One Nation, One Election: Staggered electoral cycle important safeguard of India’s federal structure
The leitmotif of ‘One Nation’ is strongly aligned with the BJP’s policy and rhetoric; consider the 2017 introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (‘One Nation, One Tax’) and the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019 (‘One Nation, One Constitution’). The ONOE falls within this inherent paradigm: an overpowering centre under the guise of administrative cost-cutting and electoral efficiency.
One Nation One Election (ONOE) is a constitutional amendment bill to hold parliament and state assembly elections together. It has been cleared by the Union Cabinet and is expected to be tabled by the law Minister in the Lok Sabha, before being sent to a parliamentary committee for wider consultation. Articles 83(2) and 17(1) of the Indian Constitution provide for normal terms of five years for the Lok Sabha, the lower house of parliament, and state legislative assemblies respectively, which currently take place through staggered electoral cycles.
However, under ONOE, Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha and state assembly elections would occur simultaneously. In essence, voters will cast their votes for all three institutional tiers on (ideally) the same date(s). This is in opposition to the current scenario wherein a voter casts his vote to elect members of the Lok Sabha and state assembly as and when their respective terms are about to expire.
Despite how contentious ONOE is in the current political landscape, simultaneous elections are not new to India. Following the adoption of the Constitution, Lok Sabha and state legislative assembly elections were conducted simultaneously from the 1951-1967 election cycles. This synchrony was disrupted during the fourth round of Lok Sabha elections and has continued ever since. Currently, India experiences between five to seven state assembly elections yearly in a staggered fashion which functions to preserve its federalism.
Threat to India’s fragile federalism
India’s federal identity has always been precarious, often referred to as "quasi federalism" or "a unitary state with federal features". This is exemplified by the disproportionate powers associated with the Centre (central government), such as President’s Rule (Section 365 of the Constitution) which allows the Centre to dissolve state governments. This mechanism was used extensively - 39 times in between 1966 and 1977- by Indira Gandhi’s government against opposition-party ruled state governments. Moreover, the Centre holds the power to arbitrarily revoke constitutionally guaranteed special statuses, as seen in the abrogation of Jammu and Kashmir’s special status in 2019, and draw or redraw state boundaries.
This precarious nature of federalism in India makes it more important than ever to retain electoral mechanisms that preserve a distinction between the state and the centre. The proposed ONOE is a threat to the already vulnerable and deeply encroached state of India’s federal identity.
The ruling BJP has consistently advocated for ONOE in its election manifestos since 2015 but this is the first time it has been actively pursued. However, the leitmotif of ‘One Nation’ is strongly aligned with the BJP’s policy and rhetoric; consider the 2017 introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (‘One Nation, One Tax’) and the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019 (‘One Nation, One Constitution’). The ONOE falls within this inherent paradigm: an overpowering centre under the guise of administrative cost-cutting and electoral efficiency.
Distinction between national, state polls
Staggered elections are a key unifying feature across federalisms globally. For example, the USA and Germany intentionally maintain a staggered electoral system to enforce checks and balances on the federal government. Political scientist Orit Kedar[1] demonstrates how the staggered institutional elections in Germany create a mechanism by which voters use regional elections to counteract federal power. All federal cycles between 1965 to 2002 (cumulative of 117 elections) display a broad pattern of parties in the governing coalition in the Bundestag losing votes in the following state elections in the same states where they performed well a couple months prior - with the exception of the 1969 cycle. This shows a voter tendency - conscious or unconscious - to strive to maintain a balance between federal dominance and federated dominance.
To some extent, the Indian electorate seems to display a similar preference for such a federal identity. Christopher Jafferlot, political scientist, notes that the BJP’s success at the national level elections tends to be met with lack of domination in state legislatures elections. The BJP failed to win any major state election between 2017 and 2019, despite its landslide electoral victory on the national level. In 2018, it was unable to win Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Telangana[2]. These examples are a clear indication of the Indian voters’ ability to compartmentalise their preferences at the union and at the state level. While they voted for the BJP at the national level, they preferred to have regional parties conduct state level affairs. While voters in 2019 were able to differentiate their preferences at the national and state level, if all state legislature elections took place simultaneously with the Lok Sabha, voters could invariably conflate the two elections and not display split voting preferences.
Electoral reform or political gameplan?
Indeed, recent trends have shown that when simultaneous elections take place, the phenomenon of ‘split voting’ tends to disappear, with the parties who won Lok Sabha seats going on to win the legislative elections as well. In the June 2024 elections, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Sikkim, and Arunachal pradesh all reflected this trend, with only a single percentage point range in the vote shares at the national and state level. For example, in Andhra Pradesh the NDA won 55% of the vote in assembly polls and 54% in Lok Sabha elections while the YSR congress party won 39% and 40% respectively.[3]
Through simultaneous elections, the ability of voters to compartmentalise regional and national issues is diminished, leading them to conflate the two tiers of elections. Without adequately understanding the distinctions between national and state elections, voter behaviour may be geared to vote for the same party in both.
It is important to see through the ''logistical'' rationalisation of the ONOE as an electoral reform and recognise its alignment with BJP’s political attempts to form a more centralized, unitary state structure. Preserving a staggered electoral system is an important safeguard for India’s federal structure and regional governance.
(The author is a third year political science student at National University of Singapore. Views expressed are personal. She can be reached at www.linkedin.com/in/ishani-patil-7b2455209.)
Sources
https://legalaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/simultaneous_elections/NITI_AYOG_REPORT_2017.pdf
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379405000673
https://www.ndtv.com/opinion/who-will-benefit-from-one-nation-one-election-7260914
[1] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379405000673
[2]https://www.institutmontaigne.org/ressources/pdfs/blog/indian-federalism-under-modi-theory-practice-policy-brief.pdf
[3] https://www.ndtv.com/opinion/who-will-benefit-from-one-nation-one-election-7260914
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