The term “Rohingya refugee” now seems destined for the dictionary. Their suffering continues unabated, deepening hostility, despair, and geopolitical opportunism among some neighbouring states. More than one million Rohingya refugees remain an acute burden for Bangladesh—struggling not only to return home, but also to avoid becoming a long-term destabilising factor within Bangladesh itself.

As global attention shifts elsewhere and Bangladesh’s internal political landscape evolves, the Rohingya question risks being pushed to the margins. UN Secretary-General António Guterres once described the Rohingya as “the world’s most widely dispersed minority.” Yet their confinement in Bangladesh increasingly contradicts that label.

History Of Repeated Expulsions

The brutality of the Rohingya crisis has deep historical roots. Their exclusion began in earnest after Burma’s (now Myanmar’s) 1982 Citizenship Law stripped them of nationality. Since then, waves of forced displacement have followed.

The first major exodus occurred in 1978 under Operation Nagamin, forcing around 200,000 Rohingyas into Bangladesh. A second wave in 1991–92 under Operation Pyi Thaya added roughly 250,000 more. Smaller inflows of 10,000–15,000 followed communal violence in 2012, while the 2016 military crackdown displaced another 70,000.

The largest and fastest influx came after 25 August 2017, when more than 740,000 Rohingyas crossed into Bangladesh. As of late 2025, another 150,000 have entered. These successive waves reflect a systematic pattern of expulsion. Today, around 1.2 million Rohingyas anxiously await the chance to go home.

A repatriation process was meant to start in January 2018 following a bilateral agreement in November 2017. Myanmar was supposed to verify Rohingya identities, build reception facilities, and begin phased returns, while Bangladesh compiled verified lists and provided logistical support. Attempts were revisited in 2019 and 2023 but stalled due to security concerns, lack of guarantees, and Myanmar’s failure to create safe conditions.

Diplomacy Falters, Aid Dwindles

Following the political upheaval in Bangladesh, the interim government revived efforts to resolve the crisis. Bangladesh appointed Khalilur Rahman as its UN High Representative on Rohingya issues. Under the direct supervision of Professor Muhammad Yunus, UN Secretary-General António Guterres visited during Ramadan, where “Iftar diplomacy” was used to apply pressure. ASEAN-backed back-channel negotiations reportedly yielded an agreement for 180,000 returns, but no progress has materialised.

Meanwhile, Bangladesh struggles to sustain 33 camps in Cox’s Bazar—the world’s largest refugee settlement—amid a 63% humanitarian funding deficit. Ration cuts have intensified. Following USAID reductions, 48 health facilities were closed or scaled back, according to the International Rescue Committee. Nearly 300 children are diagnosed with malnutrition daily.

Last year, an appeal sought USD 85 million in additional funding for new arrivals but fell short. The 2025 Joint Response Plan—launched by the UN and Bangladesh government—requested USD 935 million for 1.48 million refugees and host communities. Yet implementation remains stalled.

Amid this bleak outlook, many Rohingyas attempt to blend into local communities, generating social tensions and security concerns.

What Lies Ahead?

Myanmar remains unprepared to ensure safe, voluntary and dignified repatriation. With no viable alternative, Bangladesh must continue hosting the Rohingyas despite limited resources, shrinking foreign assistance, and rising social and environmental pressures.

The most probable outcome is a prolonged stalemate where Rohingyas remain in Bangladesh with diminishing hope of return or resettlement—unless Myanmar fundamentally reforms its citizenship laws and political framework. Until then, Bangladesh bears the burden of sustaining a crisis without resolution.

(The author is a foreign policy and security analyst and educator who holds a postgraduate degree from the Department of International Relations, Rajshahi University, Bangladesh. Views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at alaminislamshuvo16@gmail.com)