India may not match the United States or China in total refining capacity, but its sophisticated refining infrastructure, crude-processing flexibility, and export capability give it an important place in the global energy system. 

Remittances have become an unusually large source of external finance for South Asia. But a development model in which workers migrate because domestic employment is inadequate, and then send income home to support domestic consumption, cannot indefinitely substitute for creating productive employment at home.

In 2025, Sri Lanka was ranked as the second most expensive housing market in the world based on rentals compared to average income. It is possible that market distortions caused by black economy and corruption have contributed to this. 

The larger opportunity before West Bengal is therefore not another round of infrastructure creation in isolation. It is the creation of an ecosystem in which infrastructure, private capital, local enterprise and skilled labour reinforce one another. 

Why not begin by reopening serious discussions with Chinese conglomerate BYD about an Indian factory? BYD is now one of the world’s dominant EV manufacturers. Its Indian ambitions were caught in the post-Galwan investment freeze. Invite it back to the table—but on Indian terms

But the choice test applies to India as much as to the countries it hopes will follow its lead. If BRICS genuinely widens India's menu of markets, technology partners and financing sources without deepening its dependence on any one of them, it becomes a credible model for the rest of the Global South.

India’s stand for a dollar-based system is not a rejection of BRICS alignment or unity, but it is a determined choice to act in favour of self-interest like any other founding member. The key difference is India’s position has been the most transparent of all founding members rather than standing behind the collective rhetoric.

The evidence indicates that the increase in state borrowing over the past decade is best understood as the outcome of a changing fiscal federal system rather than simply an expansion of welfare politics.

For India, delays in its strategic projects are not merely bureaucratic setbacks but a matter of national security. Colombo’s motives remain opaque, but for New Delhi, a presence in Sri Lanka’s North and East is non-negotiable. 

India could potentially become a bridge between regional economies and the wider Asian and Global South payment architecture. Greater interoperability could support remittances, tourism, trade and financial inclusion while reducing some transaction costs.

Critical minerals are not literally the new oil, but they may play a comparable role in defining the balance of power. The race has already begun, and India’s preparedness will determine whether it merely secures access to the resources of the new century or helps shape the industrial order that emerges from them.

Afghanistan has sought to limit or reduce its structural vulnerability by moving trade through Iran’s Chabahar Port and Central Asian corridors. Kabul is realigning Afghanistan’s external economic geography by looking towards Iran, Central Asia, China and India.

The current rise in Indian sugar prices is the result of several factors rather than ethanol alone. Lower-than-expected production—from an initial estimate of 343 LMT to about 306 LMT—is central to the supply concern. Weather damage, disease, festival demand, global prices and market speculation have added to the pressure.

Chabahar will not transform Türkiye–India relations. It can, however, show whether two countries with serious political disagreements are capable of making one difficult commercial route work.

Sri Lankan economy is heading for a phase of slower growth due to neoliberal policy framework. Policy planners must rethink the suitability of neoliberal policies for a small developing country like Sri Lanka.