China used both the ASEAN FTA and RCEP tariff concessions to enter the ASEAN market to make it a potential platform for sneaking into the Indian market through the ASEAN–India FTA.
In a media interview, Khandu strongly refuted Beijing’s territorial claims and emphasized Arunachal’s historical relationship with Tibet, a nation forcibly occupied by China in the 1950s. He pointed out that Arunachal Pradesh shares roughly 1,200 km of border with Tibet, around 100 km with Bhutan, and 550 km with Myanmar. His remarks were a pointed rebuttal to China’s repeated claims over Arunachal Pradesh, including renaming it as “Zangnan” or “South Tibet.”
The Tibetan diaspora must now take the lead in mobilizing global opinion. The Dalai Lama has issued a clarion call — not only to uphold Tibet’s spiritual and cultural values, but to defend the right of a people to decide their own destiny.
There are multiple reasons why the MEA doesn’t dare to say “no one except Dalai Lama can decide his successor”, some of which could include External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar fears getting snubbed during his coming visit to Beijing
China’s strategy for building a regional order in Central Asia converges with its playbook in sub-regions across the Global South, like Latin America, Africa and South Asia. The substance and optics of its Latin America Summit and Xi Jinping’s tour of Southeast Asia in the last few months reflect this strategy.
China used both the ASEAN FTA and RCEP tariff concessions to enter the ASEAN market to make it a potential platform for sneaking into the Indian market through the ASEAN–India FTA.
Sri Lanka is also allowing Chinese research vessels in its ports. China has big plans for the region, not just spy ships.
India’s inevitable regional and global leadership provides a welcome new opening for the country and the region in their security calculations. It remains the region’s most important Asian partner in providing the economic and security fallback that is based on values, trust and proven expectations.
Why no heads rolled for the surprises in 2020 with PLA exercising in Aksai Chin and a new road constructed five km short of Galwan?
The establishment of a second naval base in Lakshadweep, INS Jatayu is a key part of this strategy. It's a calculated move to counter China's influence in the Indian Ocean Region.
China has tried to set up a hybrid renewable energy system mixed with solar, wind, and other renewables on three islands in the Jaffna Peninsula. It was later cancelled. There is no economic reason for hosting such a project in a place so close to India.
Australia has succeeded in sending a strong message to both ASEAN and China. To ASEAN, Canberra has communicated its commitment both in economic and security terms. The keyword will be a free and open Indo-Pacific, which is in line with the overall security vision of the West.
The US meanwhile, remains resilient in its future demographic and economic growth projection and stability, alongside the prospects of India. The so-called rise of China is now reversing, and the perceived decline of the US and the West is not happening.
Among other things, the bill, which is now an act, dismisses as inaccurate the Chinese claim that Tibet has been part of China since ancient times and empowers the State Department to actively counter China’s disinformation about Tibetan history, people and institutions.
The critical mineral supply chain in the Indo-Pacific is undergoing transformative changes through new deals, reforms, and negotiations facilitated by the strategic partnership of QUAD.
The belligerence by the PLA also exposes the futility of continuing Corps Commander-level military-to-military talks when China has repeatedly indicated there will be no more PLA pullback.
Beijing might still use this election victory for President Tsai as a pretext to increase aggression and to justify that peaceful reunification is a lost cause, portraying the DPP as the cause of increasing cross-Strait tensions.
As traditional geopolitics transforms, with the Gulf regaining centrality in the larger Indo-Pacific arena, India, Japan, and Southeast Asia see their strategic perspectives increasingly converge. The Big-B plan has significant implications for India, Bangladesh's Look East policy, and Thailand's Look West policy.
It would be prudent to establish a joint working mechanism with Myanmar at the diplomatic and military levels for managing the borders - unless we want China to keep winning.
China and Russia have shown their support for Myanmar despite the dire situation there, and their interest in the region is evident by their growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal.