The 75th anniversary of India–China relations offers a rare diplomatic opening. In a world of strategic rivalry, climate change and air pollution represent a shared threat where national interests converge. Environmental cooperation provides a low-politics entry point for rebuilding trust—through joint work on crop-residue management, high-density air-monitoring networks, and clean-energy transitions. Moreover, the Himalayan region—the planet’s “Third Pole”—is acutely vulnerable to black carbon and atmospheric pollutants from both sides of the border. Cooperation on air quality is therefore an act of Himalayan stewardship, protecting the water security of over a billion people.
At the same time, MBS has skilfully leveraged China as a strategic counterweight, signalling that any American hesitation could push Riyadh towards deeper military and technological cooperation with Beijing—an outcome the United States would prefer to avoid. China has already become Saudi Arabia’s largest trading partner, while the United States remains its primary arms supplier and security guarantor.
If Taiwan were to fall, Japan’s security architecture would be fundamentally compromised. The First Island Chain would fracture, opening a northern pathway for Beijing toward Okinawa and Kyushu. Takaichi recognised this reality and voiced what many regional strategists have long acknowledged: Japan has little choice but to act, even at the cost of Beijing’s displeasure.
Reincarnation in Tibetan Buddhism is a profound spiritual process determined by the enlightened intentions of the deceased master and recognized through visions, prophecies, dreams, and unmistakable signs - not through the drawing of lots. The historical record is unequivocal: Tibet consistently regarded the Golden Urn as an external political imposition and avoided it whenever authentic spiritual evidence was present.
It was against this backdrop that the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Sri Lanka engaged with the fisherfolk communities in Northern Sri Lanka. During then Fisheries Minister Douglas Devananda’s visit to China—which coincided with the tenth anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—China pledged Rs. 1.5 billion (Sri Lankan rupees) to bolster the fisheries sector in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
The world, including the USA, too can’t suppress or coerce China militarily or with sanctions and tariffs. The raw fact is that China unilaterally dominates the world supply chain. To be counted, India needs to step up and become relevant in this supply chain
Fulfilling vital strategic/security imperatives for rapid military deployment against China and Pakistan and enhancing regional connectivity for the benefit of people of many border states, the distribution of the 75 projects is - 19 in Jammu & Kashmir, 11 in Ladakh, 18 in Arunachal Pradesh, 9 in Uttarakhand, 6 in Sikkim, 5 in Himachal Pradesh, 2 each in West Bengal and Rajasthan and one each in Nagaland, Mizoram, and Andaman & Nicobar Islands.
Observers speculate that a key focus of discussions in Beijing will be the purported ban on Chinese “research vessels” entering Sri Lankan ports that India wants. During his visit to New Delhi, President Dissanayake promised that not an inch of Sri Lankan territory would be given for any activity that could be considered inimical to India.
The difference between the Chinese and Indian approaches is stark. While China is engaged in a frenzied military modernisation, the Indian defence establishment is absorbed in building statues, replacing iconic paintings and seeking mythological solutions to its current and future threats. Indian defence capability development has languished for too long. It needs to be in ‘mission mode’ in 2025.
One very significant development which the media seems to have missed is that on 2 September 2024, Adani Enterprises, the flagship company of the Adani Group, one of India's largest business conglomerates, established a subsidiary in Shanghai called Adani Energy Resources (Shanghai) Co. (AERCL).
As part of the greater strategic pitch, the Indo-Pacific is likely to witness heightened competition among major powers, with alliances and partnerships playing a critical role. Economic initiatives are expected to intertwine with strategic goals, as seen in projects like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).Regional forums like ASEAN, the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) will remain vital for dialogue and stability.
Many rising powers including India, which the US is counting on along with Japan, Australia, South Korea to deal with China in the Indo-Pacific, have robust and strong commercial ties with China which they can not easily jeopardize only because the US feels threatened by the rise of China. Even the European Union is economically entrenched with China and the EU would not upset China beyond a certain threshold.
One such opportunity lies in the realm of electric vehicles (EVs). Both India and China are on the cusp of transformative shifts in transportation, and the adoption of EVs could play a pivotal role in sustainable development and poverty alleviation in India. As India considers domestic EV manufacturing in collaboration with Chinese companies such as BYD, Leapmotor, and NIO, the potential for job creation, trade, and technology transfer is enormous. Chinese expertise in EV technology could help India meet its ambitious environmental goals while bolstering economic growth.
In such a scenario, closer engagement with Beijing, does not mean that New Delhi needs to abandon its call for open sea lanes and unhindered movement through the South China Seas, or its support to QUAD, or participate in the naval exercises in the Pacific, or disown His Holiness the Dalai Lama, or break trade and other contacts with Taiwan, to name a few. Each is critical to crafting India's foreign and security policy towards China, the ASEAN, and the Indo-Pacific.
Trump's strategic motivations would likely involve promoting a pro-American government in Dhaka, with Modi playing a role in shaping Bangladesh’s political future. This could open up avenues for joint Indo-US ventures in Bangladesh, possibly even enabling American companies to facilitate energy projects connecting Nepal’s hydropower resources through India to Bangladesh.
China has sought to grab this crucial mining opportunity due to the absence of major power competition in Afghanistan. Beijing's previous efforts were foiled but currently it is the only major power willing to make a bet on the Taliban government. In 2023, the official mining deal was signed between Afghan Deputy PM for Economic Affairs Abdul Ghani Baradar and Chinese Ambassador Zhao Xing. Both view this project as the start of a new era of economic and trade cooperation between the two countries.
Oli is scheduled to China after November 15. The primary discussion will likely be on speeding up the BRI as well as economic cooperation between the two nations. Beijing will do its best to draw Nepal deeper into its strategic sphere and further a joint approach in dealing with India to further China’s national interests.
It is not possible for India to follow the China model of governance of less political freedom and more economic freedom. Yet, the present government may be well advised to implement pending reforms like land, labor, and judicial at the earliest.
