In September 2001, Hamid Karzai crossed the border into Afghanistan’s Kandahar province from Pakistan, accompanied by just three unarmed associates on motorbikes, to rally the tribal rebellion against the Taliban in the rural Kandahar belt. He would later become the leader of Afghanistan, as Americans invaded the country and toppled the Taliban regime. 

Almost 20 years later, on 17 August 2021, another leader--this time from the other side of the political spectrum-- crossed the same border into Afghanistan, who now appears set to become the new leader of the very same country. 

Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the co-founder and deputy leader of the Taliban, the Islamic insurgent group which seized power in Afghanistan last week, set foot--for the first time in the last 20 years--in Kandahar, the southern province of the war-torn country, considered as the birthplace of the Taliban movement. 

He, along with other senior Doha-based Taliban leaders, first reached Pakistan by a Qatari Air Force plane and then reached Kandahar.

In 2001, Baradar, who was then defense minister in the Taliban regime, fled Pakistan after initial talks with Hamid Karzai for a formal surrender and a general amnesty for the group’s leaders broke down, ultimately paving the pay way for the brutal insurgency by the group that would rage for the next twenty years.    

Considered as a relative moderate in the hardline Sunni Islamist group, Baradar led the talks with the US and signed the Doha agreement, resulting in the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, and the subsequent collapse of the US-backed Afghan government. Apart from being a successful military commander, he is known for his sharp political acumen.

As the group secured the decisive victory over the US-backed Afghan government, what is little known to the world is the fact that he had not initially envisioned ending the war in the way it actually ended last week: the total collapse of the government. 

While in Pakistan, he was arrested by Pakistan authorities in 2010 and had spent almost eight years in a Pakistani prison. At the time, he was the top Taliban leader, heading the group’s insurgency from hiding in Pakistan. Given his tall stature in the group, Islamabad sold his arrest as proof of their cooperation with Americans in the war against the Taliban at a time when it was being called out for playing a double game.  

However, the ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence agency, reportedly bailed him out when it got wind of his secret talks with Karzai, who was Afghan president at the time. Karzai’s initiated contacts with some of the top Taliban leaders which excluded the ISI as well as Americans. 

It was the time when American troops surged and bloody battles with the Taliban were raging in Afghan villages by American and NATO troops--something Karzai had long been warning against, arguing, though rightly, it would only fuel the sympathy for the Taliban cause. Meanwhile, he went ahead, initiating talks with the Taliban for a negotiated settlement in total secrecy. 

“We picked up Baradar and others because they were trying to make a deal without us,” a Pakistan intelligence officer was quoted as saying by The New York Times. “We protect the Taliban. They are dependent. We are not going to allow them to make a deal with Karzai and the Indians,” the officer added. 
 
Later, when the war became untenable for the Americans, they asked Pakistan in 2018 to release Baradar to secure a deal for a way out. Fifteen months after his release, on 29 September 2020, he gave the US what they wanted: a secure withdrawal. 

Ties between the Taliban and Pakistan have never been smooth. The latter has been accused of torturing, jailing, and in some cases even killing several Taliban leaders who refused to toe Pakistan's line. 

Although the complete victory has given him an upper hand, Baradar will still have to battle factions like Haqqanis within the group, which will most probably push forward the interests of Islamabad aggressively. 

As Baradar entered Afghanistan, like Karzai in 2001, the challenges before him--from forming a stable and ‘inclusive’ government to provide governance--are no less. However, that similarity ends here. He is now faced with the uphill task of seeking legitimacy for his future government from the international community and assuring the entire post-Taliban generation--which is yet to reconcile with the new reality and constitutes 80 percent of the total population.