Pakistan is pursuing a series of strategic interests in Afghanistan. These include countering India’s influence in Afghanistan, accessing Central Asia through Afghanistan territory, establishing a subservient state in Kabul, securing access to water from rivers originating in Afghanistan and flowing into Pakistan, countering Pashtun nationalism through the Islamization of Pashtun society on both sides of the Durand Line, neutralizing Afghanistan’s claims over the Durand Line, and establishing strategic depth in Afghanistan.

To achieve these objectives, Pakistan has used a range of strategies, from soft to hard policies. Pakistan’s policy toward Afghanistan can be divided into two phases. The first phase spans from 1947 to 1979, during which Pakistan, as a newly formed nation-state, sought to achieve its goals through soft policies. However, during this period, Afghanistan was politically and militarily stable, providing limited opportunities for Pakistan to employ hard policies. 

Instability began when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and the West began supporting Afghanistan Mujahideen fighting against the Soviet Army and the pro-Soviet state in Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion marked the beginning of the second phase of Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy, which continued until 2021. During this time, Pakistan sought to secure its interests through the use of hard policies.

Pakistan's role in Taliban's creation

During the Soviet invasion, Pakistan became a safe haven for anti-Soviet forces. These forces were divided into seven factions, each with varying degrees of relationships with Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies. Among these factions, Jamiat-e-Islami (Islamic Society), led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party), led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, were the two most prominent groups. Pakistan maintained varying levels of ties with these factions, with Hizb-e-Islami being the closest to Pakistan’s military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

The Afghan-Soviet war lasted for a decade (1979 – 1989), during which hundreds of thousands of people lost their lives, and many more were left disabled or paralyzed. The country’s infrastructure was devastated, leaving Afghanistan in ruin. In 1989, the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan, and in 1992, the pro-Soviet government was overthrown by the Mujahideen. Following the collapse of the Communist regime in Kabul, the Mujahideen formed a government. However, internal conflicts among the Mujahideen factions, along with Pakistan’s dissatisfaction over Ahmad Shah Massoud and Burhanuddin Rabbani—prominent figures from the Tajik ethnic group—gaining control in Kabul, led to a civil war.

The civil war eventually resulted in the emergence of a new movement in 1994, known as the Taliban, originating from the south of the country. The Taliban, composed of madrassa students, promised to end the civil war and restore law and order in Afghanistan. The Taliban movement was indeed a brainchild of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). When Pakistan’s military establishment lost hope in Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s ability to capture Kabul from Massoud and Rabbani, they supported the formation of this new group, drawing on Afghan-Soviet war veterans, and called them the Taliban. The Taliban proved more effective than Hekmatyar’s forces, taking control of Kabul in 1996 and driving Massoud and Rabbani’s forces into the northern part of the country.

Despite their success in marginalizing the Kabul regime, the Taliban failed to gain widespread international recognition due to their radical policies, connections to al-Qaeda, and extensive human rights and women’s rights violations. The only states that recognized the Taliban regime (1996-2001) were Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

During the first Taliban rule (1996-2001), Pakistan achieved some of its strategic objectives in Afghanistan, though not all. The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 marked a setback for Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy. However, despite the Taliban’s removal from power, Pakistan did not lose confidence in the group. Instead, it allowed Taliban leaders and commanders to enter Pakistani territory and take refuge in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This policy enabled the Taliban to rebuild their military strength with Pakistani support and initiate an insurgency in Afghanistan.

Surge in terrorist violence

The Taliban’s resurgence began in 2003 and continued until 2021. In August 2021, history appeared to repeat itself as the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan, and the Kabul regime was overthrown by Taliban militants. One of the main reasons for the Taliban’s return to power was Pakistan’s ambiguous policy toward Afghanistan. Had Pakistan prevented Taliban leaders and commanders from entering its territory in 2001 and continuing their anti-state activities, Afghanistan situation might be different today. Unfortunately, Pakistan’s policy not only allowed the Taliban to regroup but ultimately enabled their return to power.

Since the return of the Taliban to power on august 2021, there was a belief that Pakistan had achieved its objectives in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s control not only marginalized India, Pakistan’s primary rival in Afghanistan, but was also expected to provide Pakistan with strategic depth. Additionally, Taliban control was anticipated to stabilize Pakistan’s northern border and mitigate the threats posed by the TTP and Baloch separatist groups. However, contrary to these expectations, the Taliban’s return has not stabilized Pakistan’s northern border; instead, it has led to a worsening security situation, particularly in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.

Since their return, terrorist violence has surged in these areas to unprecedented levels. According to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), terrorist activities in Pakistan increased by 27 percent in 2022 and 17 percent in 2023 compared to the period before the Taliban’s takeover. In 2023 alone, 87 percent of the attacks were attributed to groups such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Tehrik-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP), Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). In total, 306 terrorist incidents occurred in Pakistan in 2023, including 23 suicide bombings, resulting in the deaths of 330 security personnel, 260 civilians, and 193 militants, with 1,124 others injured. These figures represent a 17 percent increase in terrorist attacks in Pakistan.

Furthermore, monthly security reports for 2024 indicate continued escalation in terrorist violence. PIPS data shows that Pakistan witnessed 325 terrorist attacks from January to August 2024 alone. In August 2024, 59 incidents of terrorist violence led to the deaths of 84 individuals. These numbers once again highlight a troubling rise in violence across the country.

Trapped in a strategic dilemma

Given this situation, Pakistan has not only failed to secure strategic depth in Afghanistan but has instead found itself trapped in a strategic dilemma. The Taliban have not cooperated with Pakistan in neutralizing the TTP and have consistently denied the TTP’s presence in Afghanistan, despite evidence indicating the group’s activity in the border areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This cooperation extends beyond providing safe havens; security reports from institutions such as PIPS indicate that some Taliban members from their suicide units have joined TTP ranks and carried out suicide attacks against the Pakistani military in Waziristan and other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This demonstrates a close collaboration between the Taliban and the TTP.

The foundation of the Taliban-TTP alliance is ideological, as both groups adhere to the Deobandi interpretation of Islam and seek to establish a state governed by their version of Sharia law. However, their bond is also rooted in ethnicity, as both the Taliban and TTP primarily belong to the Pashtun community. This shared background has made the Taliban and TTP strategic allies. Previously, the TTP fought alongside the Taliban, and now the Taliban are supporting the TTP against the Pakistani government.

In fact, it is the Taliban and TTP who have gained strategic depth across Pakistan and Afghanistan, marking them as the true victors of the 20-year war in Afghanistan, not Pakistan.

(The author is a Ph.D Scholar, Department of Defence and National Security Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh. Views are personal. He can be contacted at zahidaria12@gmail.com )