of China and the United States, or it can chart a middle path that preserves agency, leverages geography, and diversifies partnerships.

The choice is not just about foreign policy; it is about Bangladesh’s future as a sovereign actor in regional politics. In the end, the most important lesson of history is that small states that recognize their leverage often punch above their weight. Bangladesh, standing at the faultline of Asia’s great-power contest, has that chance. The question is whether its leaders will seize it.

(M A Hossain is a political and strategic analyst based in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Nazifa Anjum is an undergraduate student of international relations at Rajshahi University, Bangladesh. Views expressed are personal. They can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com )