As far as China is concerned, the so-called buffer zones are now a permanent arrangement and it knows India can do precious little about it. That is why China has been saying keep the border issue separate and get on with the bilateral relations.
One such opportunity lies in the realm of electric vehicles (EVs). Both India and China are on the cusp of transformative shifts in transportation, and the adoption of EVs could play a pivotal role in sustainable development and poverty alleviation in India. As India considers domestic EV manufacturing in collaboration with Chinese companies such as BYD, Leapmotor, and NIO, the potential for job creation, trade, and technology transfer is enormous. Chinese expertise in EV technology could help India meet its ambitious environmental goals while bolstering economic growth.
In such a scenario, closer engagement with Beijing, does not mean that New Delhi needs to abandon its call for open sea lanes and unhindered movement through the South China Seas, or its support to QUAD, or participate in the naval exercises in the Pacific, or disown His Holiness the Dalai Lama, or break trade and other contacts with Taiwan, to name a few. Each is critical to crafting India's foreign and security policy towards China, the ASEAN, and the Indo-Pacific.
Trump's strategic motivations would likely involve promoting a pro-American government in Dhaka, with Modi playing a role in shaping Bangladesh’s political future. This could open up avenues for joint Indo-US ventures in Bangladesh, possibly even enabling American companies to facilitate energy projects connecting Nepal’s hydropower resources through India to Bangladesh.
As far as China is concerned, the so-called buffer zones are now a permanent arrangement and it knows India can do precious little about it. That is why China has been saying keep the border issue separate and get on with the bilateral relations.
Melaka is also seen as a possible counterbalancing base against potential power presence in the Nicobar Island chain in the Andaman Sea and as a fallback in complementing China's existing forward bases and port capacities in Gwadar in Pakistan and in linking up with the other routes in accessing the Indian Ocean.
The Indian government has no answer to the question that if we have not lost any territory, then why the 20 rounds of military-to-military talks?
The organisation of the Forum a few kilometres away from the eastern sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) not only signalled Beijing’s disregard for the LAC but also its attempt to buttress its claims over Arunachal as part of Tibet (Xizang) by selecting the venue of the international meeting in Nyingchi
The conflict of interest between India and China on the political front is likely to continue for a long time to come, with China’s territorial greed being what it is. However, business dealings between both countries must continue since such business is of mutual interest to both India and China.
India will do well to initiate the SWAMs and build a nuanced acoustic capacity and capability-building initiative nationally and at the regional level. The Security And Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) vision of India will be better served with an effective implementation of the UDA framework on the ground.
The debt phenomenon is so significant that nearly half the African Union member states are in debt – mostly to the state-owned banks of China. Countries in South America and Asia are also being caught up in this debt slide. While the New Delhi G20 summit only appealed to countries to address this serious debt issue, that China is now being seen as a part of the problem seems to be hanging over it like a Sword of Damocles.
Given the growing power differentials and China’s global hegemonic ambitions, it is observed that Xi attends mega events where his country has some clout and skips those that could put China in a tight spot and raise questions related to its accountability and responsibility.
India is increasingly being courted by the US-led West as a bulwark to Beijing, and China will want to send a two-pronged message to Delhi and Washington as well as regional neighbours that Beijing still holds the economic and security upper hand, although its economic credentials have taken a serious hit.
Facing encroaching Chinese naval presence and power projections in the Pacific Island states on its eastern flank, and an assertive bid by Beijing to challenge the naval presence of Delhi and Washington in the Indian Ocean to its western flank, Australia is faced with its highest threat level in decades.
In the last decade, one has observed repeated and serious attempts by Chinese research vessels to collect data in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The year 2018, saw 24 research cruises by Chinese vessels in the IOR, whereas during the same period six other nations, including US, India, France and others, have undertaken only 26 such cruises in the IOR.
Indian media may do any amount of spin doctoring, including claiming that the bilateral meeting was requested by the Chinese side, but the noteworthy issue is that none of the two Chinese statements mention disengagement and de-escalation.
The influence of China and its grip on the region remain a predominant factor that has divided ASEAN. One-sided economic dependence on Beijing and the fear of inciting its potential wrath and economic retaliation and potential hard-power measures have stymied the full capacity of the region in managing regional power parity.
Maritime security and stability remain of utmost importance to both Brunei and Malaysia, and Brunei has enhanced its preparedness in this regard by joining the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) maritime exercise with the US.
This gradual decline of the environment - with disastrous consequences for the region including northeastern India and Bangladesh - cannot be arrested without the cooperation of the military rulers who are neck-deep in corruption and self-aggrandizement.