On 10 November, after nearly a decade, India witnessed its first major terror attack in the heartland, beginning in the national capital, killing 13 people and injuring more than 20. The largest bomb strike since the 2006 Mumbai train bombings has blurred what were once clear red lines on terrorism against India. The Red Fort blast must be viewed as a serious warning—possibly the beginning of a new phase of jihad targeting India—marked by several significant shifts in the terror cycle.

A New Shift in Terror Strategy

Three key shifts emerge from the horrific attack in Delhi.

First, terror “gloves are off.” The audacity to strike India’s heartland—a pattern common in the early to mid-2000s—had diminished after 2014 as the focus shifted to Kashmir. Its return is alarming.

Second, the tone and nature of terror modules have changed. Earlier, attacks were directly claimed by outfits or splinter groups that recruited openly and took responsibility.

Third, the present trend reflects greater complexity and silence. No terror outfit has claimed the Red Fort attack. This suggests an evolving form of subversive terrorism—blending direct and indirect methods such as sabotage, institutional infiltration, front groups, kidnappings, and targeted assassinations.

Echoes Of IM–SIMI Era

This shift recalls the pattern seen with the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), where radicalisation centred on youth and students, who formed the core of these organisations. Both groups targeted urban centres and executed high-impact serial bombings to create maximum shock.

SIMI—originally set up for religious education and reform—radicalised along communal lines during the 1990s and early 2000s. Inspired partly by the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the organisation rejected secularism and democracy. About 90% of its members were university-educated youth and the group supported extremist ideologies through violent “social” activism.

Following the ban on SIMI, it received support from external groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Bangladesh-based Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami. This support facilitated the emergence of the Indian Mujahideen in 2003. It ushered in a new phase of indirect attack methods, where the main outfit enabled bombings without direct involvement.

The ISI’s infamous Karachi Project used LeT and other groups to train Indian youth. They were indoctrinated, trained in IED construction using locally available materials, and deployed into Indian cities—with the aim of leaving no visible Pakistani footprint and creating a band of radicalised Indian Muslims. This method fuelled the bombings in Jaipur, Pune, and Ahmedabad (2005–2010).

The cases of Sayed Zabiuddin Ansari (Abu Hamza)—who taught Hindi to the 26/11 attackers and relayed instructions via VoIP—and Yasin Bhatkal, co-founder of IM and perpetrator of multiple blasts, illustrate this pattern.

Spotters played a key role by identifying vulnerable youth—often blue-collar workers—whose grievances could be exploited for radicalisation.

Rise Of White-Collar Terror

For perhaps the first time in India’s terror landscape, an entire module of white-collar, professionally educated recruits appears to have carried out a major attack. This marks a disturbing evolution in terror strategy.

This new phase involves a hybrid of indirect and inspired terrorism, where online propaganda by groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed and LeT motivates self-radicalised individuals—often lone wolves—to execute attacks.

The involvement of four doctors, one of whom allegedly executed the Red Fort blast, indicates a model that blends 'inspired' radicalisation with limited external facilitation. Interactions with certain outfits, Kashmiri terror commanders, and external handlers—if confirmed—point to an infrastructure that encourages attacks while maintaining plausible deniability.

The danger lies in the lone-wolf precedent.

• The 2016 Nice truck attack was perpetrated by a lone radicalised individual; ISIS later claimed it.

• Conversely, the 2017 Stockholm truck attack was carried out by a self-radicalised man without any subsequent ISIS claim, at a time when the group was under military pressure.

This illustrates a new model of terror where external groups inspire action but remain silent.

Pakistan’s Evolving Terror Blueprint

Pakistan’s ISI appears to be transforming the so-called Karachi Project into a more advanced and covert operation. The emerging hybrid strategy gives terror groups:

• Plausible deniability

• High-impact strike capability, including bombings and lone-wolf attacks

• Institutional infiltration through skilled operatives

• Minimal exposure to retaliation, since direct organisational links are harder to prove

The likely modus operandi is simple: execute attacks, avoid claiming responsibility, and trigger radicalisation within India—recreating the IM-era chaos but with fewer human assets and virtually no traceable network. If this pattern crystallises, India will face a new and more elusive form of jihad, one that may not be easily deterred through kinetic responses alone.

India must therefore expand its counter-terrorism approach to include non-kinetic measures—counter-radicalisation, digital monitoring, ideological disruption, and community-based resilience—to prevent and dismantle emerging terror ecosystems.

(The author is a national security analyst specialising in intelligence and security analysis with experience at leading think tanks. Views are personal. He can be contacted at srijansharma12@gmail.com)