Rare Earth Elements (REEs) have emerged as a strategic frontier in global geopolitics. These 17 metallic elements—critical to advanced electronics, renewable energy, and defense systems—are the foundation of the digital and green economies. Although geologically abundant, the challenge lies in economically viable extraction and processing—a domain currently dominated by China.

As global supply chains become increasingly weaponised, countries like the United States are racing to reduce their dependence on China’s near-monopoly over REEs. South and Central Asia, particularly Pakistan and Afghanistan, with their untapped mineral wealth, have suddenly emerged as key players in this scramble. However, this potential is embedded in profound instability, marked by insurgencies, great power rivalries, and the evolving role of the Taliban in regional politics.

India, which shares borders and strategic rivalries with both China and Pakistan, finds itself at the epicenter of this new “mineral Cold War.” The implications for its sovereignty, economic future, and regional influence are profound.

Rise of Rare Earths

The strategic value of REEs first became apparent during the Cold War when they were used in advanced missile guidance systems. Their importance grew exponentially in the post-Cold War era with the advent of smartphones, electric vehicles, lasers, and wind turbines.

China’s rapid industrialisation in the late 20th century saw massive investment in mining and processing infrastructure. By the 2010s, it controlled over 90% of the global REE supply chain—an economic feat turned into geopolitical leverage. This dominance was dramatically demonstrated during a maritime dispute with Japan, when China imposed a strategic embargo on REE exports, disrupting Japan’s high-tech industries and alerting the world to China's strategic advantage in the rare earth market.

Since then, the United States and its allies have sought to diversify sources. Countries like Australia and Canada emerged as reliable partners. However, the discovery of substantial REE reserves in Pakistan’s Balochistan province and in mineral-rich zones of Afghanistan has introduced a new frontier—rich in promise but fraught with peril.

Pakistan’s Mineral Frontier 

Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest and least developed province, is estimated to contain 12 of the 17 known REEs. Yet these mineral riches lie beneath a region scarred by decades-long ethnic conflict. The Baloch people have long accused the Pakistani state of systematic marginalisation and militarisation under the guise of development and security.

At the heart of this contestation is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—a multi-billion-dollar infrastructure initiative that cuts through Balochistan to culminate at Gwadar Port. While CPEC promises infrastructure and energy development, it has exacerbated local grievances. Baloch separatists see it as a neo-colonial project aimed at resource extraction while suppressing indigenous rights.

For the United States, Pakistan’s REE potential is strategically attractive but politically volatile. American companies and diplomats tread cautiously, wary of destabilising an already fragile region. China, by contrast, has adopted a more assertive approach—partnering with the Pakistani state, securing military protection for its workers, and embedding itself into the region’s economic infrastructure.

Afghanistan’s Strategic Resources

Often viewed through the lens of conflict, Afghanistan is one of the world’s most mineral-rich countries. Its estimated reserves of lithium, copper, cobalt, and rare earths are valued at over USD 3 trillion. For decades, conflict has prevented their exploitation.

The Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 has changed the dynamics. While global powers debate the regime’s legitimacy, China has taken a pragmatic route, signing preliminary mining agreements. Notably, the Aynak copper mine—once a Soviet project—has reemerged as a cornerstone of Chinese investment. Lithium deposits in southern provinces like Helmand, crucial for battery production, are also attracting new interest.

The Taliban, facing international isolation, sees its mineral wealth as a path to revenue and legitimacy. China’s promise of investment, jobs, and infrastructure is more appealing than Western conditional aid. This evolving Sino-Taliban partnership poses a strategic challenge to the U.S., which fears Afghanistan becoming another link in China’s global REE chain.

United States vs. China

The U.S. and China employ fundamentally different models of resource diplomacy in the region:

This divergence is evident in both Balochistan and Afghanistan. While the U.S. avoids insurgent-heavy zones, China is willing to take calculated risks, insulating its ventures with private security and local military backing.

India: At the Crossroads 

India’s strategic geography places it at the heart of the emerging rare earth competition. With Pakistan and China asserting dominance in the region, India’s response must be robust and multifaceted.

India has recognised the need for self-reliance in critical minerals. The government has ramped up geological surveys and authorised exploration in states such as Tamil Nadu, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, and Arunachal Pradesh. These regions, rich in monazite sands, offer promise for sourcing light rare earths like cerium and neodymium.

Public sector enterprises like Indian Rare Earths Ltd. (IREL) and private-public collaborations are scaling up mining and processing. New policies liberalising exploration and allowing foreign investment indicate a strategic shift from cautious engagement to urgent action.

Yet, India continues to lag in processing and refining—areas where China dominates. Bridging this gap is essential to achieving true mineral independence.

Strategic Alliances 

India has integrated its rare earth strategy into broader multilateral platforms like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) with the U.S., Japan, and Australia—all critical players in the REE supply chain.

It has signed a Critical Minerals Partnership with Australia and is exploring joint ventures with Japanese firms on advanced mineral separation. The 2021 expansion of the India-U.S. Strategic Energy Partnership to include critical minerals further reinforces its commitment.

These alliances strengthen India’s access to raw materials and technologies while diversifying global supply chains away from China.

Regional Outreach 

India has also expanded ties with Central Asian nations such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, seeking mineral access and energy partnerships through the India-Central Asia Dialogue.

Simultaneously, investments in Iran’s Chabahar Port offer a critical maritime alternative to Pakistan-controlled corridors, improving connectivity to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

India is also exploring transit routes through Myanmar and Southeast Asia via the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, which could open new mineral corridors.

Pragmatic Openness with Taliban 

Despite being diplomatically sidelined post-2021, India has continued humanitarian engagement with Afghanistan—providing food, medicine, and infrastructure aid. This maintains moral credibility and public goodwill, potentially paving the way for strategic re-engagement when conditions permit.

India has not formally recognised the Taliban regime but has signalled pragmatic openness, suggesting a long-term vision that factors in Afghanistan’s mineral wealth and regional importance.

Race is on

The competition for rare earths in South-Central Asia is not just a story of mining—it is a story of power, politics, and people. Pakistan and Afghanistan sit on mineral treasure troves, but their benefit will depend on governance, peace, and equitable development. For India, the rare earth race presents both a challenge and an opportunity. It cannot afford to be a passive observer. By forging innovative partnerships, investing in indigenous capabilities, and practising proactive diplomacy, it can protect its sovereignty and enhance its role in the evolving global mineral order.

The rare earth race is on—and South Asia is its new battleground.

(The writer, an Indian Army veteran and a former officer in the Armoured Corps, is a defence analyst. Views expressed are personal. He can reached at manojchannan@gmail.com; linkedIn www.linkedin.com/in/manoj-channan-3412635; X @manojchannan )